Sophist – Plato
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
one of one, and being absolute unity, will represent a mere name.
STRANGER: And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
THEAETETUS: How so?
STRANGER: And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with STRANGER: To distinguish the name from the it?
thing, implies duality.
THEAETETUS: To be sure they would, and they THEAETETUS: Yes.
actually say so.
STRANGER: And yet he who identifies the name STRANGER: If being is a whole, as Parmenides with the thing will be compelled to say that it is sings,—
the name of nothing, or if he says that it is the name of something, even then the name will only
‘Every way like unto the fullness of a well-be the name of a name, and of nothing else.
rounded sphere, Evenly balanced from the centre on every side, And must needs be neither THEAETETUS: True.
greater nor less in any way, Neither on this side nor on that—’
STRANGER: And the one will turn out to be only 124
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then being has a centre and extremes, and, hav-STRANGER: But this indivisible, if made up of ing these, must also have parts.
many parts, will contradict reason.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: I understand.
STRANGER: Yet that which has parts may have STRANGER: Shall we say that being is one and a the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or way being all and a whole, may be one?
shall we say that being is not a whole at all?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
THEAETETUS: That is a hard alternative to offer.
STRANGER: But that of which this is the condi-STRANGER: Most true; for being, having in a tion cannot be absolute unity?
certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is there-THEAETETUS: Why not?
fore more than one.
STRANGER: Because, according to right reason, THEAETETUS: Yes.
that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.
STRANGER: And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there THEAETETUS: Certainly.
be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks 125
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something of its own nature?
THEAETETUS: Why so?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole, so that STRANGER: Upon this view, again, being, hav-he who does not give whole a place among being a defect of being, will become not-being?
ings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing.
THEAETETUS: True.
THEAETETUS: Yes, that certainly appears to be STRANGER: And, again, the all becomes more true.
than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.
STRANGER: Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a THEAETETUS: Yes.
certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of that quantity.
STRANGER: But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, THEAETETUS: Exactly.
and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have STRANGER: And there will be innumerable other come into being.
points, each of them causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or two.