Conatus: REVISED EDITION by Tom Wallace - HTML preview

C O N A T U S

exists’ (Georg Lichtenberg.) These variations seem to be saying that any kind of sensation would suffice to justify a belief in existence — it didn’t have to be thought. And a further one recognises the need for our continued identity: ‘I remember, therefore I am.’ But there is quite a difference nonetheless between observation (raining), feeling (I feel), thinking (thought is going on) and remembering.

Perhaps the strangest thing to note about Cartesian dualism is that, from what Descartes himself described, it would be reasonable to assume that consciousness is the primary substance and matter of lesser importance. But, arguably, this is not the way thing have turned out. Instead it seems that consciousness is the substance that has been pushed into the background and matter has become the main benchmark for our understanding of the world. But if (which arguably is the case) our primary contact with the world were considered to be consciousness rather than our experience of the outside world then probably the sharp division between consciousness and matter would not have arisen. Then Cartesian dualism would not seem so disturbing. It would not push consciousness into the realm of mystery — of being unknowable. Also, if the term ‘sensation’ were used to mean both our experience of the outside world through our senses and our inner experience of feelings and emotions (a view put forth by Francis Hutcheson, amongst others) then again Cartesian dualism would not strike us as so problematic. These concerns relating to Cartesian dualism are brilliantly explored in Antonio Damasio’s book Descartes’ Error.

99