

ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY \j.
G. F. STOUT, LL.D., F.B.A.
FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN
THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE, MUSEUM STREET, W.C. i
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

First Edition, April, 1896
Second Edition, Sepf., 1902
Third Edition, Fed., 1909
Fourth Edition, Jan., 1918
CONTENTS.
BOOK II.

MENTAL PROCESSES.
CHAPTER V.

_ ^ Noetic Synthesis.

Aj SECTION PAOB

•/J

I. Noetic Synthesis as distinguished from Association, - . . . i

— " ~ ~

2. Simple Perception,

^

fj 3. Possibility of Impressional Revival and Association,

- - - - 11

— — 4. Grades of Simple Perception, 16

^ 5. Complex Perception, 18

6. Grades of Perceptual Complexity, - -

29

7. How does a Sense-Impression suggest a Percept ? . . . - 30

- " " ^

8. Noetic Synthesis and the Train of Ideas,

31

Vj. 9. Mutual Implication of Synthesis and Analysis, - - - . -

39

^ 10. Noetic Synthesis and Apperception, 40

y* II. Final Remarks, 41

CHAPTER VI.

*

Relative Suggestion.

| | |
|---|------|
| I. Unconscious Inference, | 43 |
| 3 2. Mental Productiveness in General (i), | 45 |
| , -^ 3. Mental Productiveness in General (2), | 49 |
| ^ 4. Types and Examples of Relative Suggestion, | 52 |
| ^n- 5. Relative Suggestion in Perceptual Process, | 65 |
| ^ 6. Relative Suggestion in Automatic Movement, | 72 |
| "t 7. Informal Inference, | 73 |
| 8. The Play of Imagination, | 76 |
| g. Relative Suggestion as related to Suggestion by Formal Similarity, • | 78 |
| 10. Formal Inference, | 81 |
| CHAPTER VII. | |
| .0*** | |
| Conation and Cognitive Synthesis. | |
| J I. Conation and Cognition developed coincidentally, | 82 |
| fH 2. Practical and Theoretical Conation, | 93 |
| ^ 3. Miscellaneous Illustrations, | 103 |
| > | |
| iv Contents. | |
| CHAPTER VIII. | |
| Apperception. | |
| SECTION PAGE | |
| 1. Explanation of the Term, » • -no | |
| 2. Mental Systems, | 114 |
| 3. Apperception and Assimilation, - - - - - • | -118 |
| 4. Connective Arrangements, | 121 |
| 5. Serial Evolution of Apperceptive Systems, | 124 |
| 6. Apperception and Fixation, | 127 |
| 7. Co-operation and Competition of Apperceptive Systems, ... | 128 |
| 8. Conditions determining the Strength of Apperceptive Systems, - - | 132 |
| g. Negative Apperception, | 140 |
| 10. Destructive Apperception, | 144 |
| 11. Conflict of Systems, | 145 |
| 12. Suggestibility, | 154 |
| 13. Issue of Conflict, | 156 |
| 14. Conditions determining the Train of Ideas, ---.-- | 163 |
| 15. Thought and Association, | 164 |
| CHAPTER IX. | |
| Comparison and Conception. | |
| I Analysis of Comparison, - - . . . - . . . | 168 |
| 2. Comparison a Process Distinctive of the Human Mind, - • - | 171 |

3. Comparison as Rudimentary Conception, 173
4. Comparison as Quantitative, 175
5. Conception by means of Representative Examples, 176
6. Generic Images not Identical with Rudimentary Concepts, - - - 179
7. Functions of Generic Images, 183
8. Intuitional Thinking, 186
- g. In what sense Intuitional Thinking involves Generalisation, - • 187

CHAPTER X.

Thought and Language.

1. The Essential Functions of Language, igo
2. Language and the Train of Ideas, ig4
3. Combination of Words, ig7
4. The Social Factor, 202
5. Comparison as conditioned by Conceptual Analysis and Synthesis, - 205
6. The Explication of Concepts, 206
7. Universe of Discourse, 211
8. The Subject-Predicate Relation, 212
9. Interconnection of Sentences, 214
10. Occasional Meaning of Expressive Signs, 215

Contents. v

SECTION PAGE

11. Modification of Meaning by Analogy, 218
12. The Objective Categories of Grammar,
219
13. Gesture-Language, 221
14. Gesture-Language tends to become Conventional, . - . .
224
15. Limitations of Gesture-Language, 225
16. Formlessness of Gesture-Language,
227
17. The Varieties of Conventional Language, -.-.-. 228

CHAPTER XL

Belief and Imagination.

1. Introductory,
234
2. Belief as a Condition of Activity,
234
3. Belief as Limitation of Activity,
239
4. Belief and Impressional Experience,
244
5. The Real as Physical Resistance, --.....
245
6. Belief and Association,
248
7. Apperception and Belief, --

252

8. Desire as a Cause of Belief,

254

g. Primitive Credulity,

258

10. The Conditions of Imagination,

260

11. Imagination as Play,

262

12. Influence of Imagination on Conduct, --...--

265

CHAPTER XII.

Pleasure and Pain.

1. Statement of Problem,

268

2. General View,

269

3. Psychological Application, - . .

271

4. Physiological Application, 2S7

5. Muscular Action, 290

6. Organic Cravings,

299

7. Pain-Sensations, - . . .

300

8. Sensations of the Special Senses, -

^oi

g. The Psychological Theory of Sense-Pleasure and Pain, - - -

303

AN/VLYTIC PSYCHOLOGY.

CHAPTER V.

NOETIC SYNTHESIS.

§ I. Noetic Synthesis as Distinguished from Association.

By noetic synthesis I mean that union of presentational elements which is involved in their reference to a single object ; or, in other words, in their combination as specifying constituents of the same thought. It is by noetic synthesis that those complex psychical units come into being which we call percepts, ideas, and concepts. All these words imply something which is perceived or conceived, or of which we have an idea ; and it is this objective reference which constitutes each of them a unit in mental process. This kind of synthesis has a twofold application, according as the elements unified are themselves anoetic or noetic. As an example of the first case, we may take our recognition of persons by

means of peculiarities in their appearance which we are unable to analyse, so that, if any alteration took place, although we should notice the difference, we should not be able to detect wherein it consisted. Similarly, we may be able to identify a musical note as having a certain timbre, without being able to distinguish the overtones which give it its peculiar quality. But the second application of noetic synthesis is most important for the detailed explanation of mental process. It is to be

VOL. II. I

2 Analytic Psychology.

found wherever the objective reference is to a whole consisting of parts each of which may constitute a distinct object. In the developed consciousness the whole mind is more or less perfectly organised into a system of noetic units, in which partial apprehensions are subordinated to more comprehensive apprehensions, and these in their turn to others still more comprehensive. The percept of a particular thing in space has subordinated to it the percepts or ideas of the constituent parts of the thing and of its various sensible qualities. So the idea of the thing as it occurs in a train of thought embraces under it not merely the ideas answering to the subordinate percepts, but also the ideas of the special relations which give it its interest and significance as part of the train. This mental organisation may be compared to that of a complex society, such as an army ; the part played by the apprehension of the whole in connecting the apprehensions of the parts is comparable to the function of the officer who gives unity and combined action to the group placed under his control. The unity of the army depends on the commander-in-chief; the unity of the various divisions depends on the generals of division ; the unity of the regiment depends on the colonel ; that of the company on the captain. It would obviously be an absurdity to attempt to account for the organisation of an army merely by the contiguous adhesion of the soldiers inter se, apart from the descending scale of subordination to officers. But it is an absurdity of an exactly analogous nature, though much greater in degree, to attempt to account for the systematic unity of the human mind by mere association. We have already paved the way for the application of this analogy, and for the exposition of noetic synthesis in general. In chapter iii. of book i. we discussed the connection between our cognisance of form of combination and our cognisance of the parts combined. We there showed that our cognisance of the form of combination characteristic of a whole is a mode of Noetic Synthesis.

consciousness distinct from our cognisance of its constituents. In chapter iv. we showed that the apprehension of a whole could take place independently of the apprehension of its component details. This we called implicit apprehension. We also pointed out that the implicit apprehension of a whole might be combined with the successive apprehension of each of its components, so as to control the order of their emergence, and to exclude the intrusion of irrelevant objects. This we called schematic apprehension, and we found that it constitutes the essence of whatever can be properly termed a train of thought. If the reader carefully attends to these distinctions he will have no difficulty in clearly separating the conception of noetic synthesis from that of association. Association comes into play only in so far as co-ordinate elements tend to suggest each other, because they have been previously combined in a certain order. In any given stage of a train of thought the next step is partly determined by the controlling influence of the central idea of the topic with which the whole series is concerned, and partly by the special idea which has last emerged. In so far as it is determined by the special idea which has last emerged, the principle of association is operative ; in so far as it is determined by the central idea of the whole topic, noetic synthesis is operative. Association also manifests itself in the casual accompaniments of irrelevant imagery which appear in the course of the process, and in the casual suggestions which give rise to sudden transitions to other topics which may be wholly disconnected with the pre-existing train. It is mere association, for instance, which would lead a man in a conversation about peace and war to begin to talk about Peace the murderer. But the antithesis between noetic synthesis and contiguous adhesion is brought out in the clearest light by the passage of attentive into automatic process. In proportion as automatism supervenes association becomes substituted for thought-control, and in the 4 Analytic Psychology.

final stage completely supplants it. Thus, when we are walking without attending to our movements, our progress is wholly determined by the association between a certain group of sensations experienced at a given moment and a corresponding motor impulse. In learning to read, a child has at the outset to attend carefully to the connection between written characters and the sounds for which they stand. The idea of this connection dominates the whole process of learning. But the educated adult finds that the sight of the characters immediately suggests the sound as if it were part

and parcel of the visual impression, so that he can give his whole attention to the subject-matter of a book or letter without in the least considering the connection between visual and auditory signs. Association has been so strengthened by repetition that it has become capable of fulfilling by itself the function of attention.

We shall now proceed to a systematic examination of noetic synthesis as it appears at different levels of mental life, in simple perception, complex perception, image or idea, and conception. At the same time we shall consider carefully its connection with associative process.

§ 2. Simple Perception.

By simple perception is meant the immediate identification and distinction of an object presented to the senses, whether this be a simple sensible quality, like red or blue, or a complex thing, having a multiplicity of parts and of sensible qualities, each of which is capable of being separately identified. The nature of simple perception as thus defined has already been touched upon in discussing so-called association by similarity. We then pointed out that to perceive a thing at all implies our perceiving it as such or such, — in the words of Spencer, " we identify it as a particular thing or range it

Noetic Synthesis,
5

with certain kindred things ". We also pointed out that this does not commonly involve the ideal recall, either of other appearances of the same thing, or of other appearances of like things. If I look at a horse I immediately know it for a horse, without summoning up mental images of other horses. Ordinary introspection is quite sufficient to bear out this statement. But if it needed further corroboration, this would be supplied by the existence of simple perception where the power of ideal recall is absent. On meeting a man, I may feel convinced that I have met him before, without being able to recall when or where. In certain cases of aphasia the power of remembering words is wanting, though the words may be distinguished and identified when they are heard, so that the patient can write from dictation and understand what is said to him. To take an instance at random a man who has lost memory of substantives, "on being shown a tumbler glass shakes his head and says it is for beer but cannot remember its name ; he knows it is not called a basin, a mug, or a jug, and recognises the word

' glass ' directly it is named ; but the next minute he has forgotten it, and cannot repeat it".^

Charcot reports a case in which the power of recalling visual imagery was almost entirely lost, though visual perception was by no means proportionately affected. As Dr. Ward points out, the patient could sort wools, although he could not mentally image colours. To this pathological evidence we may add the appearance of simple perception in stages of psychical life in which mental images cannot be supposed to exist. The lower animals, such as fishes, can identify their prey or their mate

;

there is no evidence to show that they can think about these objects when they are not sensibly present. Indeed, it has been supposed that percepts may be innate. Such instances as that of the chicken picking up grains on its emerging from F. Bateman, M.D., on Aphasia, p. 103.

6 Analytic Psychology.

the shell are apt to suggest this view. But both the facts and the inference are doubtful.

What is the precise character of this peculiar mode of consciousness which we call simple perception? It might be supposed that it consists merely in the bare reference of a specific experience to a specific object, and that it does not involve the relation of the apprehension of a whole to the apprehension of its parts. Closer consideration will, however, lead us to take a different view. Whatever is perceived is recognised as such or such; and however vague and rudimentary the recognition may be, it implies a reference to something beyond the given object. The object comes before consciousness as an instance, or example, or particular appearance of something which may have other instances, or examples, or particular appearances. The precise mode of consciousness involved is perhaps best indicated by reference to a special phase of it in which its nature is manifest with peculiar clearness. After having noted a succession of similar objects, such as sheep passing through a gap in a hedge, I exclaim: "There's another

!

" or simply, "Another one!" Now, the only perceptual or ideal image which exists in my consciousness at the time will in all probability be that of the object which provokes my exclamation. But the word

"

other" implies a reference beyond this particular object; a reference to what, for psychological purposes, we may regard as a whole, of which the presented particular is a constituent part. This whole is an object of implicit apprehension, and in all human perception, at least, some such implicit

apprehension appears to be involved. All identification implies distinction, and in simple perception the distinction can only exist in this form.

How is simple perception connected with association ?

Association of ideas cannot be regarded as among its pre-conditions, for ideas do not precede but follow perception, and Noetic Synthesis.

7

even presuppose a considerable measure of perceptual complexity. Percepts, as we have seen, may exist without the corresponding ideas ; and it is equally true that ideas may exist without the corresponding percepts. The spontaneous remembrance of spoken or written words may be conjoined with word-blindness and word-deafness. The patient for whom spoken language is merely a confused murmur, may none the less be able to express his thoughts with considerable freedom. Similarly, in a remarkable case of psychical blindness, reported by Wilbrand, a lady who could perfectly well with closed eyes summon up before her mental view the images of objects and of their relative position, was thoroughly confused and bewildered by her inability to identify the same objects when actually present, so that she could not find her way without a guide. If, then, association plays any part in simple perception, it must be association between the residua of impressions, as distinguished from percepts. But here the grand difficulty emerges, that impressions as such do not appear to be revived at all, except in certain rare and curious cases. The most obvious way of parrying this objection is to put forward a theory such as that of Bain, according to which the residua of previous like impressions immediately blend with the new one and are merged in it. We may even dismiss the supposed plurality of numerically distinct residua, and simply refer identification to the re-excitement of a previous disposition. On this last view, of course there will be no room for association or reproduction, but we may consider it along with the theory based on the attraction of similars, because the same criticism applies to both. The main point of this criticism has already been indicated (pp. 279-281). It is that frequent repetition of like impressions fails to lead to identification. We here add two further examples in order to clinch our case. The first I quote from Mr. Edridge-Green.

" The plane-tree

is one of the commonest trees in London

;

8 Analytic Psychology.

most of the avenues contain large numbers of them, and nearly

all the trees in the quadrangle of St. Bartholomew's Hospital are plane-trees ; and yet I have taken a leaf and shown it to numbers of students and other persons, and asked them if they knew what it was. They have all said, * No ; I have never seen anything like it before'. And one, who prided himself on his botanical knowledge, even went so far as to say,

I am positive I have not, because I always notice everything, and should certainly have remembered if I had '. Next day he remarked to me, * It's very strange my not having noticed it before ; but I saw numbers of trees with leaves like the one you showed me yesterday on my way home '. . . . I was taking a walk with a relation who was very much interested in superficial botany, and anxious to know the names of the different trees and plants. So I went up an avenue (where nearly every second tree is a plane-tree), and pointed out the various trees and shrubs, mentioning their names, of course taking no notice of the plane-trees. I then turned into a side-avenue of a similar character, and, having reached the centre of it, stopped in front of a plane-tree, and asked,

Have you ever seen a similar tree to that before?' and received the answer I expected. 'No; I think that must be a very rare tree. I don't remember ever having seen one like it before.' We were in sight of two or three dozen at the time, and the great surprise expressed at finding every other tree a plane was amusing." ^

The following is an instance from my own experience. I was about to try a series of experiments with the view of ascertaining how far and under what conditions it is possible to discriminate the components of a compound smell or taste. For this purpose a number of spices, such as cinnamon, clove, nutmeg, etc.. were used. By way of *Edr)dge-Green on Memory, pp. iig, 120, 121.

I
Noetic Synthesis.

g
preliminary I tested my power to identify the several smells separately, rather as a matter of form than from any doubt of my ability to do so. To my amazement I found that in a large proportion of cases I utterly failed to recognise quite familiar odours. Nor was the failure due to inability to recall names. In point of fact, I knew beforehand the names of the spices which were to be used ; but when the right name occurred to me, I did not know it was the right name. My

helpless bewilderment pointed distinctly to a deficiency in perceptual discernment. To realise the importance of such facts as these, we must note that the repetition of impressions is not merely of itself insufficient to give rise to identification, but that it fails to do so even when interest is aroused. I could not identify the smell of a familiar spice, even though I had an intense desire to do so. This shows not only that the preacquired disposition need not in point of fact generate perceptual consciousness, but that it is incapable of doing so. It is not enough that the residua of previous impressions should be re-excited. Their re-excitement must bring with it a peculiar modification resulting in a new growth, both mental and physiological. On the physiological side we may take this to imply the establishment of a connection between "lower level" impressional nervous arrangements, and "higher level" perceptual nervous arrangements. However this may be, it is clear that the acquirement of a new kind of percept presupposes more than the repetition of impression. It presupposes interest ; it arises only when psychical activity is set in a certain direction. Of course it is a *varepov irporepov* to say that we feel interest in an object before it is perceived. What is meant is, that we feel an interest in some kind of whole, of which the object forms part, and that the interest requires for its fuller gratification further distinction and analysis.

If this account of the matter be correct, it does not necessarily follow that association plays no part in the development of simple perception.

It may enter into the gradual process of differentiation of a preformed disposition, which ultimately issues in perceptual consciousness. A possible mode in which this may take place is indicated by a general condition of distinction and identification, first formulated, I believe, by Lotze, and since very clearly expounded by Stumpf and James. This condition, as stated by James, is that "any total impression made on the mind must be unanalysable whose elements are never experienced apart" . . . "If all cold things were wet and all wet things cold, if all hard things pricked our skin and no other things did so; is it likely that we should discriminate between coldness and wetness, and hardness and pungency respectively ?" ^ "The converging of the eyeballs and the accommodation for near objects are, for each distance of the object (in the common use of the eyes), inseparably linked, and neither can (without a sort of artificial training . . .) be felt by itself" ^ "The contraction of the diaphragm and the expansion of the lungs, the

shortening of certain muscles and the rotation of certain joints, are examples " * of an analogous kind. " The as-safoetida in * Worcestershire sauce ' is not obvious to any one who has not tasted assafoetida per se. In a ' cold ' colour an artist would never be able to analyse out the pervasive presence of blue, unless he had previously made acquaintance with the colour blue by itself." ^ Let us now consider the mode in which this principle may be supposed to operate. How is it that the recurrence of the like impression in dissimilar contexts leads to identification ? Obviously, the presented content and its corresponding disposition must in some way undergo a modification which is one of the conditions of the genesis of the percept. How does this modification take

1

Psychology, vol. i., p. 502. ^Ibid. ^ Ibid.

* Ibid. ^ Ibid.,

p. 504.

Noetic Synthesis. ii

place ? It is conceivable that the differentiation arises merely from the excitement of the same disposition,/? , in conjunction with varying psychical concomitants. But it seems probable that besides this the associative principle also comes into play. D becomes associated with different, and usually conflicting dispositions X, Y, Z, so that whenever the corresponding impression arises in consciousness its nature is modified by preacquired reproductive tendencies. We need not suppose that these tendencies actually take effect in the distinct revival of previously experienced impressions. It is enough to assume that they give rise to increased complexity in the disposition D, and in the answering sensations. We shall adduce a little later on examples of this effect of association. In so far as the variable associations acquired by D are mutually conflicting, they will tend more or less to counteract each other, so that the central process immediately connected with D will suffer a kind of mechanical detachment from its impressional setting, and acquire a certain salience in consciousness. In some such way we may suppose association, even at the level of purely sentient process, to play a part in the transition from anoetic to noetic consciousness.

§ 3. Possibility of Impressional Revival and Association.

It must be admitted that this suggestion is somewhat speculative and precarious, but there is, I think, a presumption in its favour. It does not presuppose the existence of ideas, and it does not regard ideas as " traces, copies, or residues of sensations " } What it does assume is the possibility of

impressional revival and association. To judge from Dr. Ward's article in *Mind*, above referred to, he would entirely deny this possibility'. But it is clear that in so doing he would

*

Dr. Ward in *Mind*, N.S., No. 12, p. 531.

12 *Analytic Psychology*.

overstate his case. There are not wanting instances which are hard to interpret without assuming impressional revival. Instances of purely impressional association are rarer and more doubtful. I would call association purely impressional when one impression reinstates another without the intervention of ideas. But cases are not very rare in which an idea reinstates an impression, or in which a percept reinstates another percept.

Some persons can summon up mentally so vivid a presentment of colour that the negative image follows, as if the colour had actually been before their eyes.

J. Miiller

vouches for this fact, and A. Binet, in his *Psychologic du Raisonnement*, reports a number of cases. It is difficult to suppose that such after-images can arise otherwise than through a previous excitement of impressional centres. In dreams we have a sequence not merely of ideas, but also of percepts more or less connected in the way of association. Similarly, in the hypnotic state, it is possible to suggest hallucinations and to determine the mode and time of their occurrence by preformed association. Purely impressional association is probably involved in certain curious instances of hypnæsthesia, in which delirium or the use of drugs seems to revive the residua of a series of experiences which could never have been recalled under normal conditions. The well-known case recorded by Coleridge is perhaps the most remarkable, though it is by no means isolated. " In a Roman Catholic town in Germany a young woman who could neither read nor write was seized with a fever, and . . . was heard talking Latin, Greek and Hebrew. Whole sheets of her ravings were written out, and found to consist of sentences intelligible in themselves, but having slight connection with each other. ... At last the mystery was unveiled by a physician, who . . . discovered that at the age of nine she had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor, a great Hebrew scholar, in whose

Noetic Synthesis. 13

house she lived till his death. On further inquiry, it appeared to have been the old man's custom for years ... to read to himself with a loud voice out of his books. The books were ransacked, and . . . many of the passages taken down at the

young woman's bedside were identified." ^ What is especially deserving of notice in this case is the extreme difficulty of supposing that the associative recall took the form of a sequence of ideas. We have good reason for affirming that the woman had no ideas of the sounds which she uttered. Ideas are the counterpart of percepts, but how should the necessary percepts be formed simply by overhearing the strange sentences? The discrimination, identification, and complex synthesis of sound would have required minute and careful study, together with an exceptional mental endowment. All this we have to suppose in a young girl who is said to have been a "simple creature," and who "could neither read nor write". Is there any explanation admissible except that the fever rendered the impressional centres more unstable and excitable, and that in consequence the revival took the form of a series of actual sensations ? We seem here to have an instance of purely impressional association. Professor J. Baumann mentions a case of very similar nature as having recently occurred. A man who had taken an overdose of morphia recited passages out of Homer. He was quite ignorant of ancient Greek, and the explanation turned out to be that, as a boy, he had overheard students committing passages to memory.

There is also abundant evidence to show that even under normal, or approximately normal, conditions impressional revival may take place. It is difficult to explain such experiences in the way of mental vision as those communicated to Francis Galton by Mr. Henslow, without assuming more

*

Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, p 55.

14 Analytic Psychology.

than mere ideation,^ Dr. Wi'gan refers to an English painter who explains his mode of work in this way : " When a sitter came I looked at him attentively for half an hour, sketching from time to time on the canvas. I wanted no more. I put away my canvas and took another sitter. When I wished to resume my first portrait, / took the man and set him in the chair^ where I saw him as distinctly as if he had been before me in my own proper person — I may almost say more vividly. I looked from time to time at the imaginary figure, then worked with my pencil, then referred to the countenance, and so on, just as I should have done had the sitter been there — when I looked at the chair I saw the man. Gradually I began to lose the distinction between the imaginary figure and the real person ; and sometimes disputed with sitters that they had been with me the day before. At last I was sure of it

;

and then—all is confusion. ... I lost my senses, and was thirty years in an asylum."- Finally, I may mention an experience of my own which greatly impressed me. Under the influence of a large dose of haschisch I found myself totally unable to distinguish between what I actually did and saw, and what I merely thought about. The value of this experience lies in the fact that I was throughout able to observe my own mental state.

All this evidence in favour of impressional revival does not in the least countenance the theory that ideas are merely faint revivals of impressions. On the contrary, it tends strongly in the opposite direction. It shows that a revived impression is itself an impression, and not an idea. This is well brought out by the testimony of some of Galton's correspondents. " There are some who visualise

^

Galton, Human Faculty and its Development, p. 161, ff.

2

Wigan, A New View of Insanity, p. 125, quoted by Taine on Intelligence, pp. 45-46.

Noetic Synthesis. 15

well, and who also are seers of visions, who declare that the vision is not a vivid visualisation, but altogether a different phenomenon. . . . The following is a good instance of this condition. A friend writes : ' I find it difficult to define the difference between a waking vision and a mental image, although the difference is very apparent to myself. I think I can do it best in this way. If you go into a theatre and look at a scene—say of a forest by moonlight—at the back part of the stage you see every object distinctly and sufficiently illuminated (being thus unlike a mere act of memory), but it is nevertheless vague and shadowy, and you might have difficulty in telling afterwards all the objects you have seen. This resembles a mental image in point of clearness. The waking vision is like what one sees in the open street in broad daylight, when every object is distinctly impressed on the memory'. The two kinds of imagery differ also as regards voluntariness, the image being entirely subservient to the will, the visions entirely independent of it. They differ also in point of suddenness, the images being formed comparatively slowly as memory recalls each detail, and fading slowly as the mental effort to retain them is relaxed, the visions appearing and vanishing in an instant. The waking visions seem quite close, filling as it were the whole head, while the mental image seems farther away in some far-off recess of the mind.'"^ It

is evident that the uncontrollable nature of these visions make? them unfit for use in a train of thought, and the same holds good of Mr. Henslow's analogous experiences. But if the case against the identification of impressional revival and association, with ideal association and revival, is rather corroborated than weakened by this evidence, it remains true that impressions may be revived as well as ideas, and there is some reason to suppose that they may even be associated with each

^

Galton, Human Faculty and its Development, pp. 164-65.

1

6

Analytic Psychology.

other. There is at least a presumptive possibility that the process which we find operative in an exaggerated form in the exceptional instances above quoted will not be wholly inoperative under ordinary conditions. It is legitimate to take account of the possibility that the quality of a sensation may, by contiguous association, become modified in some such way as the quality of a fundamental note is modified by its upper tone. This suggestion will receive a more definite form presently, when we come to discuss complex perception.

§ 4. Grades of Simple Perception.

The noetic synthesis involved in simple perception has many different gradations, varying with the fineness of the distinctions which are recognised. The shepherd who can separately distinguish and identify each individual sheep in his flock is greatly superior in this respect to the ordinary person who can scarcely notice any difference between one sheep and another, even with the fullest opportunities for comparison. Many idiots require a long training before they can identify colours or shapes with anything like ordinary accuracy ; and the colour discrimination of the artist is as much superior to that of most ordinary persons as the idiot's is inferior. Mr. Edridge-Green quotes a case of a professional man of great ability who " is unable to recognise his best friends (until they speak). He has got into an omnibus and sat opposite his mother, and thought to himself that he seemed to know her face. . . . He has to judge in other ways, as by their speech, peculiarities, etc. But he is able to draw, and the sketches (which of course are not very complicated) are very fair representations of the objects intended, and from which they are copied very carefully. But on a minute examination of the drawings there was found to be no individuality ofform ; the curves and lines were the simplest possible, and looked as if they might have

Noetic Synthesis. 17

been executed with the aid of a ruler and compasses, which, in fact, many of them were," ^ A close pathological parallel to this perceptual deficiency is found in a case of psychical blindness reported by Groenouw. His patient could recognise a statue of Mercury, as such, but not as the one which he had himself carved ; he could draw a sofa, but not the particular sofa in his own room. In most instances of psychical blindness there is not merely a failure to identify, but a wrong identification.

So far we have considered the bare fact of immediate identification, disregarding whatever complexity may exist in the object identified. In complex perception the object is composed of distinct constituents, each of which may be separately perceived. At the same time it forms for the percipient consciousness a unity of such a nature that the perception of the part involves the perception of the whole, as such. The percepts of the partial constituents are percepts of the whole from different points of view. Thus I may immediately identify an object in the dark by means of touch, or I may recognise it in the light by visual perception. The distinction between simple and complex perception is rather logical than real ; it seems impossible to adduce an instance in which an object is simply identified without any discernment of its different parts or aspects. It would seem that an animal identifies its prey at least from two points of view: (i) in the moment of anticipation, (2) in the moment of fruition. In the first moment it sees, smells or touches something eatable ; in the second moment there emerges the distinctive feeling of actually eating this something. Of course it would be absurd to look for any case of absolutely simple perception in the more developed consciousness.

It should be noted that in the absence of ideas the noetic

Mtmory, pp. 75-76-
VOL. II. ?

1

8

Analytic Psychology.

synthesis involved both in simple and complex perception operates as a principle determining the serial order of mental process, only in so far as it determines bodily movement. Thus in the case of the animal and its prey the initial perception of the object determines a sequence leading to the following perception, through the medium of appropriate movements. So the squirrel's recognition of a nut is a noetic synthesis

Thank You for previewing this eBook

You can read the full version of this eBook in different formats:

- HTML (Free /Available to everyone)
- PDF / TXT (Available to V.I.P. members. Free Standard members can access up to 5 PDF/TXT eBooks per month each month)
- Epub & Mobipocket (Exclusive to V.I.P. members)

To download this full book, simply select the format you desire below

