believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their
blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority,
without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's principles can be
questioned. If they may and ought to be examined and tried, I desire to know how first and innate
principles can be tried; or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters whereby the
genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others: that so, amidst the great variety of
pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be
ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt;
since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced, will scarcely prove a sufficient mark
to direct my choice, and assure me of any innate principles.
From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men
agree; and therefore none innate.
Chapter III
Other considerations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical
1. Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate. Had those who would persuade us that there
are innate principles not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts out of
which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they
were innate. Since, if the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the
propositions made up of them should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if
the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they
will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For, where the ideas themselves are not,
there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.
2. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children. If we will attentively
consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the
world with them. For, bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some
pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas
at all in them; especially of ideas answering the terms which make up those universal propositions
that are esteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come
into their minds; and that they get no more, nor other, than what experience, and the observation of
things that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us that they are
not original characters stamped on the mind.
3. "Impossibility" and "identity" not innate ideas. "It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to
be," is certainly (if there be any such) an innate principle. But can any one think, or will any one say,
that "impossibility" and "identity" are two innate ideas? Are they such as all mankind have, and bring
into the world with them? And are they those which are the first in children, and antecedent to al
acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and
identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle
that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the same taste that it used to
receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of impossible est idem esse, et non esse, that
makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger; or that makes it fond of the one and
flee the other? Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had? Or the
understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood? The names
impossibility and identity stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it
requires great care and attention to form them right in our understandings. They are so far from
being brought into the world with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I
believe, upon examination it will be found that many grown men want them.
4. "Identity," an idea not innate. If identity (to instance that alone) be a native impression, and
consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our cradles, I would
gladly be resolved by any one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature
consisting of soul and body, be the same man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and
Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages
asunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same with both of
them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear that our idea of sameness is not so settled and clear as to
deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be
universally known and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted
truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose every one's idea
of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and thousands of his followers have. And which then
shall be true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?
5. What makes the same man? Nor let any one think that the questions I have here proposed about
the identity of man are bare empty speculations; which, if they were, would be enough to show, that
there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity. He that shall with a little attention
reflect on the resurrection, and consider that divine justice will bring to judgment, at the last day, the
very same persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life, will find it
perhaps not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists;
and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themselves, have naturally a clear
idea of it.
6. Whole and part, not innate ideas. Let us examine that principle of mathematics, viz., that the
whole is bigger than a part. This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles. I am sure it has as
good a title as any to be thought so; which yet nobody can think it to be, when he considers [that]
the ideas it comprehends in it, whole and part, are perfectly relative; but the positive ideas to which
they properly and immediately belong are extension and number, of which alone whole and part are
relations. So that if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be so too; it being
impossible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs,
and in which it is founded. Now, whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the
ideas of extension and number, I leave to be considered by these who are the patrons of innate
principles.
7. Idea of worship not innate. That God is to be worshipped, is, without doubt, as great a truth as
any that can enter into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles.
But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of God and worship are innate. That
the idea the term worship stands for is not in the understanding of children, and a character
stamped on the mind in its first original, I think will be easily granted, by any one that considers how
few there be amongst grown men who have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there
cannot be anything more ridiculous than to say, that children have this practical principle innate,
"That God is to be worshipped," and yet that they know not what that worship of God is, which is
their duty. But to pass by this.
8. Idea of God not innate. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for
many reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral
principles, without an innate idea of a Deity. Without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have
a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the atheists taken notice of amongst the
ancients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these later
ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania, in Brazil, [in Boranday,] and in the Caribbee islands,
etc., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo, in
Literis ex Paraquaria, de Caiguarum Conversione, has these words: Reperi eam gentem nullum
nomen habere quod Deum, et hominis animam significet; nulla sacra habet, nulla idola. These are
instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters and
discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found who have
enjoyed these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this
way, want the idea and knowledge of God. It will, I doubt not, be a surprise to others, as it was to
me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, let them consult the King of France's late envoy
thither, who gives no better account of the Chinese themselves. And if we will not believe La
Loubere, the missionaries of China, even the Jesuits themselves, the great encomiasts of the
Chinese, do all to a man agree, and will convince us, that the sect of the literari, or learned, keeping
to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheists. Vid. Navarette, in the
Collection of Voyages, vol. i., and Historia Cultus Sinensium. And perhaps, if we should with
attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to
fear, that many, in more civilized countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity
upon their minds, and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason.
And though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet perhaps we should hear
more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the magistrate's sword, or their neighbour's
censure, tie up people's tongues; which, were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken
away, would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do.
9. The name of God not universal or obscure in meaning. But had all mankind everywhere a notion
of a God, (whereof yet history tells us the contrary,) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of
him was innate. For, though no nation were to be found without a name, and some few dark notions
of him, yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind; no more than the
names of fire, or the sun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate; because
the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are so universally received and known amongst
mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a name, or the absence of such a notion out of
men's minds, any argument against the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof that there
was no loadstone in the world, because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such
thing nor a name for it; or be any show of argument to prove that there are no distinct and various
species of angels, or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct
species, or names for them. For, men being furnished with words, by the common language of their
own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things whose names those they
converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of
excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it;
if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind,--the idea is likely to sink the
deeper, and spread the further; especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light
of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the
visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation,
that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.
And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the minds of all that
have but once heard of it is so great, and carries such a weight of thought and communication with
it, that it seems stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish as
to want the notion of a God, than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.
10. Ideas of God and idea of fire. The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world,
to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the
principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must
necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all generations: though yet the general
reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the
unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they who made the
discovery had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced
them to their original; from whom other less considering people having once received so important a
notion, it could not easily be lost again.
11. Idea of God not innate. This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, were it to be found
universally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged, by men grown to maturity in all
countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no further
than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire
innate; since I think it may be truly said, that there is not a person in the world who has a notion of a
God, who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed
in an island where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor
name for it, how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides; and perhaps
too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion, of a God, til some one
amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things,
which would easily lead him to the notion of a God; which having once taught to others, reason, and
the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst
them.
12. Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an idea of Him, therefore naturally
imprinted by Him, answered. Indeed it is urged, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint
upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark and
doubt in so grand a concernment; and also, by that means, to secure to himself the homage and
veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.
This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those who use it in this case expect
from it. For, if we may conclude that God hath done for men all that men shall judge is best for them,
because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove, not only that God has imprinted on the
minds of men an idea of himself, but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair characters, all that
men ought to know or believe of him; all that they ought to do in obedience to his will; and that he
hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for
men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge, as St. Paul tells us all nations did
after God (Acts 17. 27); than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their
appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say it is best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of
God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth; and therefore there is one.
And I, by the same reason, say it is better for men that every man himself should be infallible. I
leave them to consider, whether, by the force of this argument, they shall think that every man is so.
I think it a very good argument to say,--the infinitely wise God hath made it so; and therefore it is
best. But it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom to say,--"I think it best; and
therefore God hath made it so." And in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a
topic, that God hath done so, when certain experience shows us that he hath not. But the goodness
of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original impressions of knowledge or ideas
stamped on the mind; since he hath furnished man with those faculties which will serve for the
sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being; and I doubt not but to show,
that a man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain a
knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued man with those
faculties of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate
notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him
bridges or houses,--which some people in the world, however of good parts, do either totally want,
or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without ideas of God and principles of morality,
or at least have but very ill ones; the reason in both cases, being, that they never employed their
parts, faculties, and powers industriously that way, but contented themselves with the opinions,
fashions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any further. Had you or I
been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish
ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there. And had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in
England, he had been perhaps as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician as any in it; the
difference between him and a more improved Englishman lying barely in this, that the exercise of
his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never
directed to any other or further inquiries. And if he had not any idea of a God, it was only because
he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it.
13. Ideas of God various in different men. I grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted
on the minds of men, we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his Maker, as a mark God
set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependence and duty; and that herein should
appear the first instances of human knowledge. But how late is it before any such notion is
discoverable in children? And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion
and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God? He that shall observe in children the
progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects they do first
and most familiarly converse with are those that make the first impressions on their understandings;
nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlarge
themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects; to retain
the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several
ways put them together. How, by these means, they come to frame in their minds an idea men have
of a Deity, I shall hereafter show.
14. Contrary and inconsistent ideas of God under the same name. Can it be thought that the ideas
men have of God are the characters and marks of himself, engraven in their minds by his own
finger, when we see that, in the same country, under one and the same name, men have far
different, nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a
name, or sound, will scarce prove an innate notion of him.
15. Gross ideas of God. What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged
and worshipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of
their ignorance of Him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and
eternity were excluded. To which, if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity, expressed in their
images and representations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, lusts, quarrels, and
other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think that the
heathen world, i.e., the greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their minds as he
himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about him, was author of. And this universality
of consent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions, it will be only this:--that God
imprinted on the minds of all men speaking the same language, a name for himself, but not any
idea; since those people who agreed in the name, had, at the same time, far different
apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say that the variety of deities worshipped by the
heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible
Being, or several parts of his providence, I answer: what they might be in the original I will not here
inquire; but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar I think nobody will affirm. And he that will
consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13, (not to mention other testimonies,) will find that the
theology of the Siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the Abbe de Choisy more
judiciously remarks in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 107/177, it consists properly in
acknowledging no God at all.
16. Idea of God not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it. If it be said, that wise
men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity, I grant it. But
then this,
First, excludes universality of consent in anything but the name; for those wise men being very few,
perhaps one of a thousand, this universality is very narrow.
Secondly, it seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions men have of God were
not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties: since the
wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and
reason, attained true notions in this as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of
men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and
vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the
notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate; for that also
wise men have always had.
17. Odd, low, and pitiful ideas of God common among men. This was evidently the case of all
Gentilism. Nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledged but one
God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God,
prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and the true ideas of him. How many even
amongst us, will be found upon inquiry to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven; and to
have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians as well as Turks have had whole
sects owning and contending earnestly for it,--that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape:
and though we find few now amongst us who profess themselves Anthropomorphites, (though some
I have met with that own it,) yet I believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the
ignorant and uninstructed Christians many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of
any age, or young people almost of any condition, and you shall find that, though the name of God
be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low, and pitiful, that
nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man; much less that they were characters written
by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he
has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world
with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us. For, being fitted with faculties to
attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them
not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two
straight lines are equal. There was never any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine
the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent to them; though yet it be past doubt that there
are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the
other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal consent, such an one
I easily allow; but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it
doe