Sophist – Plato
STRANGER: And does not false opinion also think pressions which we have just used were before that things which most certainly exist do not acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeak-exist at all?
able, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his point, Theaetetus?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
THEAETETUS: Of course he will say that we are STRANGER: And here, again, is falsehood?
contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in THEAETETUS: Falsehood—yes.
words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, STRANGER: And in like manner, a false proposi-which we admitted just now to be an utter im-tion will be deemed to be one which asserts the possibility.
non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.
STRANGER: How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a consultation as to what THEAETETUS: There is no other way in which a we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we per-false proposition can arise.
sist in looking for him in the class of false work-ers and magicians, you see that the handles for STRANGER: There is not; but the Sophist will objection and the difficulties which will arise are deny these statements. And indeed how can any very numerous and obvious.
rational man assent to them, when the very ex-117
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THEAETETUS: They are indeed.
STRANGER: I have a yet more urgent request to make.
STRANGER: We have gone through but a very small THEAETETUS: Which is—?
portion of them, and they are really infinite.
STRANGER: That you will promise not to regard THEAETETUS: If that is the case, we cannot pos-me as a parricide.
sibly catch the Sophist.
THEAETETUS: And why?
STRANGER: Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up?
STRANGER: Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try THEAETETUS: Certainly not, I should say, if we to prove by main force that in a certain sense not-can get the slightest hold upon him.
being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.
STRANGER: Will you then forgive me, and, as THEAETETUS: Some attempt of the kind is your words imply, not be altogether displeased clearly needed.
if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?
STRANGER: Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless these questions are decided THEAETETUS: To be sure I will.
in one way or another, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, 118
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or imitations, or appearances, or about the arts THEAETETUS: I did.
which are concerned with them; can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.
STRANGER: I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, THEAETETUS: Most true.
when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe, that I am examining the STRANGER: And therefore I must venture to lay question entirely out of regard for you.
hands on my father’s argument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the matter up.
THEAETETUS: There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if THEAETETUS: Nothing in the world should ever you attempt this refutation and proof; take heart, induce us to do so.
therefore, and proceed.
STRANGER: I have a third little request which I STRANGER: And where shall I begin the peril-wish to make.
ous enterprise? I think that the road which I must take is—
THEAETETUS: What is it?
THEAETETUS: Which?—Let me hear.
STRANGER: You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel—that I have no heart for STRANGER: I think that we had better, first of this argument?
all, consider the points which at present are re-119
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garded as self-evident, lest we may have fallen brought them up; and another spoke of two prin-into some confusion, and be too ready to assent ciples,—a moist and a dry, or a hot and a cold, to one another, fancying that we are quite clear and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics, about them.
however, in our part of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this THEAETETUS: Say more distinctly what you is their mythus, which goes back to Xenophanes, mean.
and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have ar-STRANGER: I think that Parmenides, and all ever rived at the conclusion that to unite the two prin-yet undertook to determine the number and ciples is safer, and to say that being is one and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a light many, and that these are held together by en-and easy strain.
mity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the severer Muses assert, while the gentler THEAETETUS: How?
ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of STRANGER: As if we had been children, to whom them; peace and unity sometimes prevailing they repeated each his own mythus or story;—
under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again one said that there were three principles, and plurality and war, by reason of a principle of that at one time there was war between certain strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in of them; and then again there was peace, and all this is hard to determine; besides, antiquity they were married and begat children, and and famous men should have reverence, and not 120
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be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing is our present subject of dispute; and now you may be said of them without offence—
see in what a fix we are about it.
THEAETETUS: What thing?
THEAETETUS: I see.
STRANGER: That they went on their several STRANGER: And very likely we have been get-ways disdaining to notice people like ourselves; ting into the same perplexity about ‘being,’ and they did not care whether they took us with yet may fancy that when anybody utters the them, or left us behind them.
word, we understand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being. But we may THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
be; equally ignorant of both.
STRANGER: I mean to say, that when they talk THEAETETUS: I dare say.
of one, two, or more elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat min-STRANGER: And the same may be said of all the gling with cold, assuming in some other part of terms just mentioned.
their works separations and mixtures,—tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean THEAETETUS: True.
by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well STRANGER: The consideration of most of them what was meant by the term ‘not-being,’ which may be deferred; but we had better now discuss 121
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the chief captain and leader of them.
two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they will be one and not two.’
THEAETETUS: Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must first investigate what THEAETETUS: Very true.
people mean by the word ‘being.’
STRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the STRANGER: You follow close at my heels, name of ‘being’ to both of them together?
Theaetetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence the dualistic philoso-THEAETETUS: Quite likely.
phers and to interrogate them. ‘Come,’ we will say, ‘ Ye, who affirm that hot and cold or any STRANGER: ‘Then, friends,’ we shall reply to other two principles are the universe, what is them, ‘the answer is plainly that the two will this term which you apply to both of them, and still be resolved into one.’
what do you mean when you say that both and each of them “are”? How are we to understand THEAETETUS: Most true.
the word “are”? Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above STRANGER: ‘Since, then, we are in a difficulty, the other two,—three in all, and not two? For please to tell us what you mean, when you speak clearly you cannot say that one of the two prin-of being; for there can be no doubt that you al-ciples is being, and yet attribute being equally ways from the first understood your own mean-to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of the ing, whereas we once thought that we under-122
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stood you, but now we are in a great strait.
STRANGER: And there is something which you Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, call ‘being’?
and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.’
THEAETETUS: ‘ Ye s . ’
There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dual-STRANGER: And is being the same as one, and ists or of the pluralists?
do you apply two names to the same thing?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
THEAETETUS: What will be their answer, Stranger?
STRANGER: And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all—must we not endeavour to as-STRANGER: It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who certain from them what they mean by ‘being’?
asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.
THEAETETUS: By all means.
THEAETETUS: Why so?
STRANGER: Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is? ‘Yes,’ they will reply.
STRANGER: To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ri-THEAETETUS: True.
diculous?