The Phenomenology of Mind HTML version

but through the third term, the mediator. Hence its will certainly becomes, for consciousness, universal will,
inherent and essential will, but is not itself in its own view this inherent reality. The giving up of its own will
as particular is not taken by it to be in principle the positive element of universal will. Similarly its surrender
of possession and enjoyment has merely the same negative significance, and the universal which it thereby
comes to find is, in its view, not its own doing proper. This unity of objectivity and independent
self−existence which lies in the notion of action, and which therefore comes for consciousness to be the
essential reality and object−−as this is not taken by consciousness to be the principle of its action, neither
does it become an object for consciousness directly and through itself. Rather, it makes the mediating
minister express this still halting certainty, that its unhappy state is only implicitly the reverse, i.e. is only
implicitly action bringing self−satisfaction in its act or blessed enjoyment; that its pitiable action too is only
implicitly the reverse, namely, absolute action; that in principle action is only really action when it is the
action of some particular individual. But for its self, action and its own concrete action remain something
miserable and insignificant, its enjoyment pain, and the sublation of these, positively considered, remains a
mere "beyond". But in this object, where it finds its own action and existence, qua this particular
consciousness, to be inherently existence and action as such, there has arisen the idea of Reason, of the
certainty that consciousness is, in its particularity, inherently and essentially absolute, or is all reality.
1. The term "ungleckliches Bewusstsein" is designed as a summary expression for the following movement,
there being no recognized general term for this purpose, as in the case of "Stoicism". The term hardly seems
fortunate: with the following analysis should be read Hegel's Philosophy of History, part 4, sec. 2, c. 1 and 2.
(Eng. Tr. Pp. 380−415) and History of Philosophy, part 2, Introduction.
2. God as Judge.
3. Christ.
4. The religious communion.
5. I.e. the philosophical observer.
6. The historic Christ as worshipped, e.g. in the mediaeval church.
7. Cp. The Crusades.
8. The conception of the nothingness of the individual in the sight of God.
9. Asceticism.
10. The Priesthood.
11. Cp. The use in the Church services of Latin instead of the vernacular: religious processions, etc.
12. Absolution.
[[Translator's comments: Reason is the first stage in the analysis of concrete self−conscious of itself in its
object and conscious of the object as universal. Reason is not a mere "function" of mind, but a stage of mind.