Monarchy & Republic in the Laboratory of History by N. Fakhr - HTML preview

From an Empirical Pattern to a New Hypothesis: “New or Modern Monarchy”

Thus far, we have seen that monarchies have outperformed republics, on average, not only in the indicators examined under welfare and security, but also in Regulatory Quality, where they have achieved substantially higher rankings. More precisely, monarchies have, on average, performed better in formulating and implementing policies and regulations that support private-sector activity and economic development.

This latest finding, at least at first glance, appears inconsistent with what is commonly expected of republics. In republics, executive officials and members of legislative bodies are elected, directly or indirectly, by the people. One might therefore expect policies and regulations, more than under any other form of government, to be designed in the public interest and to improve citizens’ lives. Historically, by contrast, monarchies were often associated with extensive privileges for royal families, aristocrats, landowners, religious authorities, and supporters of the court, while the broader population in many past monarchical societies enjoyed far fewer rights and privileges.

This brings us to a fundamental question:

When, and through what transformations, did monarchies that once looked like that come to look like this?

In the scientific method, observations can lead us to formulate an explanatory hypothesis. We must then derive testable implications from that hypothesis and examine them against independent data. A hypothesis remains viable so long as new evidence does not falsify it; and the more demanding and diverse the tests it survives, the greater our confidence in its explanatory power.

The data examined so far are still insufficient to establish a causal relationship between the form of government and national performance. Yet the recurring pattern in the results makes it reasonable to formulate a new hypothesis. This hypothesis seeks to explain why many contemporary monarchies, contrary to the historical image of monarchy, have performed favorably in several important areas of governance.

To understand this transformation, we must first return to the economic and political structure of the premodern world.

In an era before industry, technology, and trade existed on anything like their present scale, a large share of human production and wealth depended on land and what could be produced from it. Land was not merely an economic asset; it was also the principal source of income, taxation, labor, and military power. Usually, control of land also entailed control over the peasants or laborers who worked it. The more land a person controlled, the greater his wealth and influence generally were. Under such conditions, one way for a monarch to increase power and wealth was to expand the realm and acquire new territories.

Monarchs could not administer all these territories directly. In many preindustrial societies, therefore, portions of land—or rights to the income generated by them—were granted to military commanders, princes, aristocrats, and landowners. Such grants could be temporary or hereditary, and in return the holder was expected to pay taxes or tribute, provide military forces, and support the monarch in times of war.

This system took different forms in different parts of the world, and its various manifestations should not be treated as identical. Yet across many of them—from parts of Europe to the Middle East and East Asia—the central government depended on landed classes to administer territory, collect taxes, and supply soldiers. This dependence compelled monarchs to grant them extensive legal, economic, and political privileges.

As a result, laws were often structured in favor of aristocrats and landowners. In some societies, peasants lacked freedom to move, change occupations, own property, or choose where to live, and were legally or economically tied to the land they worked. Many important governmental and military offices were also, either formally or in practice, reserved for aristocrats and the upper classes.

Alongside landowners, religious institutions also played an important role in legitimizing royal power. In many ancient monarchies, religious authorities portrayed the monarch’s rule as divinely sanctioned and obedience to the monarch as a religious duty. In return, the state recognized privileges for religious institutions, including tax exemptions, land ownership, judicial autonomy, or exemption from certain public obligations.

In this way, stratified societies emerged in which different social classes possessed different legal rights and obligations. The law did not necessarily apply equally to everyone; family status, land ownership, religious affiliation, and proximity to the royal court could determine the extent of an individual’s rights.

Monarchs, of course, were not always entirely satisfied with this arrangement. The same aristocrats and landowners who supplied the state with military and financial resources could become rivals to the monarch when central authority weakened. They sometimes fought one another, defied the government, or even attempted to seize the throne. For this reason, many monarchs sought to reduce the power of local aristocracies, centralize military and taxation systems, and bring the administration of the country more directly under the control of the central government.

These efforts were not always sustainable. Weak communications, limited administrative capacity, and the difficulty of controlling vast territories often forced governments to become dependent once again on local powers. In many periods, sharing power with landowners was the easiest—or the only practicable—way to govern the realm.

Within such a structure, the monarch was often a conqueror, or the heir of a conqueror, who regarded the country as the property of his dynasty. Its territory, resources, and population were primarily instruments for maintaining power, securing wealth, perpetuating the dynasty, and expanding the realm. The people were not yet “equal citizens,” but subjects who supplied the government with labor, taxes, and soldiers.

With the growth of industry, technology, trade, and urbanization, however, this structure gradually changed. Land did not cease to have economic importance, but it lost its monopoly as the principal source of wealth and power. Capital, industry, knowledge, technology, trade, finance, and skilled human resources became new sources of wealth creation. Government revenue, too, no longer came primarily from land and agricultural production; economic activity in cities, companies, industries, and expanding markets became increasingly important sources of taxation.

The organization of armies also changed. Central governments became capable of maintaining standing armies and more systematic administrative and taxation systems, reducing their dependence on the military forces of local aristocrats. Advances in communications, education, bureaucracy, and technology likewise made more direct administration and control of the country possible.

Alongside these transformations, the source of monarchical legitimacy also changed. The doctrine of the divine right of kings, at least in many contemporary monarchies, gave way to constitutions, formal rules of succession, and the political and social acceptance of the institution of monarchy. The country was no longer a prize of war acquired by a monarch, but a political unit with recognized borders, public institutions, and a population endowed with citizenship rights.

In the modern international system, territorial conquest has also lost much of the legitimacy and economic utility it once possessed. National borders have become more firmly established, while the costs of war and occupation have risen dramatically. Consequently, the power and prestige of governments have come to depend more than before on economic development, political stability, the quality of public administration, and the welfare of the population.

As a result, the contemporary monarch does not necessarily have the same sources of power, the same dependencies, or the same objectives as the monarch of the past. To preserve his position, he need not necessarily secure the support of privileged landed classes and religious institutions in the way monarchs once did, nor does the survival of the monarchy necessarily depend on conquering new territories. In some monarchies, royal succession has acquired such legal and social stability that the monarch’s position, compared with that of elected politicians or personalist dictators, is less exposed to constant competition for control of power.

A political leader generally faces two fundamental concerns: first, preserving his own power and political position, together with those of his supporters; and second, increasing the strength, wealth, stability, and prestige of the country. The relative importance of these two objectives is not the same in every political system or for every ruler.

An elected politician must think about the next election, preserve a governing coalition, satisfy influential constituencies, and defeat partisan rivals. A personalist dictator may likewise devote a large share of the state’s capacity to controlling opponents, preventing coups, and maintaining the loyalty of military and security forces. A monarch whose position and succession are relatively securely established in law and political convention may be less preoccupied than either of these with short-term competition to retain office.

This does not mean that monarchs have no concern with preserving power, or that monarchies are immune to political crises, succession disputes, social unrest, or the risk of removal. Nor can we assume that all monarchs are necessarily benevolent or competent. The more limited claim is that the stability of the monarchical office may, under certain conditions, reduce the importance of short-term competition for power and lengthen the government’s time horizon.

Under such conditions, increasing the wealth, stability, and prestige of the country may become one of the principal sources of prestige for the monarch and the royal family themselves. The monarch can no longer behave like a conqueror seeking to extract the greatest possible benefit from his spoils before the opportunity disappears. His success becomes more closely tied than before to the success of the country with which the name and reputation of his dynasty are associated.

It is here that the analogy between the modern monarch and a parent becomes meaningful. A parent, under ordinary circumstances, does not regard the home and family as temporary assets to be exploited as quickly as possible. Parents see their own future as intertwined with that of their children and generally seek to leave them something more prosperous, secure, and stable. A monarch who sees the continuity of his dynasty as bound up with the continuity and prosperity of the country may likewise view the country through such a long-term, intergenerational horizon.

This analogy does not equate citizens with children, nor does it justify depriving them of political agency. Rather, the point is that the relationship of a modern monarch to the country may be more long-term and intergenerational than the relationship of a conqueror to conquered territory. Parents, too, do not always act correctly, justly, or without authoritarian tendencies; what matters in this analogy is the alignment of their long-term interests with the future of the family.

The ancient monarch was often a conqueror, or the heir of a conqueror, who sought to use the territory, resources, and people under his rule to preserve power and expand the dominance of his dynasty. In some respects, such behavior resembled that of a personalist dictator who places the country’s resources primarily at the service of his own political survival.

The modern monarch, provided that his position and succession possess sufficient institutional stability, may face the problem of day-to-day political survival less intensely and may therefore be able to devote a greater share of his attention to the stability and prosperity of the country. From this perspective, the distinction between such a monarch and a dictator should not be sought merely in the degree of authoritarianism or in claims of benevolence, but rather in the structure of succession, the degree to which power is institutionalized, the time horizon of decision-making, and the way the ruler’s interests are linked to the country’s future.

Both monarchs and parents may at times act in an authoritarian manner; but within this hypothesis, what matters is the prevailing direction of their decisions. A personalist dictator may desire national prosperity insofar as it helps preserve his own power, whereas a modern monarch may see the survival of his dynasty’s prestige and position as dependent on the country’s long-term prosperity. This distinction, of course, is not yet an established finding; it is part of a hypothesis that must be tested in the remainder of the study.

In the premodern world, the sources of power of many monarchs were broadly similar: conquest, land ownership, aristocratic support, military power, and religious legitimacy. It is natural that similarities in the sources of power should also produce similarities in governmental objectives and behavior. If, in the contemporary world, we likewise observe recurring patterns of behavior among monarchies that differ from those of ancient monarchies, we may consider the possibility that changes in the sources and structure of monarchical power have also produced changes in its behavior.

For this reason, applying the same name to ancient and contemporary monarchies may itself create a cognitive error. The shared label can give the impression that we are dealing with a fixed and unchanged phenomenon, even though the economic structure, source of legitimacy, rules of succession, relationship between government and society, and legal status of the population have all changed.

Accordingly, from this point onward I distinguish between two concepts:

Ancient Monarchy is a system in which power rests primarily on conquest, territorial ownership, the support of privileged classes, personal military force, and traditional or religious legitimacy, and in which the country is regarded, to a significant extent, as the property of the ruling dynasty.

New or Modern Monarchy is a system in which the monarchical office is embedded within the framework of the modern state and its institutions, succession follows relatively well-defined rules, the distinction between public property and the property of the royal family is largely recognized, and the prestige of the monarchy is more closely tied than in the past to the stability, welfare, and success of the country.

This definition does not imply that all contemporary monarchies are equally modern or that they fully possess all of these characteristics. There are substantial differences among them, and some remain closer than others to the model of ancient monarchy. “Modern monarchy,” therefore, is used here as an analytical concept that may exist in varying degrees, rather than as a label to be applied indiscriminately to every existing monarchy.

Thus far in this great experiment of contemporary history, the indicators examined have not been inconsistent with this hypothesis. Monarchies have, on average, performed better in welfare, security, and regulatory quality. At this point, however, a fundamental principle must be emphasized: a hypothesis that has encountered only supportive evidence has not yet undergone its most demanding test.

The scientific value of this hypothesis will become clearer when we expose it to indicators that may count against it. We must examine whether monarchies display the same pattern in government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, quality of public services, and other dimensions of governance. We must also ask whether different results emerge in indicators where republics should, in theory, possess an advantage.

Subsequent data may strengthen the hypothesis; they may show that it is valid only under certain conditions and for certain types of monarchy; or we may encounter indicators that weaken or even falsify it. None of these possibilities should be excluded in advance.

The time has therefore not yet come for a final verdict. What we have seen so far is not the end of the experiment, but the beginning of its more demanding stage. We now have a hypothesis that must be confronted, without reservation, with new data. If the new monarchy is genuinely a different phenomenon from ancient monarchy, that difference should also reveal itself across a broader set of independent indicators and in diverse geographical and institutional comparisons.

So we continue the experiment—not in order to confirm the hypothesis, but to see whether the data that follow are capable of falsifying it. The procedure will be as follows:

Testing Roadmap for the “New or Modern Monarchy” Hypothesis

Stage One: The Welfare Record

Hypothesis prediction: If modern monarchy is more successful, it should generate greater economic welfare for its citizens.

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Stage Two: The Security Record

Hypothesis prediction: A government that regards itself as responsible for protecting its citizens should provide a safer environment.

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Stage Three: The Order Record

Hypothesis prediction: If this pattern holds, both the quality of laws and regulations and the effectiveness of their implementation should be higher.

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Stage Four: The Justice Record

Hypothesis prediction: A government that regards itself as responsible to its people should exhibit lower levels of corruption.

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Stage Five: The Freedom Record

Hypothesis prediction: If this pattern genuinely works to the benefit of citizens, its effects should also be visible in individual freedoms and quality of life.

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Stage Six: A Composite Indicator

Hypothesis prediction: If the advantages predicted by the hypothesis are not confined to a single dimension of governance, they should also be reflected in a broader measure that captures the combined outcome of multiple aspects of national performance.

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Final Assessment

Has the “New or Modern Monarchy” hypothesis successfully passed the combined evidence from all fourteen independent tests?

Status of the “New or Modern Monarchy” Hypothesis After the First Five Indicators