Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

essence. To get a real handle on the meanings of these we can start by asking, what is it that makes a thing into a ‘something’? A thing in general into some particular thing? All we can see of a thing is the qualities it displays to the world. Earlier we picked out the difference between primary and secondary qualities. Here we can note that even the primary qualities rely on someone being there to do some kind of measurement. We can simply say that all of the qualities need some kind of relationship. Either they must be compared to other objects in order to deduce their size and shape and how old they are. Or they need to be sensed by an observer who can experience colour, smell, taste and so on.

We can ask, what is the most basic of things? There are just a limited number of fundamental particles, for instance, so surely these are the most basic things we can properly call a ’thing’. What’s more, at least it is assumed, all fundamental particles of a particular kind are identical. For instance, all electrons are identical. The fundamental particles make up atoms, the atoms combine into molecules, and still we must presume a sameness. Aren’t all water molecules or all salt molecules identical? So we seem justified in calling them ‘things’ and not ‘somethings’. ‘Somethings’ implies some kind of uniqueness. But if we go on adding molecule to molecule, do we not just create things that could, in theory, be replicated exactly, just by putting together the same set of basic elements? In fact, if the universe is infinite, are we not in a position of being able to replicate any arrangement of matter? So nothing could make a claim to uniqueness. In

25