Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

explanation, see Rebecca Goldstein — Incompleteness: The Proof and paradox of Kurt Gödel.) Gödel’s theorems have a more general counterpart in what is known as the ‘theory of types’. This states that some items in the universe cannot themselves be in a theory about the universe — namely, the concepts used to analyse the universe. Some take this to mean that any theory claiming to be about the universe as a whole is therefore meaningless.

A similar dilemma has to be faced if, as some believe, the universe is ultimately One. There is a lovely word — ‘aporia’ — that sums this up nicely. It’s the idea of an inherent contradiction in one’s thinking. If this contradiction can be acknowledged then that is a good place to start. It is to be standing on the shore of knowledge and look out at the vast ocean of mystery!

What we intend in our search for truth and knowledge is part of the story or stories we want to tell ourselves. What we exclude is also part of the story. All claims to truth, goodness and beauty are at the same time excluding something, so a close eye needs to be kept on what people choose to exclude. What then is excluded in the search for truth? Well that question goes back to a point made in the Introduction. Only certain questions get asked, and at the moment these questions are along the lines of a fundamentally materialist universe, with consciousness as ‘substrate independent’ (or ‘substrate neutral’) such that it could be ‘hosted’ by other arrangements of matter, such as, of course, computers. There’s a great deal that’s excluded by focusing on this way of seeking truth. Most especially, we miss

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