TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The aim of this translation is the same as that of the original work. Each is the outcome of experience in university instruction in philosophy, and is intended to furnish a manual which shall be at once scientific and popular, one to stand midway between the exhaustive expositions of the larger histories and the meager sketches of the compendiums. A pupil of Kuno Fischer, Fortlage, J.E. Erdmann, Lotze, and Eucken among others, Professor Falckenberg began his career as _Docent_ in the university of
Jena. In the year following the first edition of this work he became _Extraordinarius_ in the same university, and in 1888 _Ordinarius_ at Erlangen, choosing the latter call in preference to an invitation to Dorpat as successor to Teichmüller. The chair at Erlangen he still holds. His work as teacher and author has been chiefly in the history of modern philosophy. Besides the present work and numerous minor articles, he has published the following: _Über den intelligiblen Charakter, zur Kritik der Kantischen Freiheitslehre_ 1879; _Grundzüge der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus_, 1880-81; and _Über die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen Philosophie_, 1890 (inaugural address at Erlangen). Since 1884-5 Professor Falckenberg has also been an editor of the _Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik_, until 1888 in association with Krohn, and after the latter's death, alone. At present he has in hand a treatise on Lotze for a German series analogous to Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, which is to be issued under his direction. Professor Falckenberg's general philosophical position may be described as that of moderate idealism. His historical method is strictly objective, the aim being a free reproduction of the systems discussed, as far as possible in their original terminology and historical connection, and without the intrusion of personal criticism.

The translation has been made from the second German edition (1892), with still later additions and corrections communicated by the author in manuscript. The translator has followed the original faithfully but
not slavishly. He has not felt free to modify Professor Falckenberg's expositions, even in the rare cases where his own opinions would have led him to dissent, but minor changes have been made wherever needed to fit the book for the use of English-speaking students. Thus a few alterations have been made in dates and titles, chiefly under the English systems and from the latest authorities; and a few notes added in elucidation of portions of the text. Thus again the balance of the bibliography has been somewhat changed, including transfers from text to notes and _vice versa_ and a few omissions, besides the introduction of a number of titles from our English philosophical literature chosen on the plan referred to in the preface to the first German edition. The glossary of terms foreign to the German reader has been replaced by a revision and expansion of the index, with the analyses of the glossary as a basis. Wherever possible, and this has been true in all important cases, the changes have been indicated by the usual signs.

The translator has further rewritten Chapter XV., Section 3, on recent British and American Philosophy. In this so much of the author's (historical) standpoint and treatment as proved compatible with the aim of a manual in English has been retained, but the section as a whole has been rearranged and much enlarged.

The labor of translation has been lightened by the example of previous writers, especially of the translators of the standard treatises of Ueberweg and Erdmann. The thanks of the translator are
also due to several friends who have kindly aided him by advice or assistance: in particular to his friend and former pupil, Mr. C.M. Child, M.S., who participated in the preparation of a portion of the translation; and above all to Professor Falckenberg himself, who, by his willing sanction of the work and his co-operation throughout its progress, has given a striking example of scholarly courtesy.

A.C.A., Jr.

Wesleyan University, June, 1893.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION.

Since the appearance of Eduard Zeller's _Grundriss der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie_ (1883; 3d ed. 1889) the need has become even more apparent than before for a presentation of the history of modern philosophy which should be correspondingly compact and correspondingly available for purposes of instruction. It would have been an ambitious undertaking to attempt to supply a counterpart to the compendium of this honored scholar, with its clear and simple summation of the results of his much admired five volumes on Greek philosophy; and it has been only in regard to practical utility and careful consideration of the needs of students--concerning which we have enjoyed opportunity for gaining accurate information in the review exercises regularly held in this university--that we have ventured to hope that we might not fall too far short of his example.
The predominantly practical aim of this _History_--it is intended to serve
as an aid in introductory work, in reviewing, and as a substitute for
dictations in academical lectures, as well as to be a guide for the
wider circle of cultivated readers--has enjoined self-restraint in the
development of personal views and the limitation of critical reflections
in favor of objective presentation. It is only now and then that critical
hints have been given. In the discussion of phenomena of minor importance
it has been impossible to avoid the _oratio obliqua_ of exposition; but,
wherever practicable, we have let the philosophers themselves develop their
doctrines and reasons, not so much by literal quotations from their
works, as by free, condensed reproductions of their leading ideas. If the
principiant view of the forces which control the history of philosophy, and
of the progress of modern philosophy, expressed in the Introduction and in
the Retrospect at the end of the book, have not been everywhere verified
in detail from the historical facts, this is due in part to the limits, in
part to the pedagogical aim, of the work. Thus, in particular, more space
has for pedagogical reasons been devoted to the "psychological" explanation
of systems, as being more popular, than in our opinion its intrinsic
importance would entitle it to demand. To satisfy every one in the choice
of subjects and in the extent of the discussion is impossible; but our hope
is that those who would have preferred a guide of this sort to be entirely
different will not prove too numerous. In the classification of movements
and schools, and in the arrangement of the contents of the various systems, it has not been our aim to deviate at all hazards from previous accounts; and as little to leave unutilized the benefits accruing to later comers from the distinguished achievements of earlier workers in the field. In particular we acknowledge with gratitude the assistance derived from the renewed study of the works on the subject by Kuno Fischer, J.E. Erdmann, Zeller, Windelband, Ueberweg-Heinze, Harms, Lange, Vorländer, and Pünjer.

The motive which induced us to take up the present work was the perception that there was lacking a text-book in the history of modern philosophy, which, more comprehensive, thorough, and precise than the sketches of Schwegler and his successors, should stand between the fine but detailed exposition of Windelband, and the substantial but--because of the division of the text into paragraphs and notes and the interpolation of pages of bibliographical references--rather dry outline of Ueberweg. While the former refrains from all references to the literature of the subject and the latter includes far too many, at least for purposes of instruction, and J.B. Meyer's _Leitfaden_ (1882) is in general confined to biographical and bibliographical notices; we have mentioned, in the text or the notes and with the greatest possible regard for the progress of the exposition, both the chief works of the philosophers themselves and some of the treatises concerning them. The principles which have guided us in these selections--to include only the more valuable works and those best adapted
for students’ reading, and further to refer as far as possible to the most recent works—will hardly be in danger of criticism. But we shall not dispute the probability that many a book worthy of mention may have been overlooked.

The explanation of a number of philosophical terms, which has been added as an appendix at the suggestion of the publishers, deals almost entirely with foreign expressions and gives the preference to the designations of fundamental movements. It is arranged, as far as possible, so that it may be used as a subject-index.

JENA, December 23, 1885.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION.

The majority of the alterations and additions in this new edition are in the first chapter and the last two; no departure from the general character of the exposition has seemed to me necessary. I desire to return my sincere thanks for the suggestions which have come to me alike from public critiques and private communications. In some cases contradictory requests have conflicted—thus, on the one hand, I have been urged to expand, on the other, to cut down the sections on German idealism, especially those on Hegel—and here I confess my inability to meet both demands. Among the reviews, that by B. Erdmann in the first volume of the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, and, among the suggestions made by letter, those of H. Heussler, have been of especial value. Since
others commonly see defects more clearly than one's self, it will be very welcome if I can have my desire continually to make this _History_ more useful supported by farther suggestions from the circle of its readers. In case it continues to enjoy the favor of teachers and students, these will receive conscientious consideration.

For the sake of those who may complain of too much matter, I may remark that the difficulty can easily be avoided by passing over Chapters I., V. (§§ 1-3), VI., VIII., XII., XV., and XVI.

Professor A.C. Armstrong, Jr., is preparing an English translation. My earnest thanks are due to Mr. Karl Niemann of Charlottenburg for his kind participation in the labor of proof-reading.

R.F.

ERLANGEN, June 11, 1892.

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INTRODUCTION.

In no other department is a thorough knowledge of
history so important as
in philosophy. Like historical science in general,
philosophy is, on the
one hand, in touch with exact inquiry, while, on the
other, it has a
certain relationship with art. With the former it has in
common its
methodical procedure and its cognitive aim; with the
latter, its intuitive
color and the endeavor to compass the whole of
reality with a glance.
Metaphysical principles are less easily verified from
experience than
physical hypotheses, but also less easily refuted.
Systems of philosophy,
therefore, are not so dependent on our progressive
knowledge of facts as
the theories of natural science, and change less
quickly; notwithstanding
their mutual conflicts, and in spite of the talk about
discarded
standpoints, they possess in a measure the permanence of
classical works of
art, they retain for all time a certain relative
validity. The thought of
Plato, of Aristotle, and of the heroes of modern
philosophy is ever proving
anew its fructifying power. Nowhere do we find such
instructive errors as
in the sphere of philosophy; nowhere is the new so
essentially a completion
and development of the old, even though it deem itself
the whole and assume
a hostile attitude toward its predecessors; nowhere is
the inquiry so much
more important than the final result; nowhere the
categories "true and
false" so inadequate. The spirit of the time and the
spirit of the people,
the individuality of the thinker, disposition, will,
fancy—all these exert
a far stronger influence on the development of
philosophy, both by way of
promotion and by way of hindrance, than in any other
department of thought.
If a system gives classical expression to the thought of an epoch, a nation, or a great personality; if it seeks to attack the world-riddle from a new direction, or brings us nearer its solution by important original conceptions, by a subtler or a simpler comprehension of the problem, by a wider outlook or a deeper insight; it has accomplished more than it could have done by bringing forward a number of indisputably correct principles. The variations in philosophy, which, on the assumption of the unity of truth, are a rock of offense to many minds, may be explained, on the one hand, by the combination of complex variety and limitation in the motives which govern philosophical thought,—for it is the whole man that philosophizes, not his understanding merely,—and, on the other, by the inexhaustible extent of the field of philosophy. Back of the logical labor of proof and inference stand, as inciting, guiding, and hindering agents, psychical and historical forces, which are themselves in large measure alogical, though stronger than all logic; while just before stretches away the immeasurable domain of reality, at once inviting and resisting conquest. The grave contradictions, so numerous in both the subjective and the objective fields, make unanimity impossible concerning ultimate problems; in fact, they render it difficult for the individual thinker to combine his convictions into a self-consistent system. Each philosopher sees limited sections of the world only, and these through his own eyes; every system is one-sided. Yet it is this multiplicity and variety of systems alone which makes the aim of philosophy
practicable as it endeavors
to give a complete picture of the soul and of the
universe. The history of
philosophy is the philosophy of humanity, that great
individual, which,
with more extended vision than the instruments through
which it works,
is able to entertain opposing principles, and which,
reconciling old
contradictions as it discovers new ones, approaches by a
necessary and
certain growth the knowledge of the one all-embracing
truth, which is
rich and varied beyond our conception. In order to
energetic labor in the
further progress of philosophy, it is necessary to
imagine that the goddess
of truth is about to lift the veil which has for
centuries concealed her.
The historian of philosophy, on the contrary, looks on
each new system as
a stone, which, when shaped and fitted into its place,
will help to raise
higher the pyramid of knowledge. Hegel's doctrine of the
necessity
and motive force of contradictories, of the relative
justification of
standpoints, and the systematic development of
speculation, has great and
permanent value as a general point of view. It needs
only to be guarded
from narrow scholastic application to become a safe
canon for the
historical treatment of philosophy.

In speaking above of the worth of the philosophical
doctrines of the past
as defying time, and as comparable to the standard
color of finished
works of art, the special reference was to those
elements in speculation
which proceed less from abstract thinking than from the
fancy, the heart,
and the character of the individual, and even more
directly from the
disposition of the people; and which to a certain degree may be divorced from logical reasoning and the scientific treatment of particular questions. These may be summed up under the phrase, views of the world. The necessity for constant reconsideration of them is from this standpoint at once evident. The Greek view of the world is as classic as the plastic art of Phidias and the epic of Homer; the Christian, as eternally valid as the architecture of the Middle Ages; the modern, as irrefutable as Goethe's poetry and the music of Beethoven. The views of the world which proceed from the spirits of different ages, as products of the general development of culture, are not so much thoughts as rhythms in thinking, not theories but modes of intuition saturated with feelings of worth. We may dispute about them, it is true; we may argue against them or in their defense; but they can neither be established nor overthrown by cogent proofs. It is not only optimism and pessimism, determinism and indeterminism, that have their ultimate roots in the affective side of our nature, but pantheism and individualism, also idealism and materialism, even rationalism and sensationalism. Even though they operate with the instruments of thought, they remain in the last analysis matters of faith, of feeling, and of resolution. The aesthetic view of the world held by the Greeks, the transcendent-religious view of Christianity, the intellectual view of Leibnitz and Hegel, the panhelistic views of Fichte I and Schopenhauer are vital forces, not doctrines, postulates, not results of thought. One view of the world is forced to yield its pre-eminence to
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