Conatus: THIRD EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

all our ‘splits’ — purely on the mysterian side of things. But the theory seems to have to assume some kind of real world in order to argue what it denies — that there is a real world!

The ideas put forward by Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer are another form of idealism. Here, there is a transcendental other world of some kind, which provides the ‘ideals’ or ‘forms’, which in turn influence or control our world. (In Plato’s case, as we’ve seen in earlier chapters, the transcendental realm is the world of ‘perfect forms’.) Kant, Schopenhauer and others have taken up this idea in their noumenon/phenomenon split. From a modern perspective, this might seem far-fetched. But I suggest that transcendental idealism is still practised, even although its truth is denied. There is still an implicit belief in absolute truth, an absolute standard of morality and sometimes an absolute aesthetic standard.

Rationalism and Empiricism

One of the key criteria for discovering truth in science is that only ideas that are open to be disproved are open to be explored. As such, ideas not open to this type of scrutiny — such as, for instance, most if not all of philosophy and religion — must be rejected. Broadly speaking we might define it as a rejection of all truth that is not based on observation. Therefore, going along with this type of truth-seeking is an abandonment of any search for, or belief in, meaning, purpose or moral content to the universe. This is very much the dominant mindset of Western society, but as we’ve seen in preceding chapters, it has its problems. The

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