The Phenomenology of Mind HTML version

6. "Everyday Physiognomy" would be the familiar procedure of mankind, civilized and uncivilized, in diving
or supposing what is in a man's mind from bodily expressions−e.g. the tone of his voice, the lineaments
(natural and acquired) of his face, the play of his features, or even in general the conformation of his body.
The procedure is instinctive; but it also leads to rough and ready judgments of experience which are used for
guidance in everyday social life.
7. Tim¾us, 71, 72.
8. v. above, p. 349.
[[Translator's comments: In this section we have the second form in which rational experience is realized. In
"observation" mind is directly aware of itself as in conscious unity with its object: it makes no effort of its
own to realize this unity: it finds the unity by looking on, so to say. But it may have the same experience by
creating through its own effort an object constituted and determined solely by its self. Here it does not find
the unity of itself and its object; it makes the object at one with itself by moulding the character and content
of the object after its own nature. As contrasted with observation, which may be called the operation of
"theoretical" reason, this new way of having a rational experience may be called the operation of "practical"
reason. In the first we have reason in the form of knowledge and science, in the second, reason in the sense of
rational action and practice.
It is this second way of establishing the experience of reason which is analysed in the following sections. The
immediately succeeding section describes the experience in its general features. We have here the sphere of
conscious purpose and the foundation of moral and social life.]]
SELF−CONSCIOUSNESS found the "thing" in the form of itself, and itself in the form of a thing; that is to
say, self−consciousness is explicitly aware of being in itself the objective reality. It is no longer the
immediate certainty of being all reality; it is rather a kind of certainty for which the immediate in general
assumes the form of something sublated, so that the objectivity of the immediate is regarded now merely as
something superficial whose inner core and essence is self−conscious consciousness.
The object, therefore, to which self−consciousness is positively related, is a self−consciousness. The object
has the form and character of thinghood, i.e. is independent: but self−consciousness has the conviction that
this independent object is not alien to itself; it knows herewith that itself is inherently (an sich) recognized by
the object. Self−consciousness is mind, which has the assurance of having, in the duplication of its
self−consciousness and in the independence of both, its unity with its own self. This certainty has to be
brought out now before the mind in all its truth; what self−consciousness holds as a fact, viz. that implicitly
in itself and in its inner certainty it is, has to enter into its consciousness and become explicit for it.
What the general stages of this actualization will be can be indicated in a general way by reference to the road
thus far traversed. Just as reason, when exercised in observation, repeated in the medium of the category the
movement of "consciousness" as such, namely, sense−certainty,(1) perception,(2) and understanding,(3) the
course of reason here, too, will again traverse the double movement of "self−consciousness", and from
independence pass over into its freedom. To begin with, this active reason is aware of itself merely as an
individual", and must, being such, demand and bring forth its reality in an "other". Thereafter, however, its