Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

strange one.

An ‘objective’ science of morality could be formulated by examining how people actually behave and then discerning ‘rules’ based on these actions. Values and ethics would then be devised based on observation and the underlying assumption is that, because people behave in certain ways, then this is a sound basis for morality, and indeed, that no other basis need be sought. It is a particular feature of ‘behaviourism’ in psychology. But we also see it cropping up elsewhere — particularity in economics — where, for instance, people are regarded as pure pleasure-seeking creatures. This notion, in turn, (and usually without any explanation) is used as a moral justification for economics to try to satisfy the endless desires of humanity. But I’d suggest this is not really getting to the core of the issue. People might be observed believing a certain action is wrong, but it could still be asked why they think it is wrong. That’s the key question. Again, just because things are the way they are does not mean they ought to be this way.

Another similar possibility for the derivation of morality is that they are rationalisations of how we’d like the world to be. In other words, based on the emotions, or ‘passions’, as Hume might have said. However, we can note that this idea still has a truth-claim underlying it — that it’s right, for instance, to wish the world to confirm to our preferences.

As people we can be mistaken about our preferences and mistaken about what is ultimately best for us. So should morality try to

171