The Argument from Causality by N. Fakhr - HTML preview
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Week Eleven: Free Will and Determinism; What Does Determinism Mean? What Does Free Will Mean?
Skeptic: “You’re late!”
Believer: “I was going over the answer I had prepared for you, and I became so absorbed in it that I stopped paying attention to where I was going. I walked right past this place and had to turn around and come back. Anyway, I have a good answer for you.”
Skeptic: “I’m eager to hear it.”
Believer: “I don’t deny that there may be situations in which we human beings, because of environmental or psychological causes, feel compelled and have no choice but to make certain decisions. But at crucial moments, we feel with our whole being that we are capable of making a choice without any compulsion whatsoever.
“Free will is something we know intuitively. We feel it with our whole being, and it cannot be denied. No human being can say that, between determinism and free will, determinism alone governs our lives, because moments in which we exercise free will have hardly been rare in our lives. Even if causality or determinism apparently implies that our decisions are predetermined and inevitable, we still cannot deny what we experience within ourselves. The sense of free will is entirely intuitive and undeniable, and it outweighs all such theorizing.”
Skeptic, whose gestures made it clear that he did not agree with the Believer at all, was about to say something when the Believer continued:
“Let me give you an example. Depending on my physical condition, how tired my legs are, and how much money I have in my pocket, I might weigh all the relevant considerations in deciding whether to walk home, take the bus, or hire a taxi, and eventually prefer one option over the others. My preference and the choice I make are rooted in various internal and external factors. Although I may imagine that I have made a free choice, it was already determined which option I would choose. And, as you said, if someone had complete knowledge of my inner world and the world outside me—that is, of my mind and the environment in which I live—he could predict my choice. In this respect, I agree with you that although we sometimes think we are choosing freely, in reality we are ‘compelled’ to make a particular choice.
“But there are also cases in which this is simply not so. For example, at this very moment, I can choose between the two sheets of paper lying in front of me: I can pick up the one on the left or the one on the right. I have no reason to prefer either one. Whichever one I choose, my choice will be entirely free, with no internal or external ‘compulsion’ involved. Neither my inner world nor the world outside me can ‘compel’ me to make one of these two choices.”
Skeptic: “I think there has been a major misunderstanding here. And this misunderstanding is not peculiar to you. Perhaps we could even say that many philosophers who argue against determinism not only fall into this misunderstanding, but insist quite strongly on clinging to it—as though it were their only trump card and, if they gave it up, they would lose the game.”
Believer: “What misunderstanding?”
Skeptic: “In the expression ‘determinism and free will,’ when determinism is the product of causal determination or of the animator model, the word ‘determinism’ does not mean psychological compulsion. It does not mean that, ‘against our own inner desires,’ we are forced to make a choice imposed upon us by various factors. Nor does it mean that, within our own minds, we actually ‘feel’ compelled or reluctant.
“Of course, perhaps the word ‘compulsion,’ when used in discussions of ‘divine decree and destiny,’ may have the meaning you have in mind—that is, psychological compulsion. In discussions of ‘destiny,’ for example, it may be said that God has decided in advance what our fate will be and what event will befall us at a particular time; or that God decides whether we will be among the guided or the misguided; or that God or the cosmos has decreed that, at a particular time, a certain boy will bring about Pharaoh’s downfall. From that point onward, none of Pharaoh’s attempts to prevent the event will succeed, and his inevitable fate will come to pass ‘against his will.’
“Or consider someone trying to escape the appointed hour of his death. Whatever decisions he makes, his appointed hour eventually arrives, and through his own choices—choices he has no alternative but to make, and which he may sometimes make reluctantly—he ultimately walks into the arms of his foretold death. He is forced, against his will and reluctantly, to submit to his appointed end.
“In the past, many people believed—and many still do—that our destiny is written in such a way that even if we knew it beforehand, we could not remove it from our path. Here, ‘compulsion’ means that, despite our inner wishes and with psychological reluctance, we are forced to choose among options that all lead us toward our prewritten destiny, and every attempt to escape it is futile.
“But the ‘determinism’ that follows from the law of causality is something entirely different. Here, the claim is not that the law of causality forces us to make choices we dislike or that run contrary to our inner desires.
“Here, ‘determinism’ means this:
According to the law of causality, the choice we make entirely willingly is itself a phenomenon whose occurrence has already been determined.
“In other words, our inner desire, the act of will that arises within us, and our action are all phenomena. They are therefore products of causality and are determined—that is, their coming into existence has already been causally determined. Perhaps, then, it would be better to use the expression ‘causal determinism’ rather than simply ‘determinism,’ so as to encompass both causal models of creation: creation through a chain of causes and effects, and creation in the manner of an animation.
“Using the word ‘compulsion’ in any sense other than causal compulsion will lead us into faulty reasoning.
“If I say:
A bank is a financial institution.
The side of a river is a bank.
Therefore, the side of a river is a financial institution.
“This means that I have failed to notice that the word bank is being used in two different senses. My syllogism therefore commits the fallacy of equivocation. In one premise, bank means a financial institution; in the other, it means the land alongside a river.”
“The same applies to the word ‘compulsion’ in the debate over determinism and free will. If we understand compulsion to mean ‘psychological compulsion’ and argue, ‘Sometimes, at the moment of choice, we do not feel compelled at all,’ then we have misunderstood what ‘compulsion’ means in this context and have committed the fallacy of equivocation.
“If determinism holds, then which sheet of paper you pick up from the table ‘of your own free inclination’—that is, according to an inclination that arises within you—is already determined. Whether you do it while feeling compelled or while feeling completely free makes no difference whatsoever to the fact that the phenomenon is determined, nor does it introduce any breach into the law of causality.
“At the moment before you have decided which sheet of paper to pick up, it is you who are ignorant of what will happen in the future. You interpret your own ignorance as evidence that it has not really been determined in advance what decision you will ultimately make and which sheet you will choose.
“But it is a mistake to equate ‘our ignorance of the future’ with ‘the future being undetermined.’
“If determinism holds, then even at this very moment, it is already determined what decision you will make regarding those sheets of paper.”
Believer: “So, given your understanding of determinism, can you tell me whether you are sitting here of your own free will or not?”
Skeptic: “That question, too, stems from a misunderstanding of causal determinism. Of course I am sitting here because I want to, and I feel no psychological compulsion or reluctance whatsoever.
The right question is this: Was the fact that I am sitting here of my own free will determined from eternity or not? Is the event of my sitting here—entirely willingly and of my own accord—an event brought about by preceding events, or is it created by the Animator?
According to the causal argument, the answer is yes: it is either brought about by preceding events or created directly by the Animator.”
If Determinism Is True, What Becomes of Moral Values? When the Implications of Causality Conflict with Moral Values, Which Should We Side With?
Believer: “Then what becomes of moral values? On this account, it has been determined from eternity which moral actions each person will be inclined toward and which immoral actions they will commit. So someone who leads a moral life has no greater virtue than anyone else, and someone who commits a crime should feel no shame.”
Skeptic: “What consequences following the law of causality may have for morality is not the subject of our discussion. The question of causality is prior to the question of morality. We cannot say that because morality is important, we should simply disregard causality and all the consequences that follow from it.
That said, I think taking seriously the causal determinism that follows from the argument from causality, although it affects the way we judge one another and prevents boundless hatred and excessive reactions toward one another’s undesirable interests, preferences, desires, and actions, does not necessarily lead to the spread of immorality or to indifference toward immoral conduct.
We will still feel aversion toward an immoral act when it visibly causes suffering to other sentient beings, and the immoral person will feel shame upon seeing this aversion in others. Aversion, followed by shame, is among the first factors that inhibit immoral behavior. Someone who harms an animal, for example, may be causally determined to do so, but his action arouses aversion in others; their aversion, in turn, causes him to feel ashamed and helps prevent the further spread of his immoral behavior. All of these things, if they occur, are themselves determined.
If someone harms us, knowing the laws of causality and believing in causal determinism does not prevent us from feeling pain. The pain occurs regardless, and that pain produces mental, emotional, and bodily reactions toward the agent who caused it. One of these mental reactions is the instinctive feeling of aversion that we call a ‘negative moral evaluation of an immoral act.’”
Believer: “The society you have in mind is one in which the concept and philosophical implications of the argument from causality, as well as the determination of our desires, volitions, and actions, have not been fully internalized by its members. Sometimes they act rationally, and sometimes instinctively.”
Skeptic: “What do you mean by ‘sometimes they act rationally, and sometimes instinctively’?”
Believer: “When the members of this society want to prevent a crime from occurring again, they impose a punishment on the offender so that, in the future, neither he nor others will develop the desire to commit that crime—or, if such a desire does arise, so that the volition to carry it out will not arise.
But at the same time, those very members of society instinctively feel hatred toward the offender, and this causes the offender to feel ashamed.”
Skeptic: “What is wrong with that?”
Believer: “So far, nothing. But suppose a society came into existence in which:
First, its members always gave reason and logic priority over their instincts;
and second, the philosophical implications of the argument from causality and causal determinism had become so deeply ingrained in their minds that they could no longer feel hatred or resentment toward criminals, while criminals themselves could no longer feel ashamed of their actions.
Don’t you think such a society would become extremely vulnerable, morally speaking?”
Skeptic: “Although I don’t think the consequences of such a widespread view of the argument from causality are relevant to our discussion, and whatever its effects on society may be, they should not prevent us from accepting the truth of causal determinism in the world—let me think about what you said for a minute.”
The Skeptic rose from his seat, walked over to the pastry refrigerator, and returned with two slices of cake. “Go ahead and start eating while I think this over.”
A few minutes later, the Skeptic began: “I think that if the philosophy of causality were fully understood and internalized by every member of society, young and old, and everyone became a philosopher, such a society would lose some of its emotional reactions. One of them, for example, would be resentment toward ‘criminals.’ That would disappear altogether, because everyone would accept that a person who developed the desire to commit a crime, then formed the volition to carry it out, and finally committed it, could not possibly have had thoughts or behaved in any way other than he did. So they could no longer harbor resentment toward him.
But aversion to ‘criminal acts’ would not disappear. Aversion to criminal acts is a product of the pain and suffering caused by those acts, and has nothing to do with whether one accepts the philosophy of determinism or causal necessity.
Criminals themselves, being aware of this same philosophy of causality and seeing that others bear them no resentment, would likewise cease to feel shame. But because of the consequences and subsequent punishments—and perhaps also because of the awakening of their conscience1—they would feel regret and sorrow. Regret that, out of all these people, they happened to be the ones for whom the entire chain of phenomena unfolded in such a way that they came to desire committing that crime; and sorrow that their desire and volition brought punishment upon themselves and suffering upon others. What I mean is that I don’t think people would become indifferent to immoral acts.”
Believer: “Do you think society’s aversion to crime, together with the criminal’s regret that chance and circumstance made him the person who desired and committed the crime, would be enough to prevent criminal and immoral acts?”
Skeptic: “I don’t know whether it would or not. Nor do I know what other emotions might disappear from society under the conditions you described, or what the ultimate consequences would be. For now, I have only two conjectures.
First, I think it is extremely unlikely that an entire society would ever come to think philosophically one hundred percent of the time, to the point where philosophy prevented certain emotions from arising in everyone.
Second, I suspect that even if this did happen, it would not necessarily follow that society would become immoral. Consider parents who, in trying to understand their child’s misbehavior, look for the causes and factors behind it. Whenever the child does something wrong, they may punish him in an effort to prevent him from repeating the behavior, ‘without harboring the slightest resentment toward the child himself,’ and they are often successful. Who knows? Perhaps the society you describe would become more like a family in which no one harbors resentment toward anyone else, and whose members are kinder and less harmful toward one another. Perhaps such a society would actually be better than ours is now.
In any case, what the philosophical implications of causality might ultimately do to society is not the subject of our discussion.”
Believer: “Then what becomes of moral evaluation? We human beings regard good moral actions as valuable. If good moral actions are causally determined, and whether they will be performed by particular people has been settled from eternity, why should we value them at all?”
Skeptic: “Whether belief in causal determinism would lead us to lose our respect for good actions cannot affect our acceptance of the logical consequences of the law of causality.
Whatever thoughts or feelings we may have about morally good actions cannot alter the fact that moral desires, volitions, and actions are ‘phenomena.’ The fact that they are all phenomena is enough to bring them under the law of causality; and whatever falls under the law of causality has its occurrence and creation entirely determined by the First Cause or by the Animator.
Whatever feeling we may have that good moral actions are freely chosen is still only a feeling, and feelings cannot determine what actions and volitions really are.
Our feelings of approval and disapproval toward the actions of other members of human society arose over the course of the evolution of human beings and their ancestors, and influenced their social relations in ways that contributed to the preservation and survival of human communities. That alone was enough for such feelings and emotions to persist in those who possessed them and in subsequent generations. The existence of emotions and feelings of this kind merely contributes to the continued survival of individuals and human societies and sustains our social way of life; it does not tell us what the underlying reality is.
Perhaps we can say that one of the factors that has preserved our social existence is precisely these kinds of emotions toward the actions and behavior of our fellow human beings, emotions that lead us to divide actions into two categories: moral and immoral. ‘Moral’ actions are those that produce a favorable feeling in us; ‘immoral’ actions are those that produce an unfavorable one. The weight of these judgments has consequences that ultimately encourage more actions of the first kind and fewer of the second among other members of our society, thereby contributing to the preservation of our way of life.
It would be illogical to say, ‘Because we feel good about morally good actions and the people who perform them, a fundamental underlying law such as causality must somehow have been violated.’ There are plenty of instinctive feelings that mislead us simply because doing so promotes the survival of our species. So we should not make the discovery of truth dependent on what our feelings tell us.
As I said before, we may begin an inquiry by proclaiming our commitment to rationality and logic and claiming that our aim is to discover the truth, but somewhere along the way, whenever the logical consequences of the discussion cease to be to our liking, we usually try somehow to deceive ourselves. For someone who claims to pursue philosophy and truth to turn away from the conclusions of an argument such as the argument from causality merely out of fear that the judicial system and punishment might collapse, or out of concern that moral and human values might disappear—and openly refuse to accept those conclusions because good deeds might perhaps no longer be rewarded and crimes might go unpunished—is one example of abandoning the pursuit of truth in favor of psychologically desirable conclusions.
Although I have offered reasons for thinking that belief in determinism would not necessarily lead to the spread of immorality, suppose for the sake of argument that it did. Even then, rejecting the unwelcome implications of causality would not bring us any closer to the truth we were seeking. It would only take us farther away from it—even if doing so happened to produce a society that was more moral and, perhaps, better.
When we began our discussion, our aim was not to arrive at morality; it was to discover the truth. If the bitter truth is that determinism, or causal necessity, governs all our desires, volitions, and actions, and that therefore a prophet who claims that there will be a Day of Judgment is making a claim contrary to reality—and if, furthermore, morality itself would consequently be doomed to disappear from society—then, according to the terms on which we began this discussion, we must accept those truths. It would not be right to let fears whose justification is itself uncertain bring the inquiry to a halt and say that we had better go no further.
To insist that the very ‘moral value of our choices’ should make us reject determinism in favor of free will does not show that determinism is false. It merely means that we believe:
‘We should regard as true whichever hypothesis will probably bring about a more moral way of life for human beings, and we should regard as false whichever hypothesis might cause a decline in society’s morality.’
Whatever else this method may be, it is not a truth-seeking method. It reveals one of humanity’s great weaknesses in the pursuit of truth.
In any case, what matters for our discussion is that causality leads either to ‘deterministic necessity’ or to ‘the Animator’s necessity.’ Either way, the ultimate agent behind everything is the Necessary Existent.
If the God of the religions is the same Necessary Existent established by the argument from causality, then since it itself creates all our desires, volitions, and actions, and all of them are its creations, the idea that this Necessary Existent should institute punishment, reward, heaven, and hell is unacceptable. It itself has determined what we desire, what we will, and what we do. If any of these deserves punishment or reward, it would have to punish or reward itself—which is impossible.
Therefore, the God claimed by Islam, or by any religion that includes a system of reward and punishment in the afterlife, is not the Necessary Existent of the argument from causality. It is merely a myth fashioned by those who claimed prophethood and communication with that Necessary Existent. Why they created such stories is irrelevant and has nothing to do with our discussion. Whether their intentions were good or bad is likewise beside the point. The only issue that matters is that what they said was their own construction—or the joint product of the culture of their time and their own imaginative creativity—and therefore may contain many errors. There is consequently no necessity to believe in or obey their prescriptions and commands.”
Believer: “Actually, I’m in a bit of a hurry this week, and I have to leave early. We’ll continue the discussion next week.”