Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview
Download the book in PDF, ePub, Kindle for a complete version.
C O N A T U S
element of purpose implies, it is suggested, a Mind that has planned things. The problem here is that it is by no means evident that there is a purpose in things. There are many dead ends and blind alleys in the development of life on Earth that might suggest a less than perfect Creator, or equally, no Creator at all.
The ontological argument for the existence of God is the argument from being. If, as a finite mind, I am able to conceive of a God, it is argued, then God must necessarily exist, otherwise I would not be able to have such a conception. The argument would seem to be invalid, as I am well able to conceive of non-existent creatures and events.
One more argument to the traditional ones given above can be added and this is known as the ‘argument from sentience’. Simply stated, the argument suggests that sentience cannot have arisen from matter, and therefore it must have another cause. That cause is God. (See Colin McGinn — The Mysterious Flame.)
‘Deism’ could also be mentioned — mostly within the teleological argument. The Deist belief in God, often by way of ‘natural religion’, is that God just started off the universe and then left things to run by themselves. So, He/She/It is just the ‘first cause’ (as with the cosmological argument) and it is no use petitioning such a God with prayer or trying to apportion blame for evil in the world. Meanwhile, the term ‘perseity’ — meaning ‘necessary existence’ — relates closely to the ontological argument. Note the link back to Leibniz, discussed above. There are also echoes
144
