Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

get a bit more of a picture as to his meaning. The word ‘form’ is being used in a third manner — different from how it was examined in previous chapters. Remember we had the plain meaning of form, as just three-dimensional shape, and also the mysterian meaning — that form is some kind of pattern that is derived from a transcendent world, such as with the Platonic perfect forms. Aristotle is using form in a third way, I suggest, in that the pattern of a thing is known through its immanence in real things. So the form of a soul is known through its visible instances of real people and how we behave in the world. As Wittgenstein said, ‘if you want to see the human soul, look at the body’.

The word soul — in the context of Aristotelian soul I’ve been describing here — may not be the best term to use for the meaning I’ve been ascribing to it. But I think it shows a different way of understanding her, and even a way that, whilst recognising its meaning in common parlance, nevertheless does not rely on supernatural interpretations. Instead, she may be known through the emergence inherent in nature, and the ways that larger entities in nature can affect their smaller counterparts.

But there are, of course, still the supernatural interpretations, and I think it is worthwhile trying to tease out all the other meanings of soul, to see how this might relate to our different types of truth-seeking. In particular, of course, there is the religious concept of the soul and truth by means of revelation.

I don’t think that what has been set out in this chapter should destroy religious faith — in fact it

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