Sophist – Plato
THEAETETUS: To be sure.
and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view STRANGER: Into that region the Sophist, as we of meeting this evasion, we must begin by en-said, made his escape, and, when he had got quiring into the nature of language, opinion, and there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; imagination, in order that when we find them no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered we may find also that they have communion with falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any not-being, and, having made out the connexion way partake of being.
of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he THEAETETUS: True.
deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.
STRANGER: And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not THEAETETUS: Certainly, Stranger, there appears continue fighting in this direction, but he will to be truth in what was said about the Sophist probably say that some ideas partake of not-be-at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, ing, and some not, and that language and opin-for he seems to have abundance of defences, ion are of the non-partaking class; and he will which he throws up, and which must every one still fight to the death against the existence of of them be stormed before we can reach the man the image-making and phantastic art, in which himself. And even now, we have with difficulty we have placed him, because, as he will say, opin-got through his first defence, which is the notion and language do not partake of not-being, being of not-being, and lo! here is another; for 157
Sophist – Plato
we have still to show that falsehood exists in the THEAETETUS: True.
sphere of language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of defence without end.
STRANGER: Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; STRANGER: Any one, Theaetetus, who is able to for that is the direction in which the answer may advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, be expected.
for what would he who is dispirited at a little progress do, if he were making none at all, or THEAETETUS: And what is the question at is-even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, sue about names?
as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the cita-STRANGER: The question at issue is whether all del is ours, and what remains is easier.
names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.
THEAETETUS: Very true.
THEAETETUS: Clearly the last is true.
STRANGER: Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, STRANGER: I understand you to say that words in order that we may have clearer grounds for which have a meaning when in sequence may determining, whether not-being has any concern be connected, but that words which have no with them, or whether they are both always true, meaning when in sequence cannot be connected?
and neither of them ever false.