

OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SRI MADHWACHARYA

Krishnaswamy Rao Boray

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PREFACE

The life and teachings of Sri Madhwacharya find elucidation in English in the works of a few early savants like Sri C.M. Padmanabhachar in his *Life and Teachings of Sri Madhwacharya*, C.N. Krishnaswamy Iyer in his *Sri Madhwa and his life and times*, S. Subba Rao in his *The Philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya*, C.R. Krishna Rao in his *Sri Madhwa, His life and doctrine* and others. Dr. R. Nagaraja Sharma has, as he says, 'attempted a faithful exposition of Sri Madhwa's Philosophy in modern terminology' in his *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy*. In recent years Sri H.N. Raghavendrachar has published a book entitled *The Dwaita Philosophy and its place in the Vedanta* and Dr. S. Dasgupta has published his third volume of *History of Indian Philosophy* containing an exposition of the doctrine and literature of the Dwaita Vedanta. Dr. B.N. Krishnamurthy Sharma has written a thesis on the Dwaita literature which is awaiting publication.

My aim in this book is to place before the student of Indian Philosophy in general and the lay reader in particular the fundamental stand of Sri Madhwacharya in the construction of his Philosophy and to work out the logical conclusions of his position. The book is, however, intended primarily for the intelligent layman although the student of Philosophy also might find the book useful as an introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya. I have therefore taken special pains to be sufficiently intelligible. I have minimized the use of technical terms and wherever such terms are unavoidable I have given their approximate equivalents.

I have, in this book, attempted an exposition of the Philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya in outline in a comparatively new way which might appeal to the modern reader and in doing so I have freely employed the arguments advanced in the works of the Acharya and in the *tikas* and used them in my own way for the purpose. The first few chapters of the book deal with the epistemological basis of Sri Madhwacharya's philosophy and the fundamental tenets find exposition in the later chapters. The epistemological principles and the metaphysical consequences that follow based on the several works of the Acharya are placed before the reader in as clear a manner as possible without loss of rigor so that the reader can form an idea of the Philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya almost in the words of the Acharya himself. Since the main object has been to present the Acharya's Philosophy in a persuasive manner based primarily on his works no references have been made to the works of other savants in the field.

The significant contributions of Sri Madhwacharya to Indian Philosophy epistemological and ontological find special elucidation in the book. The concept of Sakshi which is most fundamental in the system with the associated concepts of space and time are elaborated in a chapter devoted for the purpose and the logical conclusions of these concepts are worked out in the later chapters. The last two chapters of the book are devoted to the enumeration and justification of the metaphysical categories of the system and the concept of Moksha according to Sri Madhwacharya.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to Dr. R. Nagarajasharma, the well-known scholar and savant of Madras who was kind enough to read through the manuscript and to suggest ways of improving the same. I can never be sufficiently grateful to him for his kind words of encouragement towards the publishing of the book.

I take this opportunity of giving expression to my sense of respect and gratitude to Asthanamahavidwan Agnihotri Sri Yagnavithalacharya of the Uttaradi Mutt, Bangalore under whom I was privileged to study the tikas on the prakaranas and the tatvaprakashika for over ten years. His erudite scholarship and clarity of exposition have left a deep impression on me.

Krishnaswamy Rao Boray

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CHAPTER 1 – SRI MADHWACHARYA – LIFE AND WORKS

Sri Madhwacharya was born in the year 1238 A.D. on the Vijayadashami day of the month of Ashwayuja in a village about three miles from Udupi in coastal Karnataka, India. His father was a pious *brahmin* belonging to the *Bhagavata Sampradaya* and a *pauranic* by profession. Sri Madhwacharya was born at a late period in his father's life after constant prayer and dedication of vows to Ananteshwara in Udupi. Madhyageha Bhatta, the father, was therefore happy and proud in no ordinary degree in his son whom he christened Vaasudeva. Boy Vaasudeva was very precocious, and his father taught him the three R's in the privacy of his house. Vaasudeva's upanayanam was performed at an appropriate age and therefore he underwent training at Gurukulam. Not even had the boy attained his teens, when he felt an inner urge he could not resist, to taking to the holy orders and took sanyasa under Achyutaprekshacharya in Udupi.

Achyutaprekshacharya had been brought up in the then current Advaita school of thought but the philosophy of that school did not appeal to the new sanyasi. Achyutaprekshacharya was somewhat displeased with his new disciple but he was however very much impressed with the earnestness, and scholarship of his disciple whom he christened Purnaprajna. Purnaprajna thereupon began to preach his own philosophy according to which the world is real, the individual souls are different from Brahman, and Vishnu is the Highest Entity in the universe. Many a pundit and scholar of other schools came to him for debate and went back defeated by his keen and irrefutable logic. Purnaprajna, in order to propagate his faith undertook a pilgrimage to the various shrines in South India and the pilgrimage was also an opportunity to meet opponents of other schools in different places. Immediately after he returned from the pilgrimage Purnaprajna wrote the commentary on Bhagavadgita. The Gita Bhashya (commentary on the Gita) is the first work of the Acharya.

Seven years after he took to holy orders. Purnaprajna commenced a pilgrimage to the North where he touched Benares, Allahabad. Dwaraka. Delhi and other places and reached the famous Badarikshetra. He went further North alone all by himself, to the depths of Himalayas where Sri Vedavyasa Is said to have His Abode. He composed the Brahmasutra-Bhashya at this place. On his return journey Purnaprajna came to the banks of the Godavari and had debates with two eminent and scholarly pundits Sobhana Bhatta and Shamashastry belonging to the Advaita school. The pundits were defeated in the debate and with the conviction of truth of the school of philosophy expounded by Purnaprajna, both of them became his disciples taking up sanyasa. Sobhana Bhatta became the famous Padmanabha Thirtha who succeeded to the pontifical seat of Purnaprajnacharya. Shamashastry became Narahari Thirtha and at the behest of the Acharya stayed behind in his own country for some time In order to obtain the images of Mula Rama and Sita from the treasury of the local prince. Padmanabha Thirtha followed his master and was greatly devoted to him.

After his return to Udupi. Purnaprajna began to write various works establishing the new system of philosophy, which has come to be called Dwaitasiddhanta. The cardinal point which distinguishes his system from others Is the essential difference between Brahman who is Swatantra (independent) and all else which are Aswatantra (dependent). This system has therefore come to

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be called Dwaitasiddhanta (the philosophy of Basic difference). Purnaprajnacharya declares himself at the end of many of his works to be an avatar of the Wind God Vayu and says that his avatar as Purnaprajna has been foretold in the shrutis where he has been called Madhwa. Purnaprajnacharya is therefore popularly known as Sri Madhwacharya. The Acharya founded the Sri Krishna temple at Udipi and established eight mutts, the sanyasis of which had to worship the image by rotation. The system of rotation has continued until the present day at Udipi. Sri Madhwacharya wrote commentaries on the ten principal Upanishads, the special treatises called Prakaranas ten in number, the Gita Tatparya, and other works during this period.

Sri Madhwacharya undertook a second tour to the North again. He met Jalaluddin Khilji at Delhi and seems to have conversed with him in Parsi. After returning from North, he spent the rest of his time in Udipi occasionally visiting a place called Vishnumangala near Udipi. During one of his visits to Vishnumangala he had to meet a reputed champion of the Advaita school by name Trivikrama panditacharya. The debate between them seems to have extended to fifteen days and covered all the different systems of philosophy like the Bauddha, Sankhya, Nyaya and Advaita. In the end Trivikrama panditacharya had to admit defeat. He was very much impressed with the Acharya and became his disciple having renounced Advaita and accepting the Dwaitasiddhanta. The conversion of Pundit Trivikrama was a great moral victory for the Acharya and many were the new adherents to his system. Trivikrama panditacharya became so devoted to the Acharya that his admiration for the Acharya became a byword. He wrote the commentary known as Tatvapradiya on the Brahmasutra Bhashya of Sri Madhwacharya. At his request Sri Madhwacharya wrote a metrical commentary on the Brahmasutras which is famous as Anuvyakhyana.

Sri Madhwacharya had many disciples belonging to the sanyasa ashrama and many disciples who were householders. He vanished from the sight of men in his eightieth year in the month of Magha on the 9th day of the bright fortnight while he was teaching the Aitareya Upanishad Bhashya to his disciples. A shower of flowers is said to have rained on him and he vanished from the sight of men in the shower of flowers.

Sri Madhwacharya has written in all thirty-seven works and they are collectively called Sarvamula. Four of his works are on the Brahmasutras, two on Bhagavadgita, ten are the Bhashyas on the ten Upanishads, one on the Mahabharata and one on the Bhagavata. In order to determine their Import, and ten are the prakaranas. The Rig bhashya is a commentary on the Rigveda (for a few typical Riks). Seven of his works are of the Stotra type. Nobody can fail to be impressed by his works. His method is very brief and simple. His logic is infallible and energetic. The depth of his knowledge is seen in the profuseness, range, and variety of quotations from various religious texts. His familiarity with the Upanishadic, puranic, tantric and other literature is in ample evidence. In all his works. He is singularly free from the use of alankaraprayoga and he is very matter of fact in all his arguments.

The Brahmasutra Bhashya of the Acharya possesses in full measure the characteristics a Bhashya should possess (*sutratho vamyate yatra padaiah sutranukarbhihi: swapadanichavarnyate bhashyam bhashyavido viduh* - A work on which the meaning of the sutras is explained by the words similar to those in the sutras and in which the author explains his own works is called a Bhashya). Accordingly, the Brahmasutra Bhashya of Sri Madhwacharya is a very brief and precise

composition in contrast with the Bhashyas of the Acharyas of other systems. Sri Madhwacharya however reserves polemical treatment of the Brahmasutras to be effected in Anuvyakhyana. The commentaries on the Upanishads are peculiar and philosophical hosts in themselves. Sri Madhwacharya invariably quotes appropriate puranic and Vedic literature and the samhitas which purport to explain the Upanishadic passages.

The direct disciples of Sri Madhwacharya. viz. Padmanabha Thirtha. Narahari Thirtha, Trivikrama panditacharya and others have written commentaries on his works. These are called Prachina tikas. They were followed by the brilliant commentaries of Jayatirtha who is famous as Tikacharya. Jayatirtha has written commentaries called tikas on almost all of the works of Sri Madhwacharya. In particular, the commentary on Anuvyakhyana called ‘Nyayasudha’ is famous as a commentary of the highest merit. The works of Jayatirtha have been commented upon by many later scholars of whom Vyasaraaja and Raghavendra Tirtha are well known.

CHAPTER 2 – ROLE OF EXPERIENCE IN PHILOSOPHY

Sri Madhwacharya defines Philosophy as the determination of things as they are in themselves (*tatva nirnaya - svartham paratham va tatwanimayasadhini* A.V.P. 19). In such a determination experience (Anubhava) plays a very important role. Experience is to Sri Madhwacharya, the most secure foundation for philosophical speculation. Philosophy not based on experience is barren and experience not informed by philosophic enquiry is blind and has no significance. In so far as philosophy deviates from the dictates of experience it falls short of being philosophy at all. At the very outset of his philosophy, therefore, he lays great stress on the role of experience in philosophy. To Sri Madhwacharya experience is the sole criterion of truth and no knowledge opposed to experience has a place in his philosophy. The whole world he says is afraid of going against the dictates of experience (*sarvaloko bibhetyanjo yasmadanubhava vatsada* A.V.P. 29). In the building up of the mansion of philosophy the critical examination of experience in all its diverse forms would be the concrete brick and mortar.

Value of Experience in Philosophy

Why is experience so pre-eminently placed in philosophy? It is because, experience possesses the hallmark of personal conviction. To experience is to get convinced. Lessons in the school of experience are never learnt ill. To experience is to get convinced and nothing satisfies the human mind so completely and forcibly as experience. Experience is a hard taskmaster pitiless, unrelenting, and uncompromising. Sri Madhwacharya therefore stakes all his philosophy on experience. Again, and again in his works he appeals to the dictates of experience. Experience has certain unique features which give it its value in philosophy. Besides having the characteristic of carrying conviction, experience in its native simplicity has the characteristic of being unsublated or of being uncontradicted. Experience is never sublated. When I experience misery at some time, at no future time can I believe or realise that what I experienced was not misery. What I experience, I experience. A later experience, again, cannot contradict an earlier experience. When it is said that experience is non-self-contradictory in character it is very important to realise what experience means. Almost all experiences are coloured by the interpretation of the perceiving mind and conflicting experiences, if any, arise owing to the association of such interpretation. Almost all observations of the senses are unconsciously associated with interpretation and inference. Pure experience, shorn of the interpretation due to the active perceiving mind and the ever-present tendency to infer cannot be self-contradictory. In a mirage, for instance, the actual deliverance of perception is merely the presentation of a reflecting surface or what appears to be so. But the mind generally associates such a reflecting surface with a sheet of water and the observation of a sheet of water in a mirage is thus coloured by the association by the mind with a sheet of water experienced at an earlier time. We have here an illustration of the role of inference in experience. The contradiction of what was thought to have been experienced as a sheet of water and the later realization of the absence of the sheet of water are due to the pure experience of a reflecting medium being interpreted by the mind as a sheet of water. Pure experience as such, is non-contradictory in character. The non-contradictory character (*abadhyatva*) of experience is to Sri Madhwacharya an infallible guide in all cases of doubt. In all cases of doubt the appeal is to experience and again and again in his works Sri Madhwacharya appeals to the dictates and

deliverance of experience. It is this unique feature of experience that gives it its preeminent place in the Philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya.

Abadhyatva of Experience

The characteristic of unsublatedness (abadhyatva) is borne out in the daily experience of one and all. When I experience misery at some time, at no future time can I be made to believe that the misery experienced was no misery. What I experienced. I experienced; nothing can alter that. The characteristic of unsublatedness forms the cornerstone of the metaphysical foundations of Sri Madhwacharya's philosophy. Experience is thus given a very important role in philosophy and the enthronement of experience in the realm of philosophy forms a very significant contribution of Sri Madhwacharya to the metaphysical speculation of Indian thinkers.

Definition of Truth as unsublated

The concept of unsublatedness (abadhyatva) is also an equally significant contribution to the metaphysical contribution of Indian metaphysics. What is truth? is a great question in philosophy. Sri Madhwacharya's answer to that question is truth Is that which is unsublated (Abadhyam Satyam). The whole philosophy of Sri Madhwacharya is built upon this postulate and all the metaphysical concepts in his system are derived on the basis of experience, which is always unsublated. What is given in pure experience must of necessity be real. Because reality consists in being unsublated and true experience Is inherently unsublated. Sri Madhwacharya accordingly solves the fundamental and persistent problems in philosophy such as the problem of knowledge, the notion of substance and quality, the concepts of space and time, the mind body problem, the concept of individual self and Supreme self, and the relation between them, in a most convincing manner in his various works by a thorough-going analysis of the different aspects of experience to all humanity. No aspect of experience is left out of account but has its proper place in the evaluation of experience.

Fundamental tenets of the system

The fundamental tenets of his philosophy follow from a brief analysis of experience. From a careful analysis of the process of acquiring knowledge during the three states of consciousness of daily life, viz., wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, the existence of the self (individuals) as the agent of cognition is established. Space and time are derived as entities perceived directly by the self (or sakshi) without the Intermediary of the external organs of cognition. An examination of the knowledge of external objects leads to the concept of matter as different from the perceiving mind and self and matter existing as ontological reals (sathya). The uniqueness of individual experiences leads to the concept of essential difference between individual selves (jiva-jiva bheda).

The individual self-experience shows, is limited In capacities and powers and it Is also dependent (asvatantra). This argues in favour of invoking a controlling Independent (svatantra). All knowing (sarvajna) being as the controller of the world of animate and inanimate beings. Such an Independent principle of Being, Sri Madhwacharya identifies with Vishnu in the Vedic literature. By the very nature of being Independent and dependent, the Independent and dependent are different essentially from another. The independent Vishnu, because He is independent is

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Perfect (purna) and All knowing (sarvajna). While the Individual self and the inanimate world are given in experience. God is not so given or derived as the deliverance of experience. He can be known only through scriptures that inform us about Him are the Vedas. The Vedas form the supreme and only source of our knowledge of Him in as much as they form the only authority regarding the moral values of life. The Vedas are apauruseya (not composed by any author, human or divine) and are therefore Infallible. God can be known only through such an infallible scripture (shastraikavedya). The knowledge of things composing the world can be derived from three sources. Viz., sense perception (pratyakhsa), inference (anumana), and scripture (agama).

The elucidation of these tenets on the basis of experience as inculcated by Sri Madhwacharya is attempted in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3 – THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Epistemology or theory of knowledge inquires into the origins and nature of knowledge. It is the preliminary stage of philosophy investigating the means and conditions of obtaining knowledge. Knowledge is of the nature of subjective conviction familiar to all and is what we are aware of when our senses are alert and even when our senses are not alert as in the case of deep sleep (6. Some schools of philosophy like the *Mimamsa* hold that there is no knowledge during deep sleep. Sri Madhwacharya however holds that we have positive knowledge even during deep sleep. See Chapter 5). We have experience of knowledge every instant of our existence as a mental event occasioned under favourable conditions by suitable stimuli. Notwithstanding its familiarity, it is however, an event of profound significance. It claims to be an apprehension of an independent fact or truth.

Knowledge arising in various ways

Knowledge which is essentially awareness of object arises in us in a variety of ways in our daily experience. It is also of different kinds. We have knowledge of things around us such as chairs, roses, trees etc. We have knowledge of our misery or happiness. We have knowledge of ourselves in "I know myself", i.e., in self-knowledge (*ahampratyaya*). Finally, we have knowledge of space and time. Again, we are conscious of outside objects during the walking state (*jagradavastha*), of mental objects during the state of dreams (*swapnavastha*) and of ourselves, of space and of time during the state of deep sleep (*susupthiavastha* - The consciousness of I, space and time during deep sleep is not admitted by all. Sri Madhwacharya demonstrates that such knowledge does exist). Knowledge, thus, arises in all the three states of daily life. No theory of knowledge can be regarded as satisfactory that does not take into account all the various kinds of knowledge we are aware of in our daily experience. Sri Madhwacharya's theory of knowledge is based on a thoroughgoing analysis of the different kinds of knowledge arising in various ways and common to all humanity.

Sri Madhwacharya attacks the problem of knowledge on the basis of two fundamental postulates. The first postulate is that experience is the most secure foundation of philosophy and the second postulate is that whatever is unsublated is real. All aspects of knowledge are investigated on the basis of these postulates, in his theory of knowledge.

Internal and External knowledge

At the very outset of his theory of knowledge Sri Madhwacharya draws attention to two types of knowledge which are essentially distinct from one another '*jnanancha dvividham bahyam thatha anubhavathmakam*' he says in **Vishnutatva Vinirnaya** (p. 4). There are two types of knowledge viz, external, and internal. The latter is always true while the former may be occasionally false. Knowledge generally refers to things outside of us, such as is obtained through our senses of perception. The knowledge of a red rose, the report of a gun, the hardness of a table and the warmth of fire refer to external objects like rose, gun, table, and fire respectively and such knowledge is external knowledge (*bahyajnana*). Again, we have knowledge that does not refer to

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things outside of us. We are conscious of our misery or happiness; we are conscious of ourselves. Such knowledge is internal knowledge (*antarika jnana*). There is however one very essential distinction between external and internal knowledge. Whereas external knowledge may be sometimes sublated, and hence false, internal knowledge is never sublated and is therefore always true.

When I apprehend a shell as a shell my knowledge of the shell is true knowledge. But when I apprehend shell as silver the apprehension of the shell will be sublated by the apprehension of the shell when I go near it and observe it to better advantage. In this sense external knowledge may sometimes be sublated. But internal knowledge can never be sublated. The self- knowledge 'I know myself' is never sublated. At no time do I know myself to be different from myself. In spite of all the changes taking place around me and of the various vicissitudes of my experience I never feel that I am 'not I'. Again, Sri Madhwacharya says '*na dukkhanubhavah kvapi mithyanubhavatam vrajet*' (A.V.P. 35) no experience of misery can ever become falsified. What I experienced is my experience and there can be no getting over that fact. Nothing that can ever happen to me at a later time can falsify my experience of misery at an earlier time. Sri Madhwacharya lays special emphasis on this essential distinction between the two types of knowledge viz., external, and internal knowledge in his great work **Anuvyakhya** again and again. On the basis of this distinction, he is able to deduce some very fundamental metaphysical concepts of his system.

Bipolar character of knowledge

All knowledge says Sri Madhwacharya. whether internal or external possesses some common characteristics. An examination of these characteristics and their appreciation is of very great importance In the Epistemology of his system. Sri Madhwacharya is able to deduce many fundamental concepts from such an examination on the basis of the two postulates referred to viz., experience and unsublatedness. The most obvious characteristic of knowledge is that it is bipolar. The essence of knowledge is awareness, and the knowledge is no knowledge if it is devoid of awareness. Awareness is an activity induced when knowledge is occasioned. Awareness is occasioned to an entity which becomes aware of and refers to another entity about which the former becomes aware.

Perception can occur to an entity which perceives and refers to an object as perceived. A stone for instance, cannot have knowledge. Now that entity or agency which perceives or knows or to which knowledge dawns is the subject or knower (*jnatru*) and that about which there is knowledge is the object or known (*jneya*). All knowledge is thus bipolar having the subject and object as its poles at either end. Such polarity is an essential characteristic of all knowledge. There is no evidence of knowledge devoid of such polarity as Sri Madhwacharya observes Nacha '*jnatrujneyarahitam jnanam kvapi drstam*' (V.T.V.P 17). Pure knowledge as such without a knower and known is as inconceivable to Sri Madhwacharya as dinner without the diner and food (*bhokthrubhogyatahhiam bhojanameva syat* - A.V.P.61). Knowledge as mere consciousness having no internal subject-object relationship does not exist. In other words, knowledge is not partless (*akhanda*) and attributeless (*nirvishesha*) as Advaita regards it to be. Whenever I have any piece of knowledge the form or content of my knowledge is 'I know this thing to be here and

now'; the subject I and the object 'this thing' are the very necessary and essential ingredients of all knowledge.

Spatial and Temporal elements in knowledge

A second characteristic of all knowledge is the spatial and temporal aspects concomitant with knowledge. The elements of space and time are always associated with all pieces of knowledge. Whenever I perceive an object my perception is not 'a bare perception' of the object. There is a perception of the elements of space and time also. When I perceive a rose in my garden, I am conscious not only of the rose but of the rose as 'being out there' in my garden and 'now' at the time of my perception. The 'being out there' and 'now' are respectively the elements of space and time. That these elements are present by the fact that I stretch my hand to pluck the rose. If I did not believe the rose to exist 'out there' and 'now' I would not have stretched my hand. I do not pick it up when I apprehend it as a piece of silver. In both cases I believe that there exists the shell or the silver and I am indifferent to shell but cupid enough to pick up what appears to be silver. In this sense 'seeing' is 'believing'. If I did not believe in 'space' I would not have stretched my hand and if I did not believe in time' I would not have stretched my hand now. Thus, all knowledge possesses the elements of space and time. Sri Madhwacharya considers these elements of space and time as the true deliverances of perception in contradistinction with the views of some philosophers who hold that they are the superimpositions of the perceiving mind on some substratum of perception. Space and time are objective to Sri Madhwacharya while other philosophers regard them as subjective.

Prama and Bhrama

Knowledge, however, may be true (*prama*) or false (*bhrama*). We say that a given knowledge is true if the object of the knowledge exists as perceived in knowledge and false if it does not so exist. The apprehension of a rope as a rope is true knowledge while the apprehension of rope as a snake is false knowledge. Now what is the essential difference between true knowledge and false knowledge? Sri Madhwacharya answers by an appeal to experience. How do I decide what I perceive to be a rope or a snake? I go near the object and observe it to better advantage. I see a rope where I thought I saw a snake. The latter perception (or knowledge) of the rope falsifies or stultifies or sublates the earlier perception (or knowledge) of the snake. The earlier knowledge of the snake has been sublated by the later knowledge of the rope. Becoming sublated is the characteristic of false knowledge. If my earlier perception was of a rope and when I go near, my later perception is also of a rope the earlier perception is not sublated by the later one. It is unsublated and hence true. Being unsublated (*abadhya*) is the characteristic of true knowledge.

CHAPTER 4 – PRAMANAS

Definition of Pramana

Knowledge as has been said in the foregoing may be true or false. Sri Madhwacharya defines philosophy as *tatvanirnaya* i.e., the determination of things as they are in themselves. In other words, Philosophy is the true knowledge of things (*tatvajnana*). The ways of obtaining true knowledge therefore form or constitute a fundamental part of epistemology (Epistemology, is theory of knowledge on which, metaphysics which is theory of substance is based). The means of true knowledge are called Pramanas. The term Pramana is defined in different ways in the different schools of Indian Philosophy. A definition or *lakshana* should be such that it distinguishes the entity defined from others and also such that it includes all those that are encompassed in the same category as the entity defined while excluding those that do not belong to that category. When the *lakshana* does not include all those intended to be classed in the same category it becomes non-pervasive (*avyaptha*) and when it includes even those foreign to the category in question it becomes over pervasive (*ativyapta*). If the *lakshana* is not to be found in the category at all it becomes improbable (*asambhavi*). Sri Madhwacharya defines Pramana in such a way that it is free from these defects. 'yathartham pramanam' (P.L. p.1) is his definition of Pramana. 'artham' means object and 'yatha' means 'as it is'. Thus, a pramana is that which reveals an object as it is. When I perceive a shell as a shell the knowledge of the shell reveals to me the shell as it is. i.e., as a shell and when I perceive a shell as a piece of silver, the knowledge of the silver reveals to me the shell as it is not. The knowledge of the shell which reveals the shell as a shell, i.e., as it is. is a Pramana. True knowledge or prama which reveals objects as they are in themselves is a Pramana. Such a prama or true knowledge is produced by my sense of sight. The sense of sight by producing true knowledge which reveals the object as it is, is also a Pramana.

Kevala and Anupramana:

While prama or true knowledge reveals the object as it is directly, the sense of perception reveals the object indirectly through the medium of true knowledge. Hence true knowledge or prama is called *kevala* Pramana (kevala = direct) and the sense of perception is called Anupramana (Anu = after or indirect). The object revealed is called *prameya* and the perceiver is called *pramata*. Kevalapramana which is true knowledge may be external or internal. It may be derived from various means such as the external organs or sense of perception and the internal sense of cognition called 'Manas' and 'Sakshi'.

Anupramana which is the means of true knowledge is of three kinds according to Sri Madhwacharya. viz, Pratyakhsa (sense perception). Anumana (inference) and Agama (Scripture). Other epistemologists enumerate Anupramanas differently, but it will be found that there are essentially three kinds of Anupramanas as maintained by Sri Madhwacharya. The different kinds of Anupramanas are included in the three kinds as mentioned by Sri Madhwacharya.

4.1 ANUPRAMANAS

4.1.1 Pratyaksha:

Pratyaksha reveals objects which are fairly near, which exist at the time of perception and which are limited to a specific confine or field of view. When I observe through my window, I see a tree, a bullock cart passing by and the sky. They are objects confined to a specific field of view at the moment of my perceiving. Anumana reveals objects which may be elsewhere prior to being perceived in knowledge. When I observe a flood in the river when there is no rain in my place. I infer the occurrence of a rain in a place at a higher level upstream and sometime prior to my observation of the flood. The knowledge produced by Anumana can thus extend to objects separated from me in space and time. Agama can, however, reveal objects in an almost untrammelled way. Theoretically there can be no limit to the objects an Agama can reveal to us, no limit to their co-ordinates in space and time. An Agama can produce the true knowledge of events buried in the past or lying in the womb of futurity or to be delivered up to posterity. I can have a true knowledge of the reign of Akbar from an authenticated book of History. I can have a true knowledge of an eclipse taking place six months hence from a scientific book of Astronomical Predictions. The Nautical Almanac is an Agama in so far as it can produce true knowledge of Astronomical events which are predicted to take place. Again, an Agama can produce true knowledge outside the pale of Pratyaksha and Anumana i.e., of objects which are super sensory (*atindriya*). The immense potentialities of Agama as a Pramana can thus be easily realized. Agama as a Pramana has a unique place in the metaphysical speculations of all the schools of Vedanta.

Sri Madhwacharya defines Pratyaksha as the contact of a defectless sense organ with a defectless object (*nirdosharthendriya sannikarshah pratyaksham* P.L. p i). When the organs of cognition or the objects are defective the knowledge obtained cannot be true. To a jaundiced eye all objects appear yellow and to an astigmatic eye horizontal lines and vertical lines of equal brightness appear to be of unequal brightness. The organs of cognition should be free from such defects. When the object is too far or too near, it cannot be observed properly. When the light is too insufficient a rope may be mistaken for a snake. When the object is situated under favourable conditions appropriate to its proper orientation, the object is said to be defectless (*nirdosha*). The knowledge arising when a defectless organ of cognition is directed towards a defectless object is true knowledge (prama). The action 'being directed' constitutes '*sannikarsha*' or contact. In short, the knowledge produced under normal conditions by the organs of cognition in their normal state constitutes true knowledge and the organs of cognition as well as the true knowledge derived from them constitute Pratyaksha.

Pratyaksha is of seven kinds viz. the five external senses of cognition, sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell, and the internal organ called Manas and the perceiving entity called Sakshi (*sakshi sadindriyabhedena* - P.L p.2). The Manas as the internal sense of perception and the Sakshi as the perceiving entity are invoked in order to explain some aspects of experience in the domain of knowledge.

Each sense of cognition has appropriate objects which it can cognize. A lamp post can be perceived by the sense of sight but not by the sense of hearing. Noise can be perceived by the sense of hearing but not by the sense of sight.

Manas and Sakshi as internal organs of cognition

We have in experience some pieces of knowledge which are presumably not derived through any of the five external senses, but which belong indubitably to the domain of knowledge. Memory, Self-knowledge (i.e., 'I know myself') and cognition of space and time are not derived from external senses of cognition. To account for such cognition the Manas and Sakshi have to be postulated. I can sit in my chair and run in my 'mind's eye' the whole panorama of a pageant I witnessed years ago. I have a succession of pictures passing before me which are the objects of knowledge even as the objects outside are the objects of knowledge of my external senses. To conjure up these images requires an instrument which could present the images in true knowledge. Such an Instrument is the Manas.

Dreams

Again, the stuff of which dreams are made is different from the stuff of the external world. But a dream experience as experience is nevertheless a reality. The happiness and misery I experience in dreams are in no way different from what I experience in the waking state. How often have we not wished that some of our dreams might have continued to eternity! Have we not been frightened out of our wits by some dreams? How could we have been frightened if we had no knowledge to frighten us with? Such knowledge surely cannot have been derived from external sense organs. It is suggested that 'Manas' is the instrument which conjures up dream objects out of impressions that lie deep in it from past experiences registered and gathered in the waking state. The 'Manas' stores up as it were photographic impressions of experiences and these impressions (*samskaras*) form the stuff of which dreams are made. Again, the fact of mental pre-occupation argues in favour of 'Manas' as an internal organ of cognition. When I am deeply absorbed in some abstraction, I am not conscious of things right in front of me. The sense of perception is directed towards the object in front under favorable conditions and yet there is no awareness of objects in front of me. This is because there is a break in the link between the perceiver and the apparatus of perception. The break is attributable to the 'Manas' being preoccupied and being out of contact with the external organs of cognition. The 'Manas' is thus to be invoked to explain the fact of mental pre-occupation.

Pratyabhijna

Lastly recognition (*pratyabhijna*) is a unique experience calling forth the existence of 'Manas'. When I meet a long-lost friend the knowledge relative to the friend is of the nature of recognition in which I identify my friend 'now' with my friend I met 'then'. The knowledge of identity, however, is not a deliverance of perception. All that perception reveals is a person before me. That the person revealed as the object of perception is the same as the person revealed at an earlier perception is not given either in the present perception or in the last perception. The element of recognition in knowledge must have been derived from an entirely different source. It is suggested again that 'Manas' is the source producing the element of identity in recognition. The past perception has left an impression in the 'Manas' and the perception of my friend 'now' activates the old impression and the 'Manas' generates the knowledge of identity or recognition. Memory (*smrithi* - *manaspratyakhsajanya smrthihi* (P.L. p.2)) is the direct perception or *pratyakhsa* of Manas just as the knowledge of a chair is a direct perception of the sense of sight.

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