Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

be classed as perceptions.

Then, the big jump! Impulse! We act on what we’ve perceived, and then we try to make sense of it afterwards! So hopefully now it’s clear why Hutcheson’s insights are helpful and make this jump from perception to impulse less severe than it might otherwise seem.

Our ‘interpretation’ of our actions is from our imagination — images first — no rationalisation, examination or logical analysis. This, you could say, is our essence stage. In capturing an image, we’re looking for what makes it what it is — what makes it unique and special. Then finally symbol — so putting things into words (which may still just be in our head) or into spoken words, written words, pictures, music, sculpture, that we can then communicate to others.

One way to summarise all this is to say: to be alive is to be aware (sensation). To be conscious is to be aware that we’re aware (perception). To be self-conscious is to be aware that we’re aware that we’re aware (image). But even embodied consciousness is not enough — there is always context. We partake of context through sensation — we contribute to and create context through symbol. Mind + Body + Way of being in the world add up to the Aristotelian soul.

One thing to notice about this sequence is that it puts us very much on a level playing field with other creatures. The only element where us humans might claim some distinction is the broad reach of our symbol-making. It could be

166