Theater Engineer Command
1-71. The theater engineer command provides mission command and an organizational framework for the operational-level engineer effort within the AOR. The command focuses on reinforcing and augmenting tactical-level engineer efforts and developing the theater sustainment base. This focus involves planning, ensuring operational mobility, and coordinating all operational engineering assets. It also supervises the direction of geospatial operations, construction, real-property maintenance activities, logistics operation center sustainment, engineer logistics management, and base development. The command has the primary responsibility for theater infrastructure development.
1-72. The theater engineer command typically serves as the senior engineer headquarters for a theater army, land component headquarters, or potentially a JTF, and it provides mission command for all assigned or attached engineer brigades and other engineer units and missions for the theater army commander or JFLCC. When directed, it may also provide mission command for engineers from other Service and multinational forces, and oversight of contracted construction engineers. The command provides peacetime training and support of military engagement for its supported combatant commanders. The command also coordinates closely with the senior contract construction agents in the area of operations.
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1-73. The theater engineer command is a modular organization that can be adapted to mission requirements. It can deploy modular staff elements and organizations to provide the operational commander with a wide range of technical engineering expertise and support. Each command can deploy its main command post and two deployable command posts to provide flexibility and rotational capability.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers deploys its field force engineering assets to augment the command post, providing capabilities such as contracting, real estate, and interagency coordination.
Tele-engineering capabilities enable deployed elements to collaborate with subject matter experts in the United States Army Corps of Engineers, other Service technical laboratories and research centers, and other sources of expertise in the civilian community. (See FM 3-34 for more detail.)
Other Army Functional or Multifunctional Units
1-74. Other Army functional or multifunctional units may be made available to the theater army based on specific requirements of the AOR such as forward stationing, base operations, enduring security force assistance or theater security cooperation activities, or ongoing military operations. These Army functional or multifunctional units may have either a command or a support relationship with theater army. In some cases, certain functional or multifunctional units may support more than one theater army or AOR. A few examples are listed below.
1-75. Army field support brigades provide integrated and synchronized acquisition logistics and technology support to Army operational forces. Army field support brigades are regionally aligned to a theater army and are normally in direct support to the theater sustainment command or the lead theater logistics commander. Army field support brigades serve as the Army sustainment command’s link between the generating force and the operational force. They are responsible for the integration of acquisition logistics and technology capabilities in support of operational and tactical commanders across full spectrum operations. This includes coordinating for acquisition logistics and technology strategic reach capabilities via a technical reach or call-forward process. (See FMI 4-93.41 for more information on Army field support brigades.)
1-76. Contracting support brigades are the primary operational contract support planner, advisor, and contracting commander to the theater army. The contracting support brigade incorporates the capability previously provided by the ASCC’s principal assistant responsible for contracting. The contracting support brigade, through contracting authority delegated by the engineer coordination cell, executes theater support contracting actions in support of deployed ARFOR and coordinates other common contracting actions as directed by the engineer coordination cell, ARFOR commander, and the senior sustainment command in the area of operations. (See FM 4-92 for more detail).
THEATER ARMY COMMANDER
1-77. The theater army commander is the senior Army officer not assigned to the combatant command or other joint headquarters within the AOR. A theater army commander supporting a geographic combatant command must perform Army-specific functions such as internal administration and discipline, Service training, normal sustainment functions, Army intelligence matters, and specific oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with U.S. and host nation laws, policies, and directives. (See JP 1, JP 3-0, and ADP 3-0 for more information on theater army command requirements.)
1-78. Additionally, the theater army commander has other related support requirements. As a supported component, the theater army commander receives and integrates support from other Service or functional components of the combatant command. As a supporting component, the theater army provides Army support to other Service or functional components of the combatant command.
1-79. The theater army commander recommends the appropriate use of Army forces to the combatant commander or other joint force commanders. The theater army commander provides force data for assigned joint operations and exercise plans plus facilitates joint operations by performing joint training, to include training required by other Service components. The theater army commander informs the combatant commander of joint nonstrategic nuclear support required by the Army. The theater army commander also ensures signal and information management interoperability with the higher joint headquarters.
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1-80. The theater army commander informs the combatant commander of any Army sustainment support changes that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability. Additionally, the theater army commander provides sustainment support to Army forces assigned to JTFs operating in the combatant command’s AOR.
1-81. The theater army commander develops and submits Army program and budget requests to the combatant commander and informs the combatant commander of any program and budget decisions that affect joint operational planning.
THEATER ARMY HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION
1-82. The modular theater army headquarters contains the theater army commander, deputy commanding general, and the commander’s personal, special, and coordinating staff principals, under the supervision of the chief of staff. The theater army remains the senior Army headquarters for the AOR and provides Title 10 support—to include policy, plans, programs, and budgeting—to its assigned Army forces in the combatant command’s AOR.
1-83. Four broad design concepts underlie the organization of the modular theater army headquarters. Each theater army headquarters is a regionally focused, globally networked organization. It is theater-committed, and it is not part of the Army’s pool of rotational forces. The theater army headquarters is designed to exercise administrative control over all Army forces assigned to the supported combatant command. It provides theater opening capabilities to support all JOAs in the AOR as well as ASOS responsibilities. It performs additional Army support functions established in specific operation and concept plans, Army executive agent agreements, and implied tasks from the GCC campaign plan. The specific missions, conditions, and GCC requirements vary considerably from one AOR to another, and the theater army commander may modify the organization of the headquarters to best meet the needs of the AOR.
1-84. The theater army headquarters is organized with three organic components with specific functions.
First, a main command post performs all of the ASCC functions (Title 10, administrative control, ASOS, common-user logistics, and support to JOA) supporting the combatant commander’s daily operational requirements. Second, the contingency command post provides a limited capability to directly mission command forces for small-scale contingency operations within the AOR. Third, a headquarters, headquarters battalion provides administrative and logistics support for the theater army headquarters and all of its organic command post elements. Although normally co-located for stationing, the theater army main command post and contingency command post ordinarily remain configured as separate command posts in order to maintain the rapid deployment capability of the contingency command post.
1-85. The modular theater army headquarters is organized with a command group, personal and special staffs, a chief of staff, a secretary of the general staff, and the following warfighting functional cells:
Intelligence.
Movement and maneuver.
Fires.
Protection.
Sustainment.
Mission command.
1-86. The chief of staff, in accordance with the commander’s guidance, establishes the battle rhythm and work schedules of the headquarters. The chief of staff may extend or otherwise modify the work schedule of the headquarters in order to support operational requirements within the AOR, including theater army support of joint or Army forces operating in one or more JOAs within the AOR. The current operations integration cell (COIC) establishes the common operational picture (COP), disseminates the COP to all staff sections, and monitors the activities of Army forces within the AOR 24 hours per day, seven days a week.
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1-87. In general, all theater army staff elements employ the military decisionmaking process as the standard process for planning and the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) for integrating and synchronizing all the warfighting functions. The theater army staff may participate in campaign design and the joint operation planning process when collaborating directly with the combatant command, other Service component commands, or external organizations.
DEPENDENCIES
1-88. The theater army headquarters depends on theater enabling units for staff functions or supporting capabilities. While these enablers may vary considerably by size and type between GCCs, paragraphs 1-89
through 1-95 explain basic theater army dependencies.
1-89. The theater army depends on the theater signal command or brigade for connectivity to all LandWarNet services, up to SECRET and NOFORN (known as not releasable to foreign nationals), including the establishment and operation of the theater network architecture to support theater army headquarters and all Army and joint forces operating within the AOR. The theater army headquarters has no organic signal capability and is dependent on the theater signal command or brigade for all network and signal capabilities, including regional hub node, joint network node, or command post node elements to support the contingency command post when it deploys to mission command operations.
1-90. The theater army depends on the garrison command of the installation on which it is located for installation access control and local security of the permanent headquarters (garrison or installation security). Regional support groups provide contingency base operations functions at intermediate staging bases or bases in the army support area.
1-91. The theater army depends on the theater military intelligence brigade for access to top secret and sensitive compartmented information communications and information systems used for analytical support.
The access enables the theater intelligence unit to provide regionally focused collection, analysis, and production to support theater army planning (operation plan or concept plan development) and operational intelligence to support mission command of limited smaller scale contingency operations. In addition, the theater intelligence unit may provide regionally focused intelligence collection and analysis in support of JTFs and JFLCC or ARFOR headquarters and other Army forces operating in JOAs within the AOR.
1-92. The theater army depends on the U.S. Army Materiel Command for support through the aligned Army field support brigade, contracting support brigade, and logistic civil augmentation program. The Army field support brigade provides national level, materiel focused sustainment support as well as logistic civil augmentation program planning and management. The contracting support brigade provides operational contract support and planning assistance.
1-93. The theater army depends on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for engineering and construction (including roads and buildings), real estate, and environmental management products and services.
Additionally, an engineer topographic company or geospatial planning cell of the MIB provides geospatial information and services to the theater army.
1-94. A military police protective services detachment provides close-in protective service details for the theater army commander, deputy commanders, and other designated high-risk personnel, as required. A force protection team assists the theater army antiterrorism or force protection section in protection, physical security, antiterrorism, and response force operations.
1-95. The theater army also depends on several unique teams to accomplish specialized functions. Defense Logistics Agency personnel provide the theater army logistical reach to the national supply system. A civil affairs planning team from a civil affairs brigade or command provides staff augmentation to the theater army G-9 for operations. A modular CBRN team is assigned to the theater army to establish a full-time CBRN planning expertise and assessment capability within the headquarters. Public affairs detachments or teams augment the organic theater army staff, and establish a media support or broadcast center, if required.
An air traffic services command augments the theater army for air traffic service during operational surges.
An Army band is assigned to the theater army to enhance unit cohesion and Soldier morale and provide musical support for civil-military, multinational, and community relations operations. The theater army depends on the human resources sustainment center and financial management center of the theater sustainment command for the execution of specified personnel and financial management activities. Digital liaison detachments provide liaison between the theater army and multinational headquarters or partners during operations and exercises.
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OPTIONS FOR FORMING A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
1-96. Chapter II of JP 3-33 describes a JTF and options for forming a JTF, and it explains its organization and command relationships in detail. The JTF's mission, composition, and its relationships are based on existing and potential adversaries, the nature of the crisis, and the time available to achieve the end state.
1-97. JP 3-33 points out three options for forming a JTF headquarters. The preferred option is to form a JTF headquarters around a combatant command’s Service component headquarters or the Service component’s existing subordinate headquarters (such as a numbered fleet, numbered Air Force, Marine expeditionary force, or an army corps) that includes an established command structure. As a second option, the GCC may designate the standing joint force headquarters (core element) as the core headquarters element and augment it with additional Service functional experts. The third option is when the combatant command assessment team or similar organization forms the core element for the JTF. This option is used typically where no military presence currently exists.
1-98. The contingency command post of the theater army offers the GCC a fourth option for forming and deploying a JTF or JFLCC. The GCC can use the theater army contingency command post as the core element of a JTF and augment it with additional personnel, either Army or other Service, to conduct the mission. Because of its established habitual internal staff working relationship, the contingency command post is a viable option to support short notice or limited duration operations. (Refer to JP 3-31 and JP 3-33
for more information on JTFs.)
TRAINING IMPLICATIONS
1-99. In most cases, the contingency command post deploys as a rapid redeployment assessment capability for small-scale contingency operations. However, the contingency command post can become the core element for a JTF or be combined with other augmentation components to form the JTF headquarters. Each option for forming the JTF requires specific military skill sets and training levels to ensure the required capabilities are organic to the JTF. One important requisite skill set is the staff’s proficiency on joint mission command systems, networks, and software applications. The theater army is equipped with Army Battle Command Systems and is able to train on them. However, the theater army must coordinate with the GCC to gain access to joint command and control (C2) capabilities for training.
1-100. The United States Joint Forces Command has fielded (or will shortly field) a deployable joint C2
suite of equipment for each GCC (some GCCs may have multiple equipment sets). The deployable joint C2
suite provides the combatant and component commands a rapidly deployable, scalable, modular command post suite, according to the deployable joint C2 program executive office. Reconfiguration of the deployable joint C2 system allows for rapid response and en route communications capabilities if required.
This suite of equipment provides a standardized command post with full joint C2 capabilities. These capabilities include the following: servers, workstations, and satellite uplinks to support the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System, the Combined Enterprise regional Information Exchange System, nongovernmental organizations, Secret Internet Protocol Router Networks and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Networks, Global Command and Control System-Joint and Command and Control Personal Computer applications, and a host of collaborative information environment and communications capabilities. Additional information on deployable joint C2 programs can be obtained at the following Web site: https://www.djc2.org.
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Chapter 2
Theater Army Contingency Command Post Employment
2-1. To better understand how the theater army conducts operations, this chapter examines several historical examples and hypothetical scenarios to illustrate how joint task forces (JTFs) have been formed and used in the past and how the theater army and its contingency command post (CCP) might be employed under similar circumstances in the future. These examples will examine theater army operations, both as the Army Service component command (ASCC) in support of Army and joint forces operating in joint operations areas (JOA)s within the area of responsibility (AOR) and as an Army forces commander (ARFOR) or JTF directly commanding and controlling Army or joint forces conducting operations in a designated JOA. In all cases, the theater army headquarters, with its organic CCP, is simply one of several tools available to the GCC to address the operational mission command requirements across the AOR. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) determines to use or not use the theater army or its CCP in the command and control (C2) scheme for any given operation. The examples that follow merely explore ways for employing the theater army and its CCP.
EXAMPLE NUMBER 1: OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
Figure 2-1. Kuwait Theater of Operations
2-2. The first example, Operation Desert Shield, provides a situation which is useful for examining how the theater army provides sustainment support to Army and joint forces in a JOA. It also provides an opportunity to explore CCP employment options to mission command the initial phases of a long-term 12 October 2011
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operation. The example shows the rapid deployment of an airborne brigade combat team to deter an adversary, followed by a build-up of forces and relief of the CCP-based headquarters by a more capable warfighting headquarters (division or corps). Figure 2-1 on page 2-1 depicts the Kuwaiti theater of operations.
2-3. In the early morning hours of 2 August 1990, three armored divisions of Saddam Hussein’s elite Iraqi Republican Guard crossed the Kuwaiti border and sped toward the city of Kuwait. The several brigades of the Kuwaiti Army, already disorganized by special operations attacks, proved no match for this assault. Within days, most Kuwaiti forces had surrendered or escaped to Saudi Arabia, the Republican Guard divisions had closed the Saudi border, and the Iraqi follow-on forces had fanned out to secure the oil fields and commercial wealth of the small, yet prosperous, country.
2-4. For the American government and President George H. W. Bush, the first priority was to deter further Iraqi aggression and provide an effective defense of Saudi Arabia. The disruption of Kuwaiti oil supplies was damaging enough to the global economy; disruption of Saudi oil supplies could have been disastrous. The Saudis shared President Bush’s view, and their national leadership overcame a traditional antipathy to the presence of foreign troops. On 6 August 1990, Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz approved American intervention to assist in the defense of his kingdom. The president approved the deployment of combat forces to the kingdom. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive assigning Central Command the mission to deter and counter any Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia. The challenge for the U.S. Army and the other Services was to turn the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia into a substantial barrier through which Iraqi forces could not penetrate. Fortunately, U.S. Central Command had anticipated this problem and had developed draft Operation Plan 1002-90 in January 1990
that refocused U.S. Central Command from fighting the Soviets in Iran to defending Saudi Arabia. During mid-July 1990, U.S. Army Forces, Central Command, and Third Army’s main headquarters conducted exercise Internal Look based on Central Command’s Draft Plan 1002-90.
2-5. Under the direction of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the joint force buildup, code-named Operation Desert Shield, began. With the operational area halfway around the world from the United States and thousands of Iraqi troops sitting on the Kuwait-Saudi border, a rapid buildup of forces was critical. The President’s intent was to deploy enough forces to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and, eventually, to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Diplomatic efforts were made to obtain the time needed to build an effective multinational force to fight a war. (See figure 2-2.)
Figure 2-2. U.S. Central Command organization
2-6. Combat forces began deploying to the Persian Gulf area on 7 August 1990. The first Army unit to deploy was the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. With its light antitank weapons and Sheridan tanks, the Second Brigade established perimeter defenses around Dhahran airfield and the port at Al Jubal.
The lead elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post arrived by air on 9 August, and they soon relieved the U.S. Army Central Command forward command post of direct supervision of tactical forces. By 24 August, the remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division had completed its deployment to Saudi Arabia. Additional Army units also arrived in August, including the 7th Transportation Group, the 11th Signal Brigade, and the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. This force package allowed U.S. Army Central Command to meet the daily demands of a changing and growing force. During this phase of the buildup, the Army provided in-theater support for other Services and arranged contracted and host-nation support, including water, subsistence, fuel, transportation, and sanitary support.
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EMPLOYENT OF THEATER ARMY IN DESERT SHIELD AND
SIMILAR SCENARIOS
2-7. The command structure established by Central Command for Desert Shield (and later Desert Storm) was unique in several ways. First, General Schwarzkopf did not establish a subordinate JTF to mission command the operation. Instead, GEN Schwarzkopf, as Central Command commander, retained direct control of his Service and functional components. In addition, he personally served as the land component commander over Third Army (including two Army corps) and the First Marine Expeditionary Force.
General Schwarzkopf did not use a joint force land component commander as advocates of joint doctrine might have expected. However, GEN Schwarzkopf did exercise mission command over all Army forces through a single ASCC headquarters, United States Army Central Command, and Third Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Yeosock. Lieutenant General Yeosock also performed overall land component planning responsibilities for GEN Schwarzkopf in the absence of a dedicated joint force land component commander. United States Army Central Command provided administrative control over all Army forces deploying into the AOR and sustainment support to Army, joint, and multinational forces engaged in the operation (including Army support to other Services, common-user logistics, and Army executive agent functions). United States Army Central Command opened the theater, established aerial and seaports of debarkation, and organized base support areas in Saudi Arabia and in the United Arab Emirates. This is consistent with the current sustainment concept of support (developed and implemented several years after Desert Shield) and the theater army roles and responsibilities for supporting the GCC’s requirements across the AOR and in support of JOAs opened within the AOR, as set forth in this manual. United States Army Central Command executed these Army support functions, even though it did not have a theater sustainment command or other theater enabling commands subsequently provided under current modular Army designs.
2-8. The early phases of Desert Shield provide a scenario to examine options for employing the theater army CCP as a forward command post for immediate response to a crisis. In limited intervention operations such as deterrence or show of force, the very act of deploying an operational command post to a forward location is provocative and may strongly influence the behavior of potential adversaries. It is both a demonstration of political will to confront potential adversaries as well as a practical preparatory measure to establish forward mission command capabilities for the initiation of military operations should deterrence fail. Coupled with the rapid deployment of even a token combat force (in this case, the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division), the timely deployment of a forward command post is a powerful deterrent. The theater army CCP design facilitates its use for immediate response to unanticipated crises and is a viable option in this scenario. Even for operations like Desert Shield, where an extended build-up of forces was expected, the CCP could have been employed effectively as the nucleus of an early entry forward command post for either Central Command or United States Army Central Command. The CCP
could have provided mission command for the immediate response force until reinforced or relieved by a warfighting headquarters capable of commanding and controlling sustained operations (Army division or corps).
2-9. In scenarios similar to Desert Shield, the CCP can form the nucleus of a JTF headquarters, with several options available to the GCC. The GCC can designate the theater army as the JTF headquarters, with the theater army commander functioning as both the Army Service component commander and the JTF commander. Another option is for the GCC to task the theater army to provide the CCP and its personnel to form the core of an ad hoc JTF headquarters under the command of the GCC or other designated senior officer (i.e. another component commander or the GCC’s deputy). The theater army, with its CCP, can also be designated the joint force land component or operational Ar