Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

the belief in primary and secondary qualities, also appears to have thought that at some level there is no distinction.) Another way of describing this is to say that physics can only tell us about ‘relational properties’, so sheds no light on any truly intrinsic properties (essence) or whether intrinsic properties actually exist. Space, time, mass, energy, charge and spin are all relations. Take them away and there seems to be no substance. Physics can only tell us about the qualities of the world, not about its underlying reality.

Descartes seemed to see both primary and secondary qualities as uncertain, but he suggested at least a degree of certainty with regard to ‘substance’ (which we’ll come to in more detail presently), duration in time and number. Descartes seemed to be thinking of a wider understanding of substance than extension in space and time, as he included mind as a substance. He described qualities as ‘the clothing under which corporeal substance appears to us’. Hence, some substance exists beneath the surface of reality that gives rise to the qualities we perceive. This thought has been retained by science.

The fundamental particles and the forces that are currently known seem a bit arbitrary. Why these particles, we could ask, and why these forces? So there is always a yearning to discover a yet-more fundamental layer of matter, together with the rules that would explain how our familiar world of particles and forces came about. This is one variety of the search for an underlying substance — an ‘ultimate substrate’ — to the universe. The

20