SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this two being the extreme opposites of one another.
idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I Was not that said?
may look, and by which I may measure actions, EUTHYPHRO: It was.
whether yours or those of any one else, and then SOCRATES: And well said?
I shall be able to say that such and such an ac-EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was tion is pious, such another impious.
certainly said.
EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like.
SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods SOCRATES: I should very much like.
were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear differences?
to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.
to them.
SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do whether what you say is true or not I cannot as differences of this sort make us enemies and set yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will us at variance with one another? Do we not go prove the truth of your words.
at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
by a sum?
SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what EUTHYPHRO: True.
we are saying. That thing or person which is dear SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about to the gods is pious, and that thing or person magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differ-which is hateful to the gods is impious, these ences by measuring?