Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

‘character-based’ approach, which — rather than being about moral rules — seems to be more about who a person is in themselves and thus about virtue. But arguably it is also about the underlying value of love, which Kant — almost despite himself — seemed to be advocating in his ‘kingdom of ends’. What’s missing — or perhaps just not obvious — from Kant, is a reason why humans should be ‘ends in themselves’ (and a basis for his kingdom of ends). We could simply say that there is an assumption of humans’ intrinsic worth here, and indeed a certain regard for the wider world as being, in some way, sacred. Kant, and most philosophers of the past, had this usually as a result of their belief in God. But it seems reasonable for us to accept the intrinsic worth and sacredness of people, nature and the universe as a foundational value, even if we might not have a religious faith.

Virtue, as a basis of ethics, dates back to Aristotle. For him, what was important in virtue is where it is leading. What will a person become in the long term? ‘Virtue ethics’ is about becoming a good person, rather than just obeying rules. It is a morality based on what we regard as constituting a good and dignified life for a person.

Virtue ethics is often also given a narrative spin, where one’s efforts towards forging a vocation, and generally living a good life, form the basis of a narrative for one’s purposes in the world. This setting up of a life narrative — grading our wants and so on — always comes from a prior conception of what is right and wrong, what counts as good and the like. What would our

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