Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

acting fairly in terms of what it offers us by way of entitlements. This adds a further layer of complexity, an obligation to an authority that seeks to administer moral rules.

And then there is the curious case of the ‘ideal observer’, which is something of a link between ethics (as in, the behaviour of individuals) and morals (the relationship between individuals, or, more broadly, our relationships with others, with nature and with the universe at large). The ideal observer would have to have perfect knowledge and probably need to be perfectly good in order to come to correct conclusions in matters of morality. (Roderick Firth described the ‘ideal observer’ as, ‘omniscient, disinterested, dispassionate, but otherwise normal’.) But even so, the idea of a detached and impartial standpoint can be useful in trying to discern a ‘common good’. There is right action, which the ideal observer might discern — but what about right thought? There are things that we call ‘duties’ or ‘obligations’ — but also things that we regard as rights and entitlements — hence obligations towards rather than by us. What should be made of them?

As people we can be mistaken about our preferences and mistaken about what is ultimately best for us. So should morality try to express what people should want if they were not mistaken? (This is what the ideal observer idea is really driving at.) Or should morality just accept people’s mistaken wants and desires as a given? (This, arguably, is the stance of laissez-faire economics.)

One further thought is that an ‘objective’ science

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