De Cive by Thomas Hobbs - HTML preview

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faction, do convene; insomuch as the Laws do flote here, and there, as it were upon the waters.

XIV. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience, that whereas it is oft

of great consequence, that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the

enemy before they can be brought to any effect, and their power, and will, is as soon known abroad, as

to the People it selfe commanding at home.

XV. These inconveniences which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies do so farre forth

evince Monarchy to be better than Democraty, as in Democraty affairs of great consequence are oftner trusted to be discussed by such like Committees, than in a Monarchy. Neither can it easily bee done

otherwayes; for there is no reason why every man should not naturally rather minde his own private,

than the publique businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence, whereby he may

gain the reputation of being ingenuous, and wise, and returning home to his friends, to his Parents, to

his wife, and children, rejoyce, and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour: As of old all the

delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was, to see his praises so well pleasing to his

Mother. But if the People in a Democraty would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of Warre,

and Peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomination of Magistrates, and

publique Ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration, then it must be confest, that

in this particular, Democraty and Monarchy would be equall.

XVI. Neither do the conveniencies or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of

government than another, arise from hence, namely, because the government it self, or the

administration of its affairs, are better committed to one, than many; or on the other side, to many, than

to some few. For Government is the power, the administration of it is the act. Now the Power in all kind of government is equall; the acts only differ, that is to say the actions and motions of a common-weale, as they flow from the deliberations of many, or few, of skilfull, or impertinent men. Whence we

understand, that the conveniences, or inconveniences of any government, depend not on him in whom

the authority resides, but on his Officers; and therefore nothing hinders, but that the common-weale

may be well governed, although the Monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit

for affaires, who are endued with the publique Offices, and charges; And that which is said, Woe to the

land whose King is a childe, doth not signifie the condition of a Monarchy to be inferiour to a Popular state, but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a Kingdome, that the King being a childe, it often happens, that many by ambition, and power, intruding themselves into publique counsels, the

government comes to be administred in a Democraticall manner, and that thence arise those infelicities

which for the most part accompany the Dominion of the People.

XVII. But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute Monarchy is the best state of government, that not

onely Kings, but even those Cities which are subject to the people, or to Nobles, give the whole command of warre to one only, and that so absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein by the way this

must be noted also, that no King can give a Generall greater authority over his army, than he himselfe

by Right may exercise over all his subjects). Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the

Camps. But what else, are many Common-wealths, than so many Camps strengthened with armes,

and men against each other, whose state (because not restrained by any common power, howsoever

an uncertain peace, like a short truce, may passe between them) is to be accounted for the state of

nature, which is the state of War.

XVIII. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of our selves to be subject to some Man, or

Councell, we cannot on better condition be subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon our

safety, and welfare; and this then comes to passe when we are the inheritance of the Ruler; for every

man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the Lands, and Monies of

the Subjects are not onely the Princes Treasure, but their bodies, and active minds; which will be easily

granted by those who consider at how great rates the Dominion of lesser Countries is valued, and how

much easier it is for men to procure mony, than money men; nor doe we readily meet with any example

that shewes us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his Prince been despoiled of

his life, or goods, through the sole licenciousnesse of his Authority.

XIX. Hitherto we have compared a Monarchicall, with a Popular State; we have said nothing of

Aristocracy; we may conclude of this, by what hath been said of those, that, that which is hereditary,

and content with the election of Magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few, and those

most able; which simply imitates the government of Monarchs most, and the People least of all, is for the Subjects both better, and more lasting than the rest.

1. Compacted by the artifice of men, &c. It seems the Ancients who made that same fable of

Prometheus pointed at this. They say, that Prometheus having stolne fire from the Sunne, formed a

man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetuall gnawing in his liver.

Which is, that by humane invention (which is signified by Prometheus) Laws and Justice were by

imitation taken from Monarchy, by vertue whereof (as by fire removed from its naturall orbe) the

multitude (as the durt and dregs of men) was as it were quickned and formed into a civill Person, which

is termed Aristocraty, or Democraty; but the Awthours and Abettors being found, who might securely

and quietly have lived under the naturall jurisdiction of Kings, doe thus smart for it, that being exposed

still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetuall cares, suspitions, and dissentions.

Chapter XI.

Places and Examples of Scripture of the Rights of Government agreeable to what hath been said

before

I. We have in the 6. Chapter, and the 2. Article, so derived the Originall of institutive, or politicall

Government from the consent of the Multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or be

esteem'd as Enemies. Such was the beginning of Gods Government over the Jewes instituted by

Moses, If ye will obey my voice indeed, &c. Ye shall be unto me a Kingdome of Priests, &c. And Moses came, and called the Elders of the People, &c. And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath spoken we will do, Exod. 19. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. Such also was the beginning of Moyses his power

under God, or of his Vicegerency. And all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings, and the

noyse of the Trumpet, &c. And they said unto Moyses, speak thou unto us, and we will hear. Exod.

20:18,19. The like beginning also had Sauls Kingdome. When yee saw that Nahash King of the

children of Ammon came out against you, yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall raign over us, when

the Lord your God was your King; Now therefore behold the King whom yee have chosen, and whom

yee have desired. 1 Sam. 12:12. But the major part only consenting, and not all (for there were certain Sons of Belial, who said, How shall this man save us? And they dispised him, 1 Sam. 10:27.) Those who did not consent were put to death as Enemies; And the people said unto Samuel, Who is he that

said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men that we may put them to death. 1 Sam. 11.

II. In the same 6. Chapter, the 6. and 7. Articles, I have shewed, that all judgment and Wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who beares the Supreme Authority; that is to say, in a Monarchy, on

a Monarch, or King; and this is confirmed by the Peoples owne judgement. Wee also will be like all the

Nations, and our King shall JUDGE us, and goe out before us, and fight our BATTELS. 1 Sam. 8:20.

And what pertaines to judgements, and all other matters, whereof there is any controversie, whether

they be Good, or Evill, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon. Give therefore thy Servant an

understanding heart to JUDGE thy People, that I may discerne between GOOD and EVILL. 1. Kings

3:9. And that of Absolom, There is no man deputed of the King to heare thee. 2. Sam. 15:3.

III. That Kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been shewed above in the sixth Chapter,

and the twelfth Article, King David also confirmes, who, though Saul sought to slay him, did

notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him, and forbad Abishai, saying, Destroy him, not; for who

can stretch forth his hand against the Lords Anointed, and be innocent? 1 Sam: 4:9. And when he had

cut off the skirt of his garment, The Lord forbid (saith he) that I should doe this thing unto my Master the Lords Anointed, to stretchforth mine hand against him. 1 Sam. 24:7. And commanded the

Amalekite, who for his sake had slain Saul, to be put to death. 2 Sam. 1:15.

IV. That which is said in the 17. Chapter of Judges, at the 6. verse. In those dayes there was no King in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes (as though where there were not a

Monarchy, there were an Anarchy or confusion of all things) may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of Monarchy above all other forms of government, unlesse that by the word King may

perhaps be understood, not one man onely, but also a Court, provided that in it there reside a supreme power; which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a supreme and absolute

power (which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth Chapter) there will be a liberty for every man

to doe what hee hath a minde, or whatsoever shall seem right to himselfe; which cannot stand with the

preservation of mankinde, and therefore in all Government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power

understood to be somewhere existent.

V. We have in the 8. Chapter, the 7. and 8. Article, said, that Servants must yeeld a simple obedience

to their Lords, and in the 9. Chapter, Article 7. that Sonnes owe the same obedience to their Parents.

Saint Paul sayes the same thing concerning Servants, Servants obey in all things your Masters

according to the flesh, not with eye service, as men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, fearing God.

Colos. 3:22. Concerning Sonnes, Children obey your Parents in all things, for this is well pleasing unto

the Lord. Colos. 3:20. Now as wee by simple obedience understand ALL THINGS which are not

contrary to the Lawes of God; so in those cited places of Saint Paul, after the word ALL THINGS, we

must suppose, excepting those which are contrary to the Lawes of God.

VI. But that I may not thus by peecemeale prove the right of Princes, I will now instance those

testimonies which altogether establish the whole power, (namely that there is an absolute and simple

obedience due to them from their subjects). And first out of the new Testament. The Scribes and

Pharisees sit in Moyses seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe, and doe.

Mat. 23:2. Whatsoever they bid you, (sayes he) observe, that is to say, obey simply: Why? Because they sit in Moyses seat; namely, the civill Magistrates, not Aaron, the Priests. Let every soule be subject to the higher powers, for there is no Power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God;

whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall

receive to themselves damnation. Rom. 13:1. Now because the powers that were in Saint Pauls time

were ordained of God, and all Kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their

subjects, it followes that such a power was ordained of God. Submit your selves unto every ordinance

of man for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King as supreme, or unto Governours, as unto them

that are sent by him, for the punishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that doe well, for so

is the will of God. 1 Pet. 2:13. Again Saint Paul to Titus, Put them in mind to bee subject to

Principalities and Powers, to obey Magistrates, &c. Chap. 3. vers. 1. What Principalities? Was it not to the Principalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience? Furthermore, that we may

come to the example of Christ himselfe, to whom the Kingdome of the Jewes belonged by hereditary

Right, derived from David himselfe; He when he lived in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto

Caesar, and pronounced it to be due to him. Give unto Caesar (saith he) the things which are Caesars, and unto God, the things which are Gods. Mat. 22:21. When it pleased him to shew himselfe a King, he

required entire obedience. Goe (said he) into the village over against you, and straightway yee shall finde an Asse tyed, and a Colt with her, loose them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say ought

unto you, yee shall say the Lord hath need of them. Mat. 21:2,3. This he did therefore by the right of being Lord, or a King of the Jewes. But to take away a subjects goods on this pretence onely, because

the Lord hath need of them, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the old Testament are

these, Goe thou near, and heare ALL that the Lord our God shall say, and speak thou unto us all that

the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and doe it. Deut. 5:27. But under the word all, is contained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua. And they answered Joshua saying, ALL that

thou commandest us, we will doe, and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will goe; according as we

hearkened unto Moyses in ALL things, so will we hearken unto thee, onely the Lord thy God be with

thee, as he was with Moyses; whosoever hee be that doth rebell against thy Commandement, and will

not hearken unto thy words in ALL that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death. Joshua 1:16-

18. And the Parable of the Bramble. Then said all the trees unto the Bramble, Come thou, and reign

over us; And the Bramble said unto the trees, If in truth yee anoint me King over you, then come and

put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the Bramble, and devoure the Cedars of

Lebanon. Judges 9. vers. 14, 15. The sense of which words is, that we must acquiese to their sayings,

whom we have truly constituted to be Kings over us, unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed

by the fire of a civill warre. But the Regall authority is more particularly described by God himselfe, in

the 1. Sam. 8. vers. 9. &c. Shew them the Right of the King that shall reign over them, &c. This shall be the Right of the King that shall reign over you; he will take your Sons, and appoint them for himself, for

his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and some shall runne before his Chariots, &c. And he will take

your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take your vineyards, and give them to his

Servants, &c. Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the KINGS RIGHT; neither was any man among the Jewes, no not the High Priest himselfe, exempted from this obedience. For

when the King (namely Solomon) said to Abiathar the Priest, Get thee to Anathoth unto thine own

fields, for thou art worthy of death, but I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou barest the Ark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my

Father was afflicted. So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being Priest unto the Lord. 1 Kings. 2:26. It cannot by any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord; neither read we, that either

Solomon was reproved, or that his Person at that time was any whit lesse acceptable to God.

Chapter XII.

Of the internal causes, tending to the dissolution of any Government

I. Hitherto hath been spoken by what causes, and Pacts, Common-weals are constituted, and what the

Rights of Princes are over their subjects; Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes

which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of naturall bodies, three things

are to be considered, namely, internall disposition, that they be susceptible of the motion to be

produced; the externall Agent, whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced; and

the action it selfe: So also in a Common-weale where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things

present themselves to our regard; First the Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace, wherewith the mindes of men are fitted and disposed; next their quality and condition who sollicite, assemble, and

direct them already thus disposed, to take up armes, and quit their al egiance; Lastly, the manner how

this is done, or the faction it selfe. But one, and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, That the knowledge of good and evill belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every

man lives by equall Right, and have not by any mutuall Pacts submitted to the command of others, we

have granted this to be true, nay in the first Chapter, Article 9. we have demonstrated it. But in the civil

state it is false. For it was shown in chap. 6. art. 9. that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and evill, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the Legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evill; and the Legislator is ever that Person who hath the supreme power in the Commonweale, that is to say, the Monarch in a Monarchy. We have confirmed the same

truth in the eleventh Chapter, Article 2. out of the words of Solomon; for if private men may pursue that

as good, and shun that as evill which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his?

Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy People, that I may discern between

good and evill. Since therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good and evill, wicked are those, though usuall sayings, that he onely is a King who does righteously, and that Kings must not be

obeyed, unlesse they command us just things, and many other such like. Before there was any

government, just and unjust had no being, their nature onely being relative to some command, and

every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just, or unjust, proceeds from the right of the Magistrate: Legitimate Kings therefore make the things they command, just, by commanding them,

and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them; but private men while they assume to

themselves the knowledge of good and evill, desire to be even as Kings, which cannot be with the safety of the Common weale. The most ancient of all Gods commands is, Gen. 2:15. Thou shalt not

eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill; and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations, Chap.

3. vers. 5. Yee shall be as Gods, knowing good and evill; and Gods first expostulation with man, vers.

11. Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that

thou shouldest not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it

seemed good to me to create thee, to be shamefull, except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the

knowledge of good and evill?

II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sinne, for he who doth so, contemns the Law.

But we must distinguish: That is my sinne indeed, which committing, I doe beleeve to be my sinne; but

what I beleeve to be another mans sin, I may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine. For if I be

commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I doe it, and he that commands me

be by Right, Lord over me, I sinne not; for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince,

conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken, I doe not therefore doe unjustly, but rather if I refuse to

doe it, arrogating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains onely to my

Prince. They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as any thing is

commanded them, which either is, or seems to be unlawfull to them: for if they obey, they sin against

their conscience, and if they obey not, against Right. If they sin against their conscience, they declare

that they fear not the paines of the world to come; if they sinne against Right, they doe as much as in

them lyes, abolish humane society, and the civill life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who

teach, that subjects sinne when they obey their Princes commands, which to them seem unjust, is both

erroneous, and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civill obedience; and it depends

upon that originall errour which we have observed above in the foregoing Article; for by our taking upon

us to judge of good and evill, we are the occasion, that as well our obedience, as disobedience,

becomes sin unto us.

III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, That Tyrannicide is lawfull; Nay, at this day it is by many Divines, and of old it was by all the Philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca,

Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek, and Roman Anarchies, held not only lawful, but

even worthy of the greatest praise. And under the title of Tyrants, they mean not onely Monarchs, but

all those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus onely at Athens, but

those thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom men

require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by Right, or without Right; if without

Right, he is an enemy, and by Right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a

Tyrant, but an enemy: if by Right, then the divine interrogation takes place, Who hath told thee that he was a Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? For

why doest thou call him a Tyrant, whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private

Person, usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill? But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that which is Monarchicall, we may hence discerne, namely, that by it

every King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement, and slain by the

hand of every murtherous villain.

IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society, is theirs, who hold, That they who bear Rule are

Subject also to the Civill Lawes. Which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6.

Chap. Artic. 14. from this Argument, That a City can neither be bound to it self, nor to any subject; not

to it selfe, because no man can be obliged except it be to another; not to any Subject, because the

single wills of the Subjects are contained in the will of the City, insomuch, that if the City will be free

from all such obligation, the Subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so. But that which holds

true in a City, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men, who have the

Supreme Authority, for they make a City, which hath no being but by their Supreme Power. Now that

this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Govern