The Argument from Causality by N. Fakhr - HTML preview
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Week Seven: Continuing the Argument from Causality; Proving That the Necessary Existent Is Unbounded
Proving That the Necessary Existent Is Unbounded
Skeptic: “How did you spend the past week? Did you manage to find a solid argument for why the Necessary Existent must be unbounded?”
Believer: “To tell you the truth, no matter how much I searched through the arguments of Muslim philosophers, I could not find anything that you would not be able to object to.
“Muslim philosophers have either incorporated what you would call arbitrary assumptions and purely mental criteria into their arguments—like what I said about the gradation of existence or deficiency in the existence of things—or they have relied on their preexisting religious beliefs. For example, they have argued that deficiency and limitation are incompatible with divine unity and oneness, because a deficient God would resemble other beings and creatures, and there would then be no distinction between Him, as the unique Creator, and created things.
“As you can see, they have taken ‘God’s being unlike anything else in every respect’, which is a religious belief, as a premise, whereas this complete dissimilarity should itself have been established through argument.
“We established that the Necessary Existent cannot possess any characteristic that would make it a phenomenon and therefore dependent on a cause. But we have not yet succeeded in proving that limitation is a characteristic exclusive to phenomena, and that the Necessary Existent cannot be limited.
“Being temporal is a characteristic confined to phenomena, and the First Cause cannot be temporal or undergo change; we established that. But we have not yet established that being limited in itself is likewise a characteristic exclusive to phenomena. In some of the arguments I mentioned, however, it is assumed from the outset that because God is neither a phenomenon nor a created being, He cannot resemble created things in any respect—including in being limited. Those who offer such arguments have derived this particular kind of dissimilarity between Creator and creation from their religious beliefs rather than establishing it through philosophical and logical argument. So you certainly wouldn’t accept those arguments.”
Skeptic: “Then what are we left with? Can we say that the Necessary Existent might be limited, or might be unlimited? Could the first existent in the universe, the ultimate cause of everything, have been something similar to other things? The only difference being that this thing was not a phenomenon, but had existed eternally without having been created by anything else?”
Believer: “I spent a great deal of time last week thinking about whether the Necessary Existent is limited or unlimited. For the reasons you gave, I set aside the notion of limitation in the sense of deficiency. It occurred to me that if I could construct an argument merely to show that the Necessary Existent is not limited in the sense of ‘having specific and determinate bounds and qualities,’ I would thereby show both that the Necessary Existent possesses no numerically measurable or quantitatively or qualitatively determinate attribute, and, consequently, that no deficiency can be attributed to it. That way, I could accomplish two things with one argument.”
Skeptic: “And what did you come up with?”
Believer: “I think I have found my own argument for proving that the Necessary Existent is unbounded.”
Skeptic: “You mean you have developed a new argument—one without precedent among Muslim philosophers?”
Believer: “As far as my own reading has shown me, yes. This is a new argument1.”
Skeptic: “I’m listening.”
Believer: “We previously discussed the complete cause. The defining feature of a complete cause is that once it exists, its effect necessarily follows immediately.
“A complete cause is an existent that we identify as the cause that brings about its effect.
“Suppose I hold this cup of tea one meter above the ground. Its spatial coordinates are among the bounds that determine its location. The spatial coordinates of the fundamental particles that make up the cup—the electrons and the quarks that constitute its protons and neutrons—as well as the magnitudes of the forces these particles exert on one another, their masses, and so forth, are among the properties from which the material constitution and fragility of the cup arise.
“The Earth’s gravitational force and its magnitude likewise have their own specific and limited values. The mass of the Earth and the mass of the cup determine the magnitude of the gravitational force exerted on the cup. The hardness of the floor where we are is likewise a consequence of the coordinates and properties of the fundamental particles composing its materials and of their relations to one another.
“The position of my fingers relative to the cup, together with the force my fingers exert on it, keeps the cup in my hand despite the Earth’s gravitational pull and prevents it from falling.
“When the spatial coordinates of my fingers change and the force they exert on the cup decreases, a new configuration arises, and the previous bounds and quantities are altered to some extent.
“Now it appears that the complete cause of the cup’s falling has come into existence. In fact, the complete cause of the cup’s fall consists of a set of quantities and qualities, and once this complete cause exists, its effect—namely, the beginning of the cup’s fall—comes into existence without any delay. Successive phenomena then bring one another about, one after another, until eventually we arrive at the phenomenon of the cup striking the hard floor. From that point onward, the quantities and qualities of the phenomena I have described lead to the cup’s breaking.
“If the numerical values associated with the coordinates of the atoms and subatomic particles, and with the fundamental forces among the particles composing the cup, were different from what they actually are, the cup might not have been made of a fragile material, and the final outcome of these successive events might not have been the breaking of the cup.
“If the coordinates and quantities associated with the particles composing the floor were different from what they are, perhaps the floor would not be hard and the cup would not break.
“If the mass of the Earth were different, then necessarily the force exerted on the cup would be different; the cup would fall toward the ground at a different acceleration, and the outcome could be different.
“You can see that the existence of the cup, the Earth, and indeed the world as a whole, at the moment when I am holding the cup at a particular height above the ground, possesses a set of specific coordinates and properties. In the case of the physical world, we can assign numerical values to these characteristics. The very fact that numerical values can be assigned to them reveals a particular feature of both our world as a whole and its individual constituents: that feature is limitation, or having bounds—being confined to specific quantities and qualities.
“Whatever these numerical values may be, they have definite bounds. They are neither greater nor smaller than what they are. The masses of the atoms and subatomic particles composing the cup each have particular values. If those values were greater or smaller, physical objects would have different properties. The electric charges of electrons and protons likewise have specific values, and a specific value means a specific bound. If these values were greater or smaller—in other words, if the bounds of the existence of an electron or proton were altered—we would no longer be dealing with the same existent, but with a different existent possessing different properties.
“An existent with new bounds or a new quality will be the cause of a different effect. That is, the previous effect—the falling and breaking of the cup—will not occur; instead, another effect will occur and other phenomena will arise.
“My emphasis here is on this point: the bounds and coordinates of an existent cannot be taken away from it without thereby bringing about a different existent2. The bounds and coordinates of an existent are not merely parts of that existent; they are the existent itself. Alter any one of them, even slightly, and we are dealing with a different existent.
“On the other hand, there can be no interval between a complete cause and its effect. If the complete cause exists while its effect has not yet come into existence, that shows that what we took to be the complete cause was not actually complete, and that our judgment about it was mistaken.”
Skeptic: “Why can there be no interval between the complete cause and its effect?”
Believer: “By logical exhaustion, if the complete cause exists and its effect does not immediately come into existence, only two possibilities seem available.
“The first is that the complete cause exists, but alongside it there is something else preventing it from producing its effect. When we say ‘something else,’ we are speaking of another existent. In other words, the existence of some other ‘thing’ or ‘existent’ might prevent the supposed complete cause from producing its effect.
“But the presence of the supposed complete cause alongside this other thing tells us something important: what we had was never the complete cause in the first place.
“What we were dealing with was not yet the complete cause of the effect in question. Only after the obstructing thing is removed does the actual complete cause come into existence. Only then can we say that the complete cause exists, and at that point its effect cannot fail to occur.
“The second possibility under this logical exhaustion would be that the complete cause exists, but nonexistence or nothingness somehow prevents it from producing its effect. Given what we established earlier about nonexistence and nothingness, it is clear that this possibility is impossible.
“Thus, both possibilities that might conceivably be proposed, under this logical exhaustion, to prevent a complete cause from producing its effect turn out to be invalid and impossible. Therefore, once the complete cause exists, its effect must necessarily come into existence.”
Skeptic: “What does any of that have to do with the First Cause, or the Necessary Existent, being unable to have limits?”
Believer: “An existent that has definite bounds and coordinates, if it is the complete cause of an effect, cannot prevent itself from operating and fail to bring about that effect. We said that if we alter the properties, limits, or coordinates of an existent, we are no longer dealing with that same existent, but with a new and different one.
“Therefore, if the First Cause has bounds, those bounds determine that the First Cause has one specific and determinate set of properties. And having a specific and determinate set of properties means that the First Cause can be the complete cause of one and only one phenomenon. Likewise, if the First Cause had different properties, it could be the complete cause of one and only one different phenomenon. Thus, it is the limitation of the First Cause that determines which effect it will bring about, depending on the particular bounds to which it is limited.”
Skeptic: “All right, but what is the problem with that? You proved the existence of a First Cause. This cause cannot be temporal or subject to change. So far, no problem. But saying that this First Cause cannot have bounds because, if it did, only one specific phenomenon and effect would arise from it does not prove that it cannot be limited. Fine—let it be limited and capable of producing only one effect. There is nothing problematic about that.
“It seems to me that because you need your God to be able to create, by choice, whatever it wants, you are forced to regard it as unlimited. You begin by believing in God, and then, to make sure that its being limited does not deprive it of the possibility of creating many different and diverse things, you are compelled to conclude that it cannot be limited. That way, it can create whatever it wants. If the First Cause is limited, its existence can be the complete cause of one and only one effect. So, to escape that conclusion, you strip it of all limitation.
“What would be wrong with the First Cause being a limited existent, like the other phenomena, while still remaining the First Cause from which the rest of existence originates?
“In fact, you have repeatedly referred to this First Cause and Necessary Existent using the pronoun ‘He.’ From the very beginning, you intended to arrive at a being with personhood, will, and free choice, and you unconsciously carried that assumption with you. In my view, until you have established that the First Cause possesses personhood and will, you should refer to it with no pronoun other than ‘it.’”
Believer: “You’re right about the pronoun. But you’ve gone too far into side issues. You didn’t let me finish what I was saying.”
Skeptic: “Sorry... I didn’t realize you hadn’t finished. Go on.”
Believer: “As I said, once the complete cause exists, its effect comes into existence immediately.
“From this premise, we can conclude that whenever a phenomenon exists, its complete cause must have existed.
“Now, given how closely the existence of a complete cause and its effect are bound together, we can also say that whenever a phenomenon or effect does not exist, this indicates that its complete cause was not eternal.”
The Skeptic leaned forward with curiosity and interest. “Please explain further.”
Believer: “Look... if I let go of this cup, it will hit the ground and break about a second later. Of course, countless phenomena occur between my releasing the cup and its breaking. Every moment of the cup’s fall can be regarded as a phenomenon, and the interval between releasing it and its breaking can be divided into countless moments.”
Skeptic: “Yes... it would be like filming the event and then treating every frame of the film as a separate phenomenon.”
Believer: “Very well... Now let me ask you a question. Could this broken cup, lying on the floor, have existed right now?
“The answer is: it could have, if and only if the complete cause of that phenomenon had already existed. Just as the only reason an effect comes into existence is the existence of its complete cause, the only reason an effect does not exist is that its complete cause does not exist.
“A phenomenon fails to exist only because its cause is preceded by nonexistence.
“Suppose you are going to take a trip next year and be in the city of Nishapur3. Could that phenomenon have existed right now? That is, could the ‘Skeptic’ who is one year older and present in Nishapur exist right now?
“That phenomenon does not yet exist, but it could exist if and only if its complete cause existed. The reason the phenomenon of ‘the Skeptic, one year older and present in Nishapur’ does not exist right now is simply that the causes required to bring it into existence have not yet come into existence. Once all those causes exist, their effect will also come into existence, and ‘the Skeptic, one year older and present in Nishapur’ will exist.
“Your very presence here right now, with your present characteristics, your age, your knowledge, and your way of thinking, can likewise be regarded collectively as a phenomenon. The sole reason for its existence is that the phenomena or causes required to bring about this particular state and this particular moment have existed.”
Skeptic: “And how do you connect this to the unboundedness of the Ultimate Cause?”
Believer: “Imagine the moment when the ‘first phenomenon of existence’ existed but had not yet brought about the second phenomenon. Let us also assume that the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ was the effect of the phenomenon of the ‘first moment of existence.’
“Freeze everything at that moment.”
Skeptic: “All right. I have frozen everything at the point where the phenomenon of the ‘first moment of existence’ exists, but the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ has not yet come into existence. Go on.”
Believer: “Now we can ask the following question about this frozen moment:
“Could the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ have existed instead?
“In other words, we can ask: was there any obstacle preventing the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ from existing, such that it did not yet exist?
“The answer is that there was no obstacle preventing the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ from coming into existence. That phenomenon could have existed
if and only if
“the phenomenon of the first moment—which is its sole complete cause—had existed.
“Now we reach the conclusion that the phenomenon of the ‘first moment of existence’ was preceded by nonexistence. For if the one and only cause of the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ was the existence of the phenomenon of the ‘first moment of existence,’ and yet the phenomenon of the first moment had been eternal, then the cause of the phenomenon of the ‘second moment of existence’ would have existed eternally.
“In other words, the ‘second moment of existence’ would also have had to exist eternally, because existence would never have been without the complete cause of the second moment. Consequently, there could never have been any point at which the ‘second moment of existence’ did not exist.”
Skeptic: “Wait a moment. I need to think about what you’ve said.”
The Skeptic thought for several minutes, then said, “Let me step outside for a few minutes and get some fresh air. Please stay here. I want to think alone for a while.”
Believer: “I’ll wait for you.”
The Skeptic went outside and returned a few minutes later.
“To tell you the truth, at first I wanted to object to your argument by raising the issue of the passage of time and the meaning of time. After all, you had asked me to imagine freezing time at the ‘first moment of existence.’
“But then I realized that even if we set time aside altogether, we can still ask why a particular phenomenon or event does not exist. And I saw that the answer would still be exactly what you said: ‘It does not exist because its complete cause did not exist.’ ‘It would have existed if its complete cause had brought it into existence.’ ‘Its complete cause would have brought it into existence if and only if that complete cause existed.’
“I froze everything at the point where only the ‘first moment of existence’ existed, and I asked myself:
“‘What is the only existing reality?’
“Then I answered myself:
“‘The existence of the first moment of existence. That, and nothing else.’
“Then I asked myself:
“‘Could the existence of the second moment of existence have been a reality?’
“And I answered:
“‘Yes, if and only if the complete cause of the second moment of existence had brought it into existence.’
“Then I asked myself again:
“‘So why had the complete cause of the second moment of existence not brought it into existence?’
“And there was only one answer I could give myself:
“‘Because the complete cause of the second moment of existence did not exist.’
“Now I understand what you are trying to say. You mean:
“The first phenomenon brought into existence by the Ultimate Cause once did not exist.
“The nonexistence of that phenomenon means that its complete cause had not brought it into existence.
“That its complete cause had not brought it into existence can mean only one thing:
“Its complete cause was not eternal; that is, its complete cause itself was preceded by nonexistence.
“Therefore:
“If the Ultimate Cause is to be eternal, it cannot have been the complete cause of any phenomenon.
“And in order not to have been the complete cause of any phenomenon,
it must therefore
‘have no definite bounds, coordinates, or qualities.’
“Because the bounds, coordinates, and qualities of an existent are precisely what make that existent the complete cause of one specific and determinate phenomenon. Therefore, the Ultimate Cause, or Necessary Existent, cannot possess bounds or coordinates at all.”
Believer: “Yes. That is exactly what I was trying to say.”
Skeptic: “I think that brings the argument from causality to an end, doesn’t it?”
Believer: “Yes. That was the argument from causality in its general form. Now tell me what you think. Can you still deny God? Do you still question my integrity? Will you finally allow me to continue teaching religious studies?”
Skeptic: “Not so fast... So far, you have established only the existence of a Necessary Existent. There are still many steps left. Establishing the truth of a particular religion does not follow merely from establishing the existence of an Ultimate Cause. Apparently, many religions could claim that their God is the very Ultimate Cause established by the argument from causality.
“I want to think carefully about everything you have said so far.”
Believer: “Very well! Until next week, then...”
