Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

Is there a morality derived from virtue ethics? In the last chapter we considered virtue ethics as either the acquisition of good character traits as an end in itself, or as a means to an end — the end usually being happiness. So, for example, Aristotle’s ethics were concerning the perfection of the individual man. Some men, plus all women and slaves, could not even hope to achieve this perfection. So — whilst Aristotle discusses a perfect state — it is an individual ethic for a chosen few that would get us there. In the last chapter we saw virtue ethics as involving life taken as a narrative and aiming at some over all good. It was suggested that individual life narratives are a way towards a viable ethic. But such a model makes little mention of co-operation, societies, cultures, eco-systems or the planet. Perhaps the crucial thing (for morality) is whether we examine our life’s narrative and see it as a guide for future action, or indeed, go further and try to construct a future story for ourselves. And also — and in line with some of the comments above — we might ask if narratives could be constructed within the context of family, neighbourhood, community and society.

The moral theories introduced in this and the last chapter could be reduced to four key ideas — ‘consequentialism’, ‘rules-based ethics’, ‘virtue ethics’ and ‘discourse ethics’. In the last chapter we saw how rules-based ideas play off against virtue ethics. This was based around what we really want to do as opposed to what the rules might be telling us to do, our motives for trying or not trying to be virtuous and our responsibilities and entitlements with regard to

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