Atlantica: The Legislative History of the Atlantic Union Movement in the U.S. Congress and Beyond (1939 - 1980) by Richard R. Biondi - HTML preview

PLEASE NOTE: This is an HTML preview only and some elements such as links or page numbers may be incorrect.
Download the book in PDF, ePub, Kindle for a complete version.

Exhibit 2—Analysis of the Atlantic Union Resolution

 

A—Testimony of Under Secretary of State John D. Hickerson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1950.

 

~

 

Mr. HICKERSON. Mr. Chairman, in addressing myself to Senate Concurrent Resolution 57, calling for United States initiative in convening the participants to the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to the establishment of a free Atlantic Federal Union, I should like to point out that application of “the principles of free federal union” as between the United States and any other country or countries would involve not only basic economic and social changes bust also changes in the structure of the United States Government. While all of us in the department are acutely aware of the urgency for continued study to sound, practicable action in progressing toward closer association of the free world, it is the fundamental issues which this resolution raises in terms of both the United States and other countries which I would like first to discuss.

Senator WILEY. It seems to me the basis of the resolution is simply to explore, is it not?

Senator HICKERSON. Yes, sir. I shall deal with that in the course of my comments, Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. All right.

 

PUBLIC REACTION TO ATLANTIC UNION

 

Mr. HICKERSON. What would be the reactions of our fellow Americans to the implications of such an Atlantic Federal Union?

Clearly, United States participation in such a union would involve the ceding of power by the United States Government to some new authority in many fields, such as the conduct of relations with other governments, control of our armed forces, taxation, imports, currency, exploitation of our national resources, and immigration. Are the American people prepared to do so? To what kind of authority? By what process?

Most of the powers which would be transferred would affect every American, but some powers would affect some groups more than others. What would be the effect on labor standards? Business? Agriculture?

 

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

 

Presumably, amendment of the United States Constitution would be involved. What mandate from the people or the Congress would United States representatives need to negotiate with other governments on matters which would involve such changes?

Other countries proposed for membership have different forms of government than ours and different political systems. How far would the American people be prepared to go in altering our form of government? Are they prepared to have the representatives of the American people a minority in the parliament of such a union?

 

EFFECT ABROAD

 

Now let us consider the effect of this proposal on other nations of the free world. It would be difficult to establish a federal Atlantic Union without profound economic repercussions upon agriculture, industry, and labor of all participating countries. Just as in our own case, which peoples would be prepared to relinquish part of their sovereignty in such fields as imports and exports, currency, taxation, immigration, and defense?

What would be the effect of the establishment of the proposed Atlantic Union up free countries not included in the Union upon their sense of security and upon their attitude toward the United States?

Furthermore, one of the most difficult problems in any new international arrangement is the question of membership. What other countries would be invited to participate in this Union and on what basis would they be selected? The composition of this Union or Convention would greatly affect its character. The more homogenous the group, the easier it is to make progress, but the greater the number excluded. For the present, the approach of separate arrangements for dealing with different problems, and with different membership, is valuable in preventing any sharp distinction between the “ins” and the “outs.”

 

CLOSER ASSOCIATION NECESSARY

 

It is true that the acceleration of scientific development and of the impact of events in an increasingly crowded world lends urgency to the need for further developments in the field of political relationships. We believe that progressively closer association, by limited and practicable steps on the basis of common interests, and in support of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, within as much as practicable of the free world, is both necessary and desirable. The United States as a world power must accordingly participate in the process of association in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary most effectively to promote its common interests with other free nations.

In the development of such closer associations, care must be exercised not to set in motion forces which will render more difficult the maintenance of the solidarity of the free world in support of the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

In a number of countries in the Atlantic community, progress in both the national and international fields has resulted from the willingness of certain groups to accept sacrifices primarily on the basis of national interest. It will take a very long time before similar strong loyalty to a new political unit emerges. We believe that under the present North Atlantic Treaty arrangements, we are utilizing this force in the most constructive way at this stage of development in international relations. The establishment at this time of such a federation, far from providing additional strength, could be a source of weakness and greater internal divisions. Furthermore, the effective operation of democracy in some of the suggested participants is severely hampered by the system of splinter parties which might be carried over and even intensified in such a federation.

We are dealing with new problems, new at least in form, magnitude, and intensity. We need new answers. We must draw on available patterns and historical experience as far as we can, but this field involves far-reaching pioneering. New patterns, new methods, and new institutions will all be necessary, and they cannot be found, much less developed, overnight.

It is easy to overemphasize the importance of institutional changes. The basic functional problems, economic and other— such as the dollar gap, for instance—must be solved in any event. New institutional forms will undoubtedly be necessary, and work on the functional problems will help to indicate their nature more clearly. The establishment of new institutions can facilitate solution of these problems, and where that is true they should certainly be established. Their establishment, however, will not in itself solve them.

We are convinced that the Congress and the people support our working toward world conditions adequate to assure the individual the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness through both the method of seeking by all practicable means to strengthen the United Nations and the method of progressively closer association within the free world, utilizing practicable associations based on common interest.

We should continue to support such presently practicable measures as the Economic Cooperation Administration, mutual defense assistance program, operation of the North Atlantic Treaty and the inter-American system, cooperation with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, ratification of the International Trade Organization, and encouragement of such developments as Benelux and the Council of Europe. The people, the Congress, and the Executive can each play a valuable role in formulating the basis for further decisions as to what is practicable and in the United States interest, and each has a great responsibility to discharge in considering such decisions and implementing them when taken.

 

CONVENTION WOULD RAISE FALSE HOPES

 

The proposed resolution directs its attention primarily to calling a convention to explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union. We believe that if the Government should sponsor such a convention at this time, it would raise false hopes. If the convention did not succeed, it would lead to reactions unfavorable to the cause of collective security.

Under present circumstances, such a convention appears more likely to bring to light and emphasize the divisions among the proposed members of the Atlantic Union than to lead to substantial progress in the desired direction. In view of these facts, the projected convention would seem likely to weaken rather than strengthen both the Atlantic community and the United Nations. We, therefore, feel that the convention should be called only if it is clearly evident that (1) it will advance American interests; (2) that both the convention and program have the support of the American people and other peoples concerned, with a full understanding of the implications of each; (3) that there is a reasonable chance of agreement; and (4) that it would strengthen rather than weaken both the North Atlantic community and support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

 

STATE DEPARTMENT CANNOT SUPPORT SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 

For the reasons which I have given, the Department cannot support this particular resolution. Yet I believe that the finding of answers to the problems which have just been raised constitutes a great challenge to both official and private thoughts, and we at the State Department are devoting our best efforts toward making our contribution.

 

~

B—Pros and Cons of the Atlantic Union Resolution Presented by the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1950

 

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 57 (THE KEFAUVER OR "ATLANTIC UNION" RESOLUTION)

 

A. Essentials of resolution

In the light of the experience of the United States in the creation of a Federal union as a means of safeguarding the individual liberties and common heritage of the American colonies, this resolution requests the President to invite the democracies of the North Atlantic (Canada, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the United States) to name delegates representing their principle parties to meet in a federal convention "to explore how far their peoples. . .can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union." Other democracies might be invited to join the convention or come into the union, if one were established, at a later date.

The resolution calls for a convention "to explore" the possibilities of the creation of an Atlantic Union. Representation to the convention, according to supporters of the resolution, would be roughly on a population basis; voting would be by states on the instrument the conference might produce, subject to subsequent ratification by the parties; the United States delegation might include representatives from the executive, the legislature, State officials, and private citizens. Some proponents of the resolution might envisage a constitution which would contain a bill of rights, and a frame of government including a legislature, and executive capable of enforcing law upon the citizens, and judiciary to adjudicate disputes between citizens.

Power might be divided in three ways: (1) those reserved to the people, (2) those reserved to the states, and (3) those delegated to the union. The latter might include "(1) a union defense force and foreign policy; (2) a union free market; (3) a union currency; (4) a union postal system; (5) a union citizenship in addition to national citizenship; and (6) a union power of taxation to render the union capable of implementing and exercising its delegated powers" (Mr. Justice Roberts, hearings, pp. 235 - 236).

United States participation in such a union would require amendment to the Constitution. An attempt to form such a union would not, according to its proponents, violate any provisions of the UN Charter. The union would be "totally independent" of the Charter.

The Atlantic Union proposal differs from most of the other proposals in two very important ways. In the first place, it does not contemplate any kind of open door for the Soviet Union to come in if it wishes. Secondly, while it does propose bypassing the United Nations, neither does it call for working through the United Nations.

  1. Principle arguments in support of resolution
  1. This is a simple resolution that asks nothing more than that the United States "explore" the possibility of applying federal union principles to unite the democracies of the North Atlantic. No one should object to exploration of this important matter at this critical time in world history.
  2. This resolution contains an idea and a definite plan for strengthening the democracies in the cold war. It is realistic because it seeks to bring together peoples with a like heritage and with experience in democracy.
  3. An effective Atlantic Union would reduce the danger of Soviet aggression since it would "cement the tremendous resources of these democracies" and thereby supply the only safety we can expect in this world –

 

"a      tremendous preponderance of power…" (Justice Roberts, hearings, p. 248.). "No nation on earth would dare attack" such a union (Mr. Clayton, hearing, p. 267).

 

  1. Passage of the resolution would quiet European fears of our possible return to isolationism.
  2. This plan cannot be vetoed or delayed by the United Nations and yet it would immeasurably strengthen the United Nations by uniting those members most devoted to the UN aims of world peace, world freedom, and world justice.
  3. An Atlantic Union would establish a free market 400,000,000 people. This would provide an element of stability for the people within the union as well as for people outside the union who would have to deal with it. Competition within this vast, rich, free market area would create within a few years the most efficient system of production and distribution that the world has ever known.
  4. The people of the world interested in democracy and freedom would get a psychological lift from the creation of a union of the democracies. Such a union would hold forth hope to people behind the iron curtain who now see no hope of eventual liberation, as well as to backward and colonial peoples of the world who aspire to freedom and democracy. An Atlantic Union would create such preponderance of military and economic strength on the side of freedom that the Soviet Union would be willing to make agreements that might lead to world peace.

 

  1. Principal arguments against the resolution.

1. The establishment of a federal union as between the United States and any other country or countries would involve not only basic economic and social changes but also important changes in the structure of the United States Government. It is very doubtful if the American people are ready to amend the Constitution to the extent necessary to give an Atlantic Union the powers it would need to be effective.

  1. The establishment of a federal Atlantic Union would

have—

 

profound economic repercussions upon agriculture, industry, and labor of all participating countries (hearings, p. 436).

 

Such a union at this time might raise more problems than it would solve and care would need to be exercised—

 

not to set in motion forces which will render more difficult the maintenance of the solidarity of the free world in support of the principle and purposes of the United Nations (hearings, p. 437).

 

Furthermore, the establishment at this time of such a federation might not provide additional strength but might instead be a source of weakness and internal divisions within the Atlantic Treaty area.

3. While it is recognized that new basic functional problems, such as the dollar gap, must be solved and new institutional forms will undoubtedly be necessary, it is early to overemphasize the importance of institutional changes. The establishment of new institutional forms will not itself solve the problems.

4. If the Government were to sponsor at this time a convention to explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union, it might raise false hopes. If the convention did not succeed, it might well lead to reactions unfavorable to the cause of collective security.

Under the present circumstances, such a convention appears more likely to bring to light and emphasize the divisions among the proposed members of the Atlantic Union than to lead to substantial progress in the desired direction (hearings, p. 438).

5. The representatives of the Department of State indicated that a convention should only be called only if it is clearly evident that

1) it will advance American interests;
2) that both the convention and program have the support of the American people and other peoples concerned, with a full understanding of the implications of each; and
3) that there is a reasonable chance of agreement; and
4) that it would strengthen rather than weaken, both the north Atlantic community and support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (hearings, p. 438).

6. An attempt by the Atlantic nations to create a preponderance of power might be construed by other nations as an attempt on the part of the democracies to dominate the world. That construction of the event would certainly be put forth by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, such a development might be construed as a surrender to the balance of power theory and might intensify the arms race.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exhibit 3—The Atlantic Union Committee, Inc

 

Submitted to Congress in 1955

 

~

 

ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, INC

 

1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.

 

OFFICERS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

 

President: Hon. Owen J. Roberts (deceased), former Supreme Court Justice.

Vice president: Hon. Will L. Clayton, former Under Secretary of State.

Secretary: Hon. Lithgow Osborne, former Ambassador to Norway.

Treasurer: Elmo Roper, marketing consultant and public-opinion analyst.

Chairman, executive committee: Gerald B. Henry, president, Henry & Henry, Buffalo, N.Y.

 

Note.—According to a public opinion survey, published in Public Opinion Quarterly in January 1954, nearly 10 million Americans believe in Atlantic Union.

 

The Atlantic Union Committee is composed of a national council and thousands of men and women, organized into more than 100 chapters. Similar committees exist in Canada, Britain, France, and the Netherlands.

 

ADDITIONS TO ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, INC., NATIONAL COUNCIL SINCE MARCH 15, 1955

 

Hon. Chester Bowles, former Governor of Connecticut

The Right Reverend Richard S. Emrich, bishop of Michigan

Hon. Guy M. Gillette, former United States Senator

Hon. Rudolph Halley, former president, city council, New York

Mr. G. E. Hamilton, Democratic State committeeman for Crawford County, Meadville, Pa.

Dr. Wilbur K. Jordan, president, Radcliffe College, Massachusetts.

Nicholas Kelly, director, Chrysler Corp., New York

Gen. George C. Marshall, former Secretary of State, and General of the Army

Hon. Henry T. McIntosh, editor, Albany Daily Herald, Georgia

The Right Reverend Arthur J. Moore, Atlanta, Ga.

Richard W. Norton, Jr., oil producer, Louisiana

Milton Rosenthal, president, Nelson's of Rome, Inc., New York

Rev. Harold Paul Sloan, Jr., Michigan

Hans Christian Sonne, chairman, National Planning Association, New York

A. Van Nierop, former banker, New York

Edward S. White, attorney, Atlanta, Ga.

Harold L. Bache, senior partner, Bache & Co., New York

 

DELETIONS FROM ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, INC. NATIONAL COUNCIL SINCE MARCH 15, 1955

 

Deceased:

Mrs. Mary McCloud Bethune, founder of National Council of Negro Women, Inc., Florida

Allen L. Billingsley, president, Fuller, Smith & Ross, Cleveland

Prof. William Y. Elliott, professor of government, Harvard Judge

John Knight, judge, United States district court

Resigned:

Stanley Pedder, attorney, California

Mrs. F. K. Weyerhaeuser, civic leader, St. Paul, Minn.

 

MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND BOARD OF GOVERNORS

 

Alabama:      

Dr. Lee Bidgood, dean, School of Commercial Business Administration, University of Alabama

James A. Simpson, attorney, Birmingham

Arizona:

Herbert Agar, historian, former editor, Louisville Courier Journal

Dr. Grady Gamage, former president, American Association of Teachers Colleges; president, Arizona State College

William A. Glassford, vice admiral, USN, retired

H.O. Hammond, mining engineer, Tucson

Hon. Richard F. Harless, former Member of Congress; attorney

Dick Jenkins, rancher

Rt. Rev. A. B. Kinsolving II, bishop of missionary district of Arizona

George F. Spaulding, Phoenix

Arkansas:

Mrs. John R. Hackett, civic leader, Little Rock

Hon. Sidney McMath, former Governor of Arkansas

California:

Paul S. Achilles, former president, the Psychological Corporation of New York

James D. Adams, attorney, San Francisco

Albert C. Agnew, former attorney, Federal Reserve bank

Warren H. Atherton, former national commander of American Legion

Dr. Robert R. Aurner, administrative consultant

Dr. Thomas Swain Barclay, professor of political science, Stanford University

Dr. Rosalind Goodrieh Bates, president, International Federation of Women Lawyers

Admiral Andrew C. Bennett, retired naval officer

George Biddle, writer and artist

Edgar Bissantz architect, Carmel

Dr. Elliot Blackwelder, geologist; past president, Geological Society of America

William A. Boekel, attorney, San Francisco

Dr. Karl Brandt, agricultural economist, Stanford University

Frank Capra, motion-picture producer

Lyle E. Cook, attorney, Oakland

Aylette B. Cotton, attorney, San Francisco

Chester C. Davis, economist: associate director, Ford Foundation

Maj. Gen John R. Deane, USA, retired, president, Italian-Swiss Colony Wine Co.; Chief, American Military Mission to Russia, Word War II

Hon. Douglas L. Edmonds, California Supreme Court Justice

Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., writer, motion-picture Actor, producer

J. R. Files, attorney, Los Angeles

Farnham P. Griffiths, attorney: president of Bohemian Club, SF

Dr. Rohert Gulick, Jr., director, Teaching Institute of Economics, University of California

Prof. Morgan Harris, professor of economics

Conrad N. Hilton, president of Hilton Hotels Corp.

Arthur Hornblow, Jr., motion picture producer

Dr. Henry S. Houghton, physician: former director, Peking Union Medical College, China

George Jessel, motion picture producer, actor, author