

FM 3-07

STABILITY OPERATIONS

OCTOBER 2008

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**HEADQUARTERS
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Foreword


Since the terrorist attacks on the American people seven years ago, we have been engaged in an epic struggle unlike any other in our history. This struggle, what may be the defining ideological conflict of the 21st century, is marked by the rising threat of a violent extremist movement that seeks to create anarchy and instability throughout the international system. Within this system, we also face emerging nations discontented with the status quo, flush with wealth and ambition, and seeking a new global balance of power. Yet the greatest threat to our national security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious powers, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people.

As the Nation continues into this era of uncertainty and persistent conflict, the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew. At the same time, emerging drivers of conflict and instability are combining with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our understanding of the global security environment. Military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners.

America's future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate "soft" power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.

The comprehensive approach ensures unity of effort among a very rich and diverse group of actors while fostering the development of new capabilities to shape the operational environment in ways that preclude the requirement for future military intervention. It postures the military to perform a role common throughout history—ensuring the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public services. Equally important, it defines the role of military forces in support of the civilian agencies charged with leading these complex endeavors.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine. It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world.



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Stability Operations

Contents

	Page
PREFACE	iv
INTRODUCTION.....	vi
Chapter 1 THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT	1-1
The American Experience with Stability	1-1
The Strategic Approach.....	1-2
National Strategy	1-10
National and Defense Policies	1-13
Strategy for Stability Operations.....	1-16
Chapter 2 STABILITY IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS.....	2-1
Full Spectrum Operations.....	2-1
Department of State Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks	2-5
Primary Stability Tasks.....	2-9
Stability Operations Framework	2-12
Chapter 3 ESSENTIAL STABILITY TASKS	3-1
Identifying Essential Tasks	3-1
Primary Stability Tasks	3-2
The Role of Civil Affairs in Stability Operations.....	3-21
Mission-Essential Tasks in Stability Operations.....	3-22
Chapter 4 PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS	4-1
Planning Fundamentals.....	4-1
Planning Foundations.....	4-4
Designing Stability Operations	4-6
Chapter 5 TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY	5-1
Authority and Command Responsibility	5-1
Organizing for Transitional Military Authority	5-3
Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority	5-5
Courts and Claims	5-9

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Contents

Chapter 6	SECURITY SECTOR REFORM	6-1
	Background	6-1
	Integrated Security Sector Reform	6-2
	Security Sector Reform Planning	6-5
	Comprehensive Security Sector Reform	6-10
	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	6-19
Appendix A	INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS	A-1
Appendix B	INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	B-1
Appendix C	USAID PRINCIPLES FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT	C-1
Appendix D	INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW	D-1
Appendix E	HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PRINCIPLES	E-1
Appendix F	PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS	F-1
Appendix G	SUMMARY OF CHANGES	G-1
	SOURCE NOTES	Source Notes-1
	GLOSSARY	Glossary-1
	REFERENCES	References-1
	INDEX	Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. Comprehensive approach to stability operations	1-5
Figure 1-2. The fragile states framework	1-10
Figure 1-3. Strategy and policy references for stability operations	1-11
Figure 2-1. Full spectrum operations	2-1
Figure 2-2. An integrated approach to stability operations	2-5
Figure 2-3. The fragile states spectrum	2-12
Figure 2-4. The stability operations framework.....	2-13
Figure 3-1. Relating information engagement to the primary stability tasks.....	3-20
Figure 4-1. Example of stability lines of effort.....	4-10
Figure 4-2. Using SWEAT-MSO	4-11
Figure 6-1. Elements of the security sector	6-3
Figure A-1. Country team members	A-2
Figure A-2. Notional civil-military operations center (battalion and above)	A-13
Figure A-3. Coordination within the CMOC	A-14
Figure D-1. Conflict diagnosis.....	D-4
Figure D-2. Dynamics of instability	D-8
Figure D-3. Analyzing causes of instability	D-11
Figure F-1. Example of provincial reconstruction team organization	F-3

Tables

Table A-1. Members of NATO	A-9
Table A-2. Example of coordination centers	A-12
Table D-1. Tactical stability matrix	D-12
Table E-1. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief	E-5
Table G-1. New Army terms	G-3

Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-07 is the Army's keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. FM 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Training System curricula.

The six chapters that make up this edition of *Stability Operations* constitute the Army's approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any environment across the spectrum of conflict. This doctrine focuses on achieving unity of effort through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but remains consistent with, and supports the execution of, a broader "whole of government" approach as defined by the United States Government (USG). The core of this doctrine includes the following:

- Chapter 1 describes the strategic context that frames the Army's comprehensive approach to stability operations. It includes discussion of the strategic environment, USG strategy and policy, and interagency efforts to define an integrated approach to stability operations that leverages the collective efforts of a wide array of actors toward a commonly understood and recognized end state.
- Chapter 2 links full spectrum operations to broader efforts aiming to achieve stability, emphasizing the simultaneous nature of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. It describes the phasing paradigm that defines stability operations activities conducted before, during, and after combat operations. Finally, the chapter links the primary stability tasks with broader interagency stability sectors to provide the foundation for civil-military integration at the tactical level.
- Chapter 3 addresses the essential stability tasks that comprise military stability operations. It provides a detailed discussion of each of the five primary stability tasks, and describes the subordinate tasks that constitute the range of activities in stability operations. It includes doctrine that describes the role of civil affairs forces in stability operations as the commander's conduit for civil-military integration. Finally, it describes development of mission-essential and directed task list development to support stability operations.
- Chapter 4 discusses the fundamental principles of the detailed component of planning, focused on the stability element of full spectrum operations. It builds on the precepts established in FMs 3-0 and 5-0, providing a systemic approach to planning and assessing stability operations.
- Chapter 5 addresses transitional military authority and provides doctrine concerning command responsibility, establishment, and organization of military government to support stability operations. It includes principles for establishing judicial structures to enable transitional military authority.
- Chapter 6 provides the doctrinal foundation for security sector reform, and introduces security force assistance as the capacity-building activity that encompasses organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising host-nation security forces. It also sets disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as a fundamental element of security sector reform.

Seven appendixes complement the body of the manual.

Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-07 links stability operations doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and JP 5-0. FM 3-07 expands on the fundamental principles of operations expressed in FM 3-0 and links those principles to a comprehensive approach to stability operations within the framework of full spectrum operations. FM 3-07 also uses text and concepts developed in conjunction with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners.

The principal audience for FM 3-07 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army, officers in the rank of major and above, who command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It is just as applicable to the civilian leadership of the Army. This manual is also intended to serve as a resource for the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, agencies of other governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities who seek to develop a better understanding of the role of the military in broader reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

FM 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. *Text references*: Definitions for which FM 3-07 is the proponent publication are in boldfaced text. *Glossary references*: Terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent (authority) publication include an asterisk in the glossary entry. These terms and their definitions will be included in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions within the text, the term is italicized and the reference number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

The term “adversaries” includes both enemies and adversaries when used in the context of joint definitions.

FM 3-07 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

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Introduction

Today, the Nation remains engaged in an era of persistent conflict against enemies intent on limiting American access and influence throughout the world. This is a fundamental clash of ideologies and cultures, waged across societal abysses separating rich ethnic and religious traditions and profound differences in perspective. The Nation is embarking on a journey into an uncertain future where these precipitous divides threaten to expand as a result of increased global competition for natural resources, teeming urban populations with rising popular expectations, unrestrained technological diffusion, and a global economy struggling to meet the mounting demands from emerging markets and third world countries.

The character of this conflict is unlike any other in recent American history, where military forces operating among the people of world will decide the major battles and engagements. The greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars of our past. However, time may be the ultimate arbiter of success: time to bring safety and security to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. This is the essence of stability operations.

Joint doctrine provides a definition for stability operations that captures the role of military forces to support broader governmental efforts:

[Stability operations encompass] various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).

This manual proceeds from that definition to establish the broad context in which military forces assume that role before, during, and after combat operations, across the spectrum of conflict. In doing so, the manual focuses the efforts of military forces appropriately in support of the other instruments of national and international power; thus, the manual defines a comprehensive approach to stability operations in a complex and uncertain future. For Army forces, those efforts are fundamental to full spectrum operations.

The essential nature of stability operations in this era of persistent conflict became increasingly clear following combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing this shift in focus, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented DODD 3000.05 in November 2005. The directive emphasized that stability operations were no longer secondary to combat operations, stating:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

The directive further stressed that stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations. Thus, the directive elevated stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis sets the foundation for this doctrine.

This manual addresses military stability operations in the broader context of United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. It describes the role of military forces in supporting those broader efforts by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure

environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and help transition responsibility to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is fundamental to the shift in focus toward long-term developmental activities where military forces support broader efforts in pursuit of national and international objectives. Success in these endeavors typically requires a long-term commitment by external actors and is ultimately determined by the support and participation of the host-nation population.

However, this manual also provides doctrine on how those capabilities are leveraged to support a partner nation as part of peacetime military engagement. Those activities, executed in a relatively benign security environment as an element of a combatant commander's theater security cooperation plans, share many of the same broad goals as stability operations conducted after a conflict or disaster. Such activities aim to build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, foster economic growth, and help to forge a strong sense of national unity. Ideally, these are addressed before, rather than after, conflict. Conducted within the context of peacetime military engagement, they are essential to sustaining the long-term viability of host nations and provide the foundation for multinational cooperation that helps to maintain the global balance of power.

Through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, military forces establish conditions that enable the efforts of the other instruments of national and international power. By providing the requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area, those efforts build a foundation for transitioning to civilian control, and eventually to the host nation. Stability operations are usually conducted to support a host-nation government or a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning host-nation government exists. Generally, military forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the host nation is capable of providing these services for the local populace. They perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the complementary activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When the host nation or other agency cannot fulfill their role, military forces may be called upon to significantly increase its role, including providing the basic civil functions of government.

By nature, stability operations are typically lengthy endeavors. All tasks must be performed with a focus toward maintaining the delicate balance between long-term success and short-term gains. Ultimately, stability operations do not necessarily aim to reduce the military presence quickly but to achieve broader national policy goals that extend beyond the objectives of military operations. The more effective those military efforts are at setting conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national power, the more likely it is that the long-term commitment of substantial military forces will not be required.

To that end, military forces have to operate with the other instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole of government approach. This approach accounts for a wider range of considerations beyond those of the military instrument, ensuring that planning accounts for broader national policy goals and interests. For the commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing operations within an environment of political ambiguity. As a result, the potentially slow development process of government reconstruction and stabilization policy may frustrate flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of combat operations. Thus, integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in a stability operation is essential to long-term peace and stability.

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Chapter 1

The Strategic Context

It is needless to say that Charles Gordon held a totally different view of the soldier's proper sphere of action, and with him the building part of the soldier's profession was far more important than the breaking part.... The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.

Colonel Sir William F. Butler
Charles George Gordon

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH STABILITY

1-1. During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always gravest. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America's very way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are now considered stability operations, where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks. Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.

1-2. America's experience with stability operations began with the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*. King George III of Great Britain issued it after the British acquired French territory in North America following the French and Indian War. Intended to stabilize relations with Native Americans, the proclamation established British foreign policy to regulate trade, settlement, and land purchases on the British Empire's vast western frontier. The proclamation also limited expansion of the thirteen colonies, essentially outlawing them from purchasing or settling territory west of the Appalachian Mountains. With the Proclamation, King George III authorized the British military to execute colonial policy in the Americas, including the ability to detain and arrest those who violated the proclamation.

1-3. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 3 September 1783, Congress appointed military commissioners to negotiate peace treaties and land purchases with native tribes. However, Congress had no means of enforcing the policy. In 1786, it passed *The Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs* and placed the program under Secretary of War Henry Knox. Secretary Knox directed the commanders of the frontier posts to support the Indian superintendents in settling disputes, regulating trade, adjusting land claims, and enforcing the law. Later, President George Washington tasked Secretary Knox with developing and implementing a military plan to prevent hostilities against settlers on former Indian lands. This experience continued in the trans-Mississippi West for the rest of the nineteenth century, where military forces enforced treaty agreements while protecting settlers moving into the western United States.

1-4. During the occupation of central Mexico from 1846 to 1848, General Winfield Scott quickly achieved the support of the local populace through programs focused on their immediate needs. His forces protected the goods and trade routes of local merchants, allowing markets to reopen quickly in the aftermath of operations. He instituted local programs to remove accumulated garbage and the obvious signs of war. Finally, he established civilian jobs programs that infused much needed cash into the local economies.

1-5. During Reconstruction following the Civil War, military forces maintained order and provided security. These forces also initiated comprehensive measures to establish new state governments, hold

elections, ensure the well-being of freed slaves, and provide for economic and social development. Military forces assumed three roles during Reconstruction in the South:

- As an occupation force following the war, supporting a Presidential-appointed civilian government.
- As a military government under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867.
- As a supporting force to elected state governments until 1877.

1-6. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States conducted a number of small-scale military operations around the world. It imposed a military government in Cuba, initiating free elections; reform of the security sector; and health, sanitation, and public works programs. A similar effort in the Philippines, however, resulted in a nationalist uprising that evolved into an insurgency lasting more than a decade. When President Woodrow Wilson ordered American forces into the Mexican coastal city of Veracruz in 1914, Soldiers soon found themselves performing the same humanitarian, governmental, economic, and security tasks performed in Cuba and the Philippines 15 years earlier. In 1915, the Marine Corps began a series of Caribbean interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. However, they faced constant armed, irregular opposition from the local populace and had little success establishing effective constitutional governments using the lessons of the past.

1-7. The occupations of Germany and Japan following World War II serve as models for modern post-conflict stability operations as the Army reorganized and retrained its forces for a peacetime role focused on the reconstruction and development of war-torn nations. The postwar occupation of Japan provides similar lessons. The initial 60 days of occupation focused on disarmament and demobilization, essential to the demilitarization of the Japanese military complex and the democratization of Japanese society. In 1958, following the overthrow and murder of the pro-American Iraqi royal government, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered military forces to conduct a show of force to help quell civil unrest in Lebanon, providing much-needed stability to the Beirut government.

1-8. Vietnam earned America invaluable experience with the complexity of conducting operations *among the people*. Military forces contended with an established insurgency while working alongside the other instruments of national power to bring peace and stability to South Vietnam. Through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (known as CORDS), the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense were integrated under a “single manager concept” that effectively achieved the civil-military unity of effort vital to success. While the overall war effort was ultimately unsuccessful, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support provided valuable lessons that helped shape contemporary approaches to stability operations.

1-9. Following the end of the Cold War, the Army began reducing force structure while preparing to reap the benefits of a new era of peace. The benefits of this “peace dividend” were never realized. The strategic environment evolved from one characterized by the bipolar nature of the relationship between the world’s dominant powers to one of shared responsibility across the international community. In the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Army led or participated in more than 15 stability operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and the Balkans. Many of these efforts continued into the new century, and incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world: the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of such destabilizing forces proved staggering.

THE STRATEGIC APPROACH

1-10. In the complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security persist across the spectrum of conflict. In this world of sovereign states, unequal in development and resources, tension and conflict are ubiquitous. Sources of instability that push parties toward open conflict, known as drivers of conflict, include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. The drivers of conflict emerge as numerous symptoms of crises worldwide. In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence continue to

complicate international relations. These conditions create belts of state fragility and instability that present a grave threat to national security. While journeying into this uncertain future, leaders will increasingly call on stability operations to reduce the drivers of conflict and instability and build local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth.

1-11. Any integrated approach to stability operations requires a framework that applies across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. It must frame purposeful intervention at any point along that spectrum, reflecting the execution of a wide range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational environments—

- To support a partner nation during peacetime military engagement.
- After a natural or man-made disaster as part of a humanitarian-based limited intervention.
- During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements.
- To support a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare.
- During major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities.
- In a post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized hostilities.

1-12. In each instance, the roles and responsibilities of the various actors—civilian and military—vary according to the threat, stability of the environment, viability of the host-nation government, and several other factors. When the situation requires intervention, posturing such an effort for success necessitates a detailed conflict assessment; this assessment provides a thorough measure of those factors and helps to appropriately delineate roles and responsibilities among the actors involved. This assessment also serves as the basis for planning, which links the broad strategic goals to a realizable end state, supporting objectives, and discreet, executable tasks. The resulting plan nests these together into a coherent framework optimally suited to address the conditions of the operational environment identified by the initial conflict assessment. (See chapter 4 for a discussion of planning consideration in stability operations; see FM 5-0 for doctrine on planning.)

1-13. For many agencies and organizations, stability operations are considered as part of broader efforts to reestablish enduring peace and stability following the cessation of open hostilities. For military forces, however, stability tasks are executed continuously throughout all operations. Executed early enough and in support of broader national policy goals and interests, stability operations provide an effective tool for reducing the risk of politically motivated violence. It does this by addressing the possible drivers of conflict long before the onset of hostilities. Providing the authority and resources to conduct these stability operations as part of peacetime military engagement may be the most effective and efficient method to mitigate the risk of lengthy post-conflict interventions.

UNITY OF EFFORT

1-14. Uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability operations requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. This is the essence of *unified action*: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). *Unity of effort* is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach to stability operations.

1-15. Unity of effort is the foundation of success for operations that require integrating the capabilities of all the instruments of national power, as well as those of other nations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector. However, many actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations, participate in unified action at their own discretion. Their roles are often defined by competing interests and governed by differences in policy; in the case of nongovernmental organizations, their activities are driven by fundamental humanitarian principles and may have goals

separate from the United States Government (USG) or the international community. (See appendix E for additional detail on humanitarian response principles.)

1-16. Therefore, unity of effort in such complex endeavors is often the operational norm. Unity of effort leverages the ability of various actors to achieve a cooperative environment that focuses effort toward a common goal, regardless of individual command or organizational structures. The mechanisms for achieving unity of effort are maximized when a legitimate, functioning host-nation government exists. Military forces coordinate their efforts through host-nation civilian agencies and the county team to sustain the host nation's legitimacy, build capacity, and foster sustainability. However, if the state has failed through military action or other socioeconomic factors, then a transitional authority must assume responsibility for governing. This can be a transitional civil authority typically authorized by the United Nations and under international lead, or a transitional military authority. (Chapter 5 discusses transitional military authority.)

A Whole of Government Approach

1-17. A ***whole of government approach*** is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A whole of government approach is vital to achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. It relies on interagency coordination among the agencies of the USG, including the Department of Defense, to ensure that the full range of available capabilities are leveraged, synchronized, and applied toward addressing the drivers of conflict and reinforcing local institutions to facilitate achieving sustainable peace. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation. Accomplishing this requires a willingness and ability to share resources among USG agencies and organizations while working toward a common goal. These resources—financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications—are often limited in availability and cannot be restricted to use by a single agency, Service, or entity. To achieve the broad success envisioned in a whole of government engagement, all must be integral to unified action. All are elements of the whole of government approach.

1-18. To that end, all actors involved in unified action are integrated into the operation from the onset of planning. Together, they complete detailed analysis of the situation and operational environment, develop integrated courses of action, and continuously assess the situation throughout execution. These actions ensure that the various capabilities and activities focus on achieving specific conflict transformation goals in cooperation with host-nation and international partners. (See paragraph 1-23.) A coherent whole of government approach requires early and high-level participation of both national and multinational civilian and military participants. This process necessitates active dialog and reciprocal information sharing with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the host-nation government, and the private sector, when necessary.

1-19. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole of government approach is the differing capacities and cultures in civilian agencies compared to those of military forces. A successful whole of government approach requires that all actors—

- Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process.
- Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved.
- Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
- Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.
- Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.

A Comprehensive Approach

1-20. A ***comprehensive approach*** is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity

of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach is founded in the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. It is common in successful operations involving actors participating at their own discretion or present in the operational area but not acting as a member of a coalition. Integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of actors involved; a comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain but still critical to achieving success in an operation with a wide representation. See figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1. Comprehensive approach to stability operations

1-21. Forging a comprehensive approach is necessary to leverage the capabilities of the disparate actors present to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. Unlike a whole of government approach, which aims for true interagency integration toward those ends, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort. In a comprehensive approach, actors are not compelled to work together toward a common goal; instead, they participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that goal represents. Achieving the end state is in the best interests of the actors participating; the actors recognize that fact forges the bonds that allow them to achieve unity of effort. Some groups, such as nongovernmental organizations, must retain independence of action. Reconciling that independence with the mission requirements may pose specific challenges to unity of effort and must be considered throughout the operations process.

1-22. A comprehensive approach is framed by four underlying tenets:

- **Accommodate.** The approach accommodates the concerns and contributions of all participants; it determines appropriate priorities for resourcing and sets support relationships as required to deconflict activities.
- **Understand.** The approach leverages a shared understanding of the situation toward a common goal. Understanding does not imply conformity; each actor contributes a distinct set of professional, technical, and cultural disciplines, values, and perceptions. Together they provide breadth, depth, and resilience to assessment, planning, and execution.

- **Base on purpose.** The approach focuses cooperative effort toward a common, purpose-based goal. The approach links discreet, yet interrelated, tasks and objectives to conditions that comprise the desired end state.
- **Cooperate.** The approach is based on a cooperative effort reinforced by institutional familiarity, trust, and transparency. Communities of practice that provide forums for information sharing and concept development support cooperation among the actors involved.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

1-23. Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. ***Conflict transformation is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.*** It aims to set the host nation on a sustainable positive trajectory where transformational processes can directly address the dynamics causing civil strife or violent conflict. It seeks to resolve the root causes of conflict and instability while building the capacity of local institutions to forge and sustain effective governance, economic development, and the rule of law.

1-24. Addressing the drivers of violent conflict begins with a detailed conflict assessment and thorough analysis of the conditions of the operational environment. This ensures planning focuses on the root causes of conflict or strife and prescribes integrated approaches to resolution. (See chapter 4 for a discussion of assessment and planning.) The active and robust presence of external military forces may be required to help shape the environment and reduce the drivers of violent conflict, in partnership and cooperation with a sizable international civilian presence. Together, efforts are directed toward imposing order, reducing violence, delivering essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord. Peace becomes sustainable when the sources of conflict have been reduced to such an extent that they can be largely managed by developing host-nation institutions. This facilitates the subsequent reduction of external actors to levels that foster the development effort with minimal outside presence.

1-25. Ultimately, conflict transformation aims to shift the responsibility for providing security and stability from the international community to the host nation, with a sustainable level of continuing support from external actors. Conflict transformation recognizes that conflict is a normal and continuous social dynamic within human relationships and seeks to provide effective peaceful means of resolution. Conflict transformation is based in cultural astuteness and a broad understanding of the dynamics of conflict. Success depends on building creative solutions that improve relationships; it necessitates an innate understanding of underlying relational, social, and cultural patterns. Success relies heavily on understanding, recognizing that conflict can potentially stimulate growth and to leverage that potential to spur constructive change. This understanding is based on:

- The intellectual capacity to envision conflict positively, as a natural social phenomenon with inherent potential for positive change.
- The flexibility to adapt approaches to respond in ways that maximize this potential for constructive growth.

1-26. It exploits the opportunity within a conflict to achieve positive change. It aims to reduce the motivations and means for violent conflict. At the same time, conflict transformation develops more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and economic goals. This entails addressing the drivers of conflict while assisting in developing or supporting local institutions that have both legitimacy and the capacity to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and security. It derives its long-term success from shaping the environment so the local populace can actively check the state's abuse of power.

1-27. Successful conflict transformation relies on the ability of intervening actors to identify and resolve the primary sources of conflict and instability in the host nation. These efforts reflect the constant tension between the time commitment required to achieve sustainable progress and the need to quickly build momentum to lessen the drivers of conflict and instability. National interest and resources are finite; therefore, conflict transformation efforts must focus on the underlying sources, not the visible symptoms,

of conflict and instability. In countries seeking to transition from war to peace, often a limited window of opportunity exists to reshape structures to address these drivers. This may include deterring adversaries and mitigating their effects on local populaces and institutions, as well as developing approaches that include marginalized groups, consensus-building mechanisms, checks and balances on power, and transparency measures.

LEGITIMACY

1-28. Legitimacy is central to building trust and confidence among the people. Legitimacy is a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective. Within national strategy, legitimacy is a central principle for intervention: both the legitimacy of the host-nation government and the legitimacy of the mission. The legitimacy of the government has many facets. It generally represents the legitimacy of the supporting institutions and societal systems of the host-nation. Legitimacy derives from the legal framework that governs the state and the source of that authority. It reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but also the foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. It reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups: the local populace, individuals serving within the civil institutions of the host nation, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public.

1-29. Ultimately, a legitimate government does not go to war against its population or instigate unwarranted hostilities with its neighbors. A legitimate government acts in accordance with human rights laws and ensures that citizens have access to state resources in a fair and equitable manner. It respects the rights and freedoms reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and abides by human rights treaties to which it is a party. In addition, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (known as the *National Security Strategy*) lists four traits that characterize a legitimate, effective state in which the consent of the governed prevails:

- **Honors and upholds basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.** Respects freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press.
- **Responds to their citizens.** Submits to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government.
- **Exercises effective sovereignty.** Maintains order within its own borders, protects independent and impartial systems of justice, punishes crime, embraces the rule of law, and resists corruption.
- **Limits the reach of government.** Protects the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent businesses, and a market economy.

1-30. The legitimacy of the mission is as sensitive to perceptions as it is dependent upon the support and participation of the local populace in the processes that comprise the mission. *Ownership*, a central tenet of successful stability operations that capitalizes on that support and participation, is fundamental to legitimacy. (See appendix C for a discussion of the principle of ownership.) The legitimacy of the mission includes four distinct factors:

- Mandate.
- Manner.
- Consent.
- Expectations.

1-31. The mandate or authority that establishes the intervention mission often determines the initial perceptions of legitimacy. Multilateral missions with the broad approval of the international community have a higher degree of legitimacy than unilateral missions. These might include missions conducted by a coalition under a United Nations' mandate.

1-32. The credible manner in which intervening forces conduct themselves and their operations builds legitimacy as the operation progresses. Highly professional forces are well disciplined, trained, and culturally aware. They carry with them an innate perception of legitimacy that is further strengthened by consistent performance conforming to the standards of national and international law. For military forces, a

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