Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

that there might be several versions of coherent truth that correspond with the world. And indeed, there might be several versions without us ever being able to determine if any of them is the ‘correct’ version.

Finally, there is a view called ‘under-determination’. This suggests that even if there is perfect empirical knowledge of the world then there may still be competing theories to explain how everything works. It might never be possible to decide which is the correct theory, even with all the evidence.

So there could be entire alternative views, which might be coherent and might offer equally valid ways for us to look at the world. On the other hand, there may be only one correct way to see and describe the world, so in that case the truths of this world would be necessary truths. The coherence element is important here, since potentially any number of possible worlds might be imagined, but a more limited number will be worlds where what happens — the way things are related, for instance — is logical and consistent. If, for instance, a possible world contradicts our laws of physics — and there is no alternative set of physical laws — then this is not really a viable possible world. However, as noted above, this does not stop some philosophers speculating on the reality of these ‘absolute contingencies’.

It should be noted though that this is the first real glimpse of the paradox at the heart of our human approach to truth (and indeed, goodness, beauty, meaning, purpose and so on). It is very much in our natures to give such

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