Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

music they may feel pain, much as anyone does when pricked by a pin. Or, to use the classic example, when they see something red, they get the same sensory experience as someone else when they see something yellow. This takes us right back to the ‘egocentric predicament’ considered in the Introduction. The mutant possibility is discussed in Simon Blackburn’s book, Think. How would anyone ever know they’re not a mutant? Again, it’s very difficult to prove.

Sometimes, zombie illustrations are given in order to make a case for physicalism — that there is nothing more to consciousness than the workings of matter in complex relations. And sometimes zombies are used for the opposing view — that there must be more to consciousness than merely arrangements of matter. Above I’ve just given a brief sketch of some of the examples that are offered. Perhaps the important thing is to consider why particular thinkers are giving their chosen examples. Are they invested in dismissing consciousness, or do they feel that consciousness is so important that it must be placed centre-stage in our understanding of the world?

If consciousness were to be understood, not as some ghostly presence that can’t be explained, but as the most immediate empirical knowledge of the world, then things may look very different. Therefore consciousness is our next subject for consideration.

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