Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

explanation, see Rebecca Goldstein — Incompleteness: The Proof and paradox of Kurt Gödel.) Gödel’s theorems have a more general counterpart in what is known as the ‘theory of types’. This states that some items in the universe cannot themselves be in a theory about the universe — namely, the concepts used to analyse the universe. Some take this to mean that any theory claiming to be about the universe as a whole is therefore meaningless.

We map the world as if we can view it from the outside (that is, despite the fact that notions of a ‘view from eternity’ are often treated with scorn or bewilderment). But if we must, instead, try to map the world from the inside then our maps take on a different kind of transcendence. There might be no transcendent or supernatural realm to the universe as it stands, but the process of mapping itself creates an abstract, transcendent realm. What’s more, a perfect map seems impossible. The way we try to understand things might be best described in terms of ontology — ways of being in the world — subjective, limited and about process, agency, consciousness, duration and relation. In fact, about exactly the things that science tries to explain away by its relentless reductionism. We need a science of embodiment!

A similar dilemma has to be faced if, as some believe, the universe is ultimately One. There is a lovely word — ‘aporia’ — that sums this up nicely. It’s the idea of an inherent contradiction in one’s thinking. If this contradiction can be acknowledged then that is a good place to start. It is to be standing on the shore of knowledge

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