

FM 7-100.4



**Opposing Force
Organization Guide**

MAY 2007

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Foreword

In today's complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve the U.S. Army. So the Army must be ready to meet the challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE) and the makeup of the opposing force (OPFOR) used in training for the COE.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the responsible official for the development, management, administration, and approval functions of the COE concept across the Army. Thus, the TRADOC DCSINT is responsible for documenting the doctrine, organization, and capabilities of an OPFOR that is appropriate for training the Army's leaders, Soldiers, and units for the COE.

In the FM 7-100 series, the TRADOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the COE. The OPFOR organizations outlined in FM 7-100.4 and the associated online organizational directories represent a realistic composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in real-world situations of the near- and mid-term. However, the world is constantly changing, as are the threats and challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.

This manual is approved for use in all Army training venues. However, as the OPFOR and other aspects of the COE are integrated into Army training, the TRADOC DCSINT and the intelligence community will continue research and analysis of real-world developments and trends. The goal of this continued effort is to keep our OPFOR and our understanding of the COE relevant as the world around us changes. Thus, this manual, along with the associated online organizational directories, is intended to be a living document, the ODCSINT will modify and change it as often as necessary in order to ensure its continued relevance in light of changes and developments in the COE. In anticipation of such changes, this manual will be published in electronic format available online at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at <http://www.us.army.mil>. The electronic version of the manual, as well as the organizational directories to which the manual is linked, are available on the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/COE/default.aspx>. Users need to monitor both these sites for periodic updates.



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Opposing Force Organization Guide

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Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
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Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).

Preface

This manual is one of a series that describes an opposing force (OPFOR) for training U.S. Army commanders, staffs, and units. See the References section for a list of the manuals in this series. Together, these manuals outline an OPFOR that can cover the entire spectrum of military and paramilitary capabilities against which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict.

Applications for this series of manuals include field training, training simulations, and classroom instruction throughout the Army. All Army training venues should use an OPFOR based on these manuals, except when mission rehearsal or contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific real-world threat. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the OPFOR manuals to fill information gaps in a manner consistent with what they do know about a specific threat.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to the Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats, of the TRADOC Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) at the following address: Director, CTID, TRISA-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) at <http://www.us.army.mil> and linked to online organizational directories on the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/COE/default.aspx>. Readers should monitor those sites for the status of this manual and information regarding updates. Periodic updates, subject to the normal approval process, will occur as a result of the normal production cycle in accordance with TRADOC regulation 25-36, paragraphs 2-17 and 4-7. The date on the cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest update.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Introduction

This manual is part of the FM 7-100 series, which describes an opposing force (OPFOR) that exists for the purpose of training U.S. forces for potential combat operations. This OPFOR reflects the characteristics of military and paramilitary forces that may be present in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Like those real-world threats, the OPFOR will continue to present new and different challenges for U.S. forces. The COE is constantly changing, and it is important for U.S. Army training environments to keep pace with real-world developments. This manual differs from others in the FM 7-100 series in that it includes both OPFOR doctrine regarding organization (administrative force structure and task-organized fighting force structure) and training-related issues from a U.S. viewpoint.

This organization guide also differs from other FMs in the fact that it is linked to online organizational directories. TRADOC DCSINT maintains these directories and continuously updates them, as necessary, to represent contemporary and emerging capabilities. In order to provide a comprehensive menu of the numerous types of OPFOR organizations in the detail required for the Army's live, virtual, and constructive training environments, these directories exceed the scope and size that can be accommodated within a traditional FM format. The directories contain over 10,000 pages detailing OPFOR organizations. From this menu, users can select and download just those parts needed to build the appropriate OPFOR for a particular exercise. Task-organizing an exercise order of battle also requires that users have the ability to use downloaded organizations in an interactive manner. For these reasons, it is necessary for this FM to be linked to organizational diagrams and associated equipment inventories made available in electronic form that users can download and manipulate as necessary in order to create task organizations capable of fighting in adaptive ways that typify the COE.

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In planning a training scenario and its road to war, trainers need to take into consideration the entire operational environment (OE) and its impact on the OPFOR's order of battle (OB). The DOD officially defines an *operational environment* as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander" (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0). The *contemporary operational environment* (COE) is the synergistic combination of all the critical variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations today and in the near- and mid-term.

The COE has a direct impact on the architecture and capabilities of OPFOR organizations. Proper task-organizing can either mitigate or exploit the environment by the proper selection of organization and/or equipment. This enables the appropriate OPFOR to perform countertasks that challenge the ability of U.S. units to perform the tasks in their mission essential task list (METL) in training environments.

The COE is the holistic view of the environment in the near- and mid-term that comprises the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the training and employment of military forces. Analysis of the COE focuses on eight interrelated variables:

- Political.
- Military.
- Economic.
- Social.
- Information.
- Infrastructure.
- Physical environment.
- Time.

An assessment of these critical variables and their relationships helps to understand any OE and its impact on the Army.

The COE is particularly valuable in training. In order to develop adaptive leaders capable of operating in any OE, the Army requires challenging training scenarios, an OPFOR model, and OPFOR doctrine. This provides an adaptive, asymmetric OPFOR in order to train, develop, and prepare Soldiers and leaders to overcome threats in a complex and adaptive OE. It also provides a benchmark to measure training effectiveness and combat development activities. See FM 3-0.2 (to be published) for further discussion of the COE and its application to training.

REAL WORLD

In the real world, the COE is the entire set of conditions, circumstances, and influences that U.S. Armed Forces can expect to face when conducting military operations to further the interests of the United States, its friends, and allies. The COE is “contemporary” in the sense that it does not represent conditions that existed only in the past or that might exist only in the remote future, but rather those conditions that exist today and in the clearly foreseeable near- and mid-term future. This COE consists not only of the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of potential real-world adversaries, but also of the manifestations of the seven other variables that help define any OE.

TRAINING

In training environments, the COE is the OE created to approximate the demands of the real-world COE and to set the conditions for desired training outcomes. This involves the appropriate combination of an OPFOR (with military and/or paramilitary capabilities representing a composite of a number of potential adversaries) and other OE variables in a realistic, feasible, and plausible manner. The purpose of the COE in training simulations is to produce the necessary training outcomes.

Note. The same type of COE conditions can be created to support some combat development activities that do not require simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary. However, some combat development activities may require portrayal of an OE that extends further into the future than is typical for the COE; in that case, they are dealing with the *future operational environment* (FOE).

OPPOSING FORCE

As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring partner capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. force. Training for the COE requires an OPFOR that is “a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces” (Army Regulation 350-2). This manual introduces the baseline organizational structures of a flexible, thinking, adaptive OPFOR.

As the real-world conditions and capabilities change over time, OPFOR doctrine, organizations, and equipment capabilities will evolve along with them, to continue to provide the Army an OPFOR appropriate for the COE. Thus, the OPFOR will remain capable of presenting realistic and relevant challenges that are appropriate to meet evolving training requirements at any given point in time.

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Chapter 1

OPFOR Roles and Relationships in Training

An opposing force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential combat operations.

OPFOR FOR THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-1. Training U.S. forces for the contemporary operational environment (COE) requires a different kind of OPFOR from that of the past. The OPFOR must be less predictable and not based on the armed forces of a particular country or non-state actor. In today's world, the U.S. Army must be prepared to go into any operational environment (OE) and perform its full range of missions. It must be ready to do so in the face of a wide variety of possible threats and at the same time be prepared to deal with third-party actors that may have other interests. Not all threats are purely military in nature. Therefore, the U.S. Army now defines an OPFOR as "a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces" (Army Regulation 350-2).

1-2. In some training environments, a military force or a paramilitary force alone may be the OPFOR. In other cases, military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is driven by training requirements.

1-3. Various agencies and experts have different lists of real-world threats the United States might have to face. If the U.S. Army were to pick any one of these threats as *the* threat against which to train, that threat would almost certainly not be the one that all Army forces would actually fight. What is needed is a composite that is representative of the full range and variety of possible threats and OEs. It must have a bit of everything—it could be virtually anybody, anywhere. Therefore, this manual is linked to directories of organizations that provide a representative composite of real-world military and paramilitary organizations. With this composite as a baseline, trainers have the flexibility to task-organize and adjust the capabilities of an OPFOR to fit the most demanding U.S. Army training requirements and provide a framework for training that creates the leaders, soldiers, and unit skills necessary for success on the next battlefield—wherever that might be.

ROLE IN TRAINING

1-4. As a training tool, the OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative sparring partner, capable of stressing any or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. force. However, it must also be tailored to meet specific training requirements.

Note. Although the OPFOR is primarily a training tool, it may be used for other purposes. For example, some combat development activities that do not require simulation of a specific real-world potential adversary may use an OPFOR to portray the "threat" or "enemy."

1-5. As a baseline for developing specific OPFORs for specific training environments, this manual describes an OPFOR that is representative of the forces of contemporary nation-states and non-state actors. This composite of the characteristics of real-world military and paramilitary forces provides a framework for the realistic and relevant portrayal of capabilities that U.S. forces might face in the COE. This manual is

applicable to the entire U.S. Army training community, including the OPFORs at all of the combat training centers, the TRADOC schools, and units in the field.

1-6. The FM 7-100 series, as a whole, covers not only the military and paramilitary forces of a nation-state, but also other, non-state paramilitary organizations and nonmilitary actors that might be present in a region of the world. The United States, as an extraregional power becoming involved in such a region, might have to deal with any or all of these types of military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary elements. It might encounter these elements individually or, more likely, in combination with other such elements. Whether these elements operate in concert or independently, they are an important part of the COE.

1-7. Trainers need to consider the total OE—not just the military or threat dimension—in designing training environments. All the other critical variables can affect the overall OE and the military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary entities that are part of it.

1-8. The baseline OPFOR organizations linked to this manual do not constitute an OPFOR order of battle (OB). Rather, they provide a framework from which trainers can develop a specific OPFOR OB appropriate for their particular training requirements. Within this framework, scenario writers and exercise designers have considerable flexibility in determining what the OPFOR actually has at a given point in time or a given place on the battlefield—in a particular scenario. In some cases, an organization taken straight from the OPFOR administrative force structure may meet the requirements for a particular U.S. Army training environment. In most cases, however, it will be necessary to task-organize the OPFOR organizations in order to portray the right mix of units and equipment for stressing the mission essential task list (METL) of U.S. units in particular training environments.

1-9. Thus, the baseline organizations presented in the organizational directories linked to this manual are intended to be tailored and task-organized in a manner that is appropriate for the training objectives. Depending on the training requirement, the OPFOR may be a large, medium, or small force. Its technology may be state-of-the-art, relatively modern, obsolescent, obsolete, or an uneven combination of these categories. Its ability to sustain operations may be limited or robust.

1-10. During the road to war leading up to events in a training scenario, the OPFOR may play the role of a “threat” (potential enemy) that is on the verge of becoming an enemy. However, the actual training event usually deals with a state of hostilities. Thus, once hostilities begin in the training event, the OPFOR acts as the “enemy” of the U.S. force in the training environment.

TIE-IN WITH OTHER MANUALS IN THE FM 7-100 SERIES

1-11. This organization guide is meant to be used in conjunction with other manuals in the FM 7-100 series. Together, these manuals outline an OPFOR that can cover the entire spectrum of military and paramilitary capabilities against which the Army must train to ensure success in the types of OEs it can expect to encounter in the clearly foreseeable future.

OPFOR STRATEGY, OPERATIONS, AND TACTICS

1-12. This organization guide ties in with the national-level organizations described in detail in FM 7-100, *Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*. Organizations from the OPFOR administrative force structure (found in the online directories linked to this manual) should be task-organized in accordance with OPFOR doctrine in FM 7-100.1, *Opposing Force Operations*, and FM 7-100.2, *Opposing Force Tactics*.

PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND NONMILITARY ACTORS

1-13. This organization guide ties in with FM 7-100.3, *Opposing Force: Paramilitary Organizations and Nonmilitary Actors* (to be published). See that manual for more detail on the nature and activities of such actors.

WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE

1-14. Chapters 3 and 4 each provide a link to the *Worldwide Equipment Guide* (WEG) online. The WEG contains equipment data, tier tables, and substitution matrices for the various categories of equipment found in OPFOR organizations. Training planners can employ the tier tables and substitution matrices in the WEG to find appropriate substitutes for baseline equipment shown in the organizational directories. Within each functional category of equipment, there are four tiers representing different levels of capability, with Tier 1 representing the highest level of capability and modernity. The WEG also contains technical data on the capabilities of systems identified as “Principal Items of Equipment” in the organizational directories and/or listed in the tier tables.

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Chapter 2

Administrative Force Structure

This chapter and the organizational directories to which it is linked provide the administrative force structure (AFS) to be used as the basis for OPFOR organization in all Army training, except real-world-oriented mission rehearsal exercises. This includes the forces of nation-state actors as well as key non-state actors. In most cases, the organizations found in the AFS will require task-organizing (see chapter 3) in order to construct an OPFOR order of battle appropriate for a training event.

SECTION I – NATION-STATE FORCES: STRATEGIC LEVEL

2-1. When the OPFOR consists of or includes the military and/or paramilitary forces of a nation-state, the national-level structure of that state, including the overall military and paramilitary structure, should follow the patterns described in FM 7-100. Those patterns are summarized here. (See FM 7-100 for more detail.)

2-2. The FM 7-100 series refers to the country in question as “the State.” In specific U.S. Army training environments, however, the generic name of the State may give way to other fictitious country names used in the specific training scenarios. (See Army Regulation 350-2 for additional guidance concerning the use of country names in a scenario.) The State possesses various military and paramilitary forces with which to pursue its national interests. This section of chapter 2 describes the national-level command structure and the various services that control these forces.

2-3. The State’s Armed Forces have an *administrative force structure* (AFS) that manages military forces in peacetime. This AFS is the aggregate of various military headquarters, organizations, facilities, and installations designed to man, train, and equip the forces. Within the AFS, tactical-level commands have standard organizational structures (as depicted in the organizational directories). However, these AFS organizations normally differ from the OPFOR’s wartime fighting force structure. (See chapter 3 on Task-Organizing.)

2-4. The AFS includes all components of the Armed Forces—not only regular, standing forces (active component), but also reserve and militia forces (reserve component). For administrative purposes, both regular and reserve forces come under the headquarters of their respective service component. Each of the six service components is responsible for manning, equipping, and training of its forces and for organizing them within the AFS.

NATIONAL-LEVEL COMMAND STRUCTURE

2-5. The State employs its military forces, along with its other instruments of power, to pursue its tactical, operational, and strategic goals and, thus, support its national security strategy. The national-level command structure includes the National Command Authority, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff. (See figure 2-1 on page 2-2.)

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

2-6. The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises overall control of the application of all instruments of national power in planning and carrying out the national security strategy. The NCA allocates forces and establishes general plans for the conduct of national strategic campaigns. The NCA exercises control over the makeup and actions of the Armed Forces through the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

2-7. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Armed Forces and for the readiness and overall development of the six service components of the Armed Forces. However, the General Staff has direct control over the six services. In wartime, the MOD merges with the General Staff to form the Supreme High Command (SHC).

GENERAL STAFF

2-8. The General Staff is a major link in the centralization of military command at the national level, since it provides staff support and acts as the executive agency for the NCA. Together with the MOD, the General Staff forms the SHC in wartime. The General Staff has direct control over the six services, and all military forces report through it to the NCA. The Chief of the General Staff commands the SHC.




Figure 2-1. National-Level Command Structure and Service Components

SERVICE COMPONENTS

2-9. The Armed Forces generally consist of six services. These include the Army, Navy, Air Force (which includes the national-level Air Defense Forces), Strategic Forces (with long-range rockets and missiles), Special-Purpose Forces (SPF) Command, and Internal Security Forces. The Internal Security Forces are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime, but become subordinate to the SHC in time of war. The Armed Forces field some reserve component forces in all services, but most reserve forces are Army forces. Militia forces belong exclusively to the ground component.

Note. Regular, reserve, and militia forces of the State can maintain various relationships with insurgent, guerrilla, and possibly criminal organizations.

ARMY

2-10. The Army includes tank, mechanized infantry, motorized infantry, and a small number of airborne and special-purpose forces (Army SPF). The Army fields both rocket and tube artillery to support ground operations. The Army also has some long-range rockets and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). Fire support capability includes attack helicopters of Army aviation. The Army is assigned large numbers of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and will also have mobile air defense units in support.

NAVY

2-11. The State maintains a regional force-projection navy with a significant access-control capability built on small surface combatants, submarines, surface- and ground-based antiship missile units, and antiship mines. The Navy has a limited amphibious capability and possesses naval infantry capable of conducting forcible entry against regional opponents. The Navy also fields organic Special-Purpose Forces (Naval SPF).

Note. If the State in a particular scenario is a landlocked country, it may not have a navy.

AIR FORCE

2-12. The Air Force, like the Navy, is fundamentally a supporting arm. Its aircraft include fighters, bombers, tactical transport, tankers, airborne early warning aircraft, electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and auxiliaries. The State's national-level Air Defense Forces are subordinate to the Air Force. Similar to other services, the Air Force has its own organic Air Force SPF.

STRATEGIC FORCES

2-13. The Strategic Forces consist of long-range rocket and missile units. The missiles of the Strategic Forces are capable of delivering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions, and the NCA is the ultimate CBRN release authority. The State considers the Strategic Forces capability, even when delivering conventional munitions, the responsibility of the NCA. Therefore, the NCA is likely to retain major elements of the Strategic Forces under its direct control or under the SHC or a theater headquarters in wartime. In some cases, the SHC or theater commander may allocate some Strategic Forces assets down to operational-level commands. Conventionally-armed rocket and missile units may be assigned directly in support of air, naval, and ground forces.

SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES COMMAND

2-14. The SPF Command includes both SPF units and elite commando units. The General Staff or SHC normally reserves some of these units under its own control for strategic-level missions. It may allocate some SPF units to subordinate operational or theater commands, but can still task the allocated units to support strategic missions, if required.

2-15. Four of the five other service components also have their own SPF. In contrast to the units of the SPF Command, the Army, Navy, and Air Force SPF are designed for use at the operational level. The Internal Security Forces also have their own SPF units. These service SPF normally remain under the control of their respective services or a joint operational or theater command. However, SPF from any of these service components could become part of joint SPF operations in support of national-level requirements. The SPF Command has the means to control joint SPF operations as required.

2-16. Any SPF units (from the SPF Command or from other service components' SPF) that have reconnaissance or direct action missions supporting strategic-level objectives or intelligence requirements would normally be under the direct control of the SHC or under the control of the SPF Command, which reports directly to the SHC. Also, any service SPF units assigned to joint SPF operations would temporarily come under the control of the SPF Command or perhaps the SHC.

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