Ethics of the Abyss by Denys Spirin - HTML preview
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Chapter 3

A construct is an idea about how reality is arranged. "The nation is the highest form of collective life." "God created man in His image and gave him commandments." Each of these is a claim about what exists and what matters.
When you accept a sufficiently detailed arrangement of reality a normative grid falls out of it with the force of logical consequence. The grid contains obligations: what the subject must do; permissions: what one may do without sanction; and prohibitions: what to avoid, on pain of guilt or punishment. It has two layers of enforcement: law, the explicit codification backed by institutional power, and norm, the implicit code powered by disapproval and shame.
A construct, then, is this whole package: an ontology that generates a morality. It arrives from outside and is absorbed so exhaustively that the subject mistakes it for his own thinking. The scientist's conviction that empirical evidence is the only legitimate path to knowledge is a part of a construct, complete with its own obligations and taboos. The human rights advocate's certainty that a person is born with inherent dignity is a construct too.
The word "construct" carries no judgment. To call something a construct is to describe its origin and its mode of existence. It may sustain lives; it may also produce suffering and destroy lives.
Value is whatever a given construct marks as preferable or a goal. For the patriot, the value is the nation's strength and continuity, for the utilitarian, it is the aggregate reduction of suffering. Each value seems absolute from within the construct and arbitrary from outside. The patriot cannot understand why the monk values poverty; the monk cannot accept the desire for military glory. Each sees his own values as truth and the other's as eccentricities or errors.
Good and evil are alignment indicators. An act is good when it coincides with the active construct values, evil when it contradicts them. The act itself has no inherent moral charge — it is assigned by the construct, the way a magnetic field assigns direction to iron filings.
Guilt is a corrective force. When the subject's behavior drifts from the trajectory set by the values, guilt activates, pulling back toward alignment. It feels like conscience, but it is a feedback mechanism of the construct monitoring integrity and punishing deviation. The sharper the guilt, the deeper the installation. A lapsed Catholic who has abandoned the faith intellectually but still feels guilt at skipping mass is witnessing the construct's persistence below the level of conscious revision.
The mechanism's force comes from the fact that the construct has been ontologized. When the subject's act contradicts the construct, the collision occurs between an act and the subject's sense of what he is. The guilt is an identity fracture. Therefore it must be externalized when it proves intolerable. "The devil made me do it" is an engineering solution, a way to relocate the violation to an intruder. The identity survives, and the person returns to his default state.
Duty is the construct's directive, the vector it assigns. "You ought to serve your country." Each "ought" traces back to a specific ontology, and within that it carries the weight of necessity. Outside it is one voice among many, no louder than any other, and considerably quieter than some.
Constructs are interchangeable. The same human being, born in medieval Christendom, would internalize a construct in which pride is the deadliest sin and obedience to the Church is the path to salvation. Born in classical Athens, he would adopt a belief in which greatness of soul (megalopsychia, which Aristotle later codified as the crown of the virtues) is the mark of the excellent man and submission is fit for slaves.
Christianity is worth tracing in detail because it is a good example of a construct built from ontology through a normative grid to the subjective experience.
On the ontological layer, God is the supreme good. He created the world, and the world has fallen. Man carries original sin, a defect woven into his nature, prior to any choice. This is the foundational claim about reality from which the morality follows. If God is the supreme good, then alignment with God's will is the sole obligation. If man is fallen, then his natural impulses are suspect: they pull him away from God, toward sin. Permission is what God explicitly allows, while prohibition encompasses the seven deadly sins and much else. Law is in canon law, Church councils, or papal decrees. Norm saturates daily life through confession, communal prayer, feast days and fast days, the calendar itself is reorganized around sacred time.
And from the grid, the subjective vocabulary emerges. Guilt here is the permanent condition of the subject; original sin guarantees that. It is the ontological baseline, and every act either deepens it or temporarily alleviates it through grace. Guilt generates repentance, repentance gives temporary relief, relief fades as the fallen nature reasserts itself, and guilt returns. The genius of the design is that it is self-perpetuating: the believer can never reach a stable state of alignment; the ontology guarantees that he is constitutionally misaligned.
Value is closeness to God. Good is what aligns with His will, evil is what deviates. Duty is obedience and humility — the behavioral profile that the Church requires for construct reproduction. None of these categories were discovered separately, they are generated by the ontological premise "God is the supreme good and man is fallen."
Remove God or original sin from the picture and the entire edifice dissolves. Guilt becomes a psychological artifact without an object, repentance is reduced to submission. The seven deadly sins become descriptions of ordinary human drives, no more sinful than hunger or fatigue. This vocabulary survives: modern secular culture still speaks of guilt and moral failing, but it has been cut loose from the ontology that gave it meaning and now floats as a set of reflexes without a referent.
Among the Haudenosaunee and Huron, the core belief was that the universe is pervaded by a spiritual force (orenda) inherent in all beings and things. A captive taken in war was a ritual participant in the mourning-war complex: bound to a stake and subjected to prolonged burning and mutilation over hours or days, in a public ceremony that served to assuage grief for fallen kin and restore spiritual strength to the lineage. To endure without crying out was to prove that the soul is stronger than the body. It conferred honor on the captive and demonstrated the valor of his people. Weakness under torture was a moral failure. In the Sun Dance of the Lakota and Cheyenne, the most committed participants had their chest or back pierced with wooden or bone skewers. They were tethered to a central pole by rawhide thongs, and danced pulling against the tether until the flesh tore free, fasting and praying for days. The ontology said: you acquire vision and power for your people by offering your flesh to the spirits. A man who has not suffered has not earned the right to lead. When Europeans first discovered these practices, they recoiled in horror and called them barbarism. Their disgust was as pre-computed as the Haudenosaunee warrior's pride: both were seeing it through their own ontology.
No two subjects receive the same construct identically. Each filters it through his own experience, temperament, and the other constructs already in place. The catechism says "love thy neighbor," and the subject accepts it, but the reception is shaped by everything he already carries. For one, "love" means active sacrifice; for another, tolerance; for a third, condescending pity. "Neighbor" may extend to humanity or contract to the parish. A man raised on Old Testament justice and street-level pragmatism may hold "love thy neighbor" alongside "some people deserve what they get" without experiencing a contradiction. The result is a hybrid assembled from different sources, unique to this subject and never fully replicated in any other. Accordingly, a believer can be indifferent to a theological argument that does not touch his particular configuration and react with fury to a challenge that does.
The same sincere Christian who listens to a sermon on love in the morning can rejoice in the evening at the deaths of civilians in an enemy country and feel no discomfort whatsoever. What an external observer would call hypocrisy is in fact a coherence of this specific ontology. This is the clearest proof that morality is not absolute. If a moral command can be suspended, then it was never universal to begin with; only a local rule of one particular construct.
Hybridization is not guaranteed. When two constructs resist fusion, the subject carries them side by side without integration. They may be separated by context: the two imperatives do not cancel each other out; they occupy different compartments, and each context triggers its own. Or the layers collide on the same situation and produce incompatible verdicts. The subject experiences this as a moral conflict, a collision between two unintegrated components, neither of which will yield.


