Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

for the sake of appearances but were not really following it?

Belief in God presents another alternative. The traditional view of God includes the notion that God is in some way intrinsically good. God therefore is seen as the source of moral values. But this only pushes the question one stage back. The problem is often exemplified by asking: Does God approve of something because He/She/It is good, or is something good because God approves of it? In either case there is, by implication, an outside standard of goodness by which either the character of God or a particular action is judged. Thus, we are no further forward.

It is very difficult to see how there can be a perfect form of a moral act, such as courage. Courage and other moral values, it seems, can only be known through individual acts in the real world. Courage means little by itself. We need to be courageous for the sake of something. Likewise, the brave do not seek out brave things to do and the modest do not seek situations where they can practice their modesty. The exception is justice. The just will directly seek occasions to practice justice and see justice done. Does this somehow put justice in a higher category? Well, it’s notable that all of our moral theories could be described as theories of justice — based on what is fair. So this seems to lead us toward the notion that some moral principles are foundational, or ‘constitutional’, like justice, whilst others are derivative, ‘regulative’ or ‘executive’, and thus the outworking of the more foundational morals. So courage, bravery and modesty are derivatives — executive — morals

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