Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

that something does not become wrong unless there is some agreement between individuals about a particular moral standpoint. This seems to carry with it the inevitable conclusion that morality is thereby relative. No matter how universal a particular ethical position might be — such as believing murder to be wrong — it can never be demonstrated that this is anything more than an opinion.

To believe that something is wrong means that we have some motive for not doing it and vice versa. Acting morally therefore cannot be motivated by reason alone. There must be fear or desire present in order to make us act. But emotion by itself is not sufficient to motivate us. Reason provides the ability to work out how to reach a desired end. Reason is delivered not so much by deliberation of what is good or bad directly, but rather, as we’ve seen above, by way of meanings and ideals that we might hold to be worthwhile. So there is a balance between reason and desire when we try to make ethical decisions — we don’t just reach ethical decisions based on personal preferences.

The difficulty with all theories of meta-ethics is that ethics and morality sometimes ask us to do things we don’t really want to do! The contrast between what we’d like to do and what we think we ought to do is really about our responsibilities to others — and a hierarchy of wishes. We may want a good society over and above catering to our own personal wishes. Where these two come into conflict then we may give primacy to the needs of society. On the other hand, we may be a ‘free-rider’, taking the benefits of society for granted and just indulging

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