But is and is not may be taken in two senses:
*
*
*
Either one is one, Or, one has being,
‘I cannot refuse,’ said Parmenides, ‘since, as from which opposite consequences are deduced, Zeno remarks, we are alone, though I may say 1.a. If one is one, it is nothing.
with Ibycus, who in his old age fell in love, I, like 1.b. If one has being, it is all things.
the old racehorse, tremble at the prospect of the course which I am to run, and which I know so To which are appended two subordinate conse-well. But as I must attempt this laborious game, quences:
what shall be the subject? Suppose I take my own 1.aa. If one has being, all other things are.
hypothesis of the one.’ ‘By all means,’ said 1.bb. If one is one, all other things are not.
Zeno. ‘And who will answer me? Shall I propose the youngest? he will be the most likely to say The same distinction is then applied to the nega-what he thinks, and his answers will give me time tive hypothesis:
t o b r e a t h e . ’ ‘ I a m t h e y o u n g e s t , ’ s a i d 2.a. If one is not one, it is all things.
Aristoteles, ‘and at your service; proceed with 2.b. If one has not being, it is nothing.
your questions.’—The result may be summed up as follows:—
Involving two parallel consequences respecting 1.a. One is not many, and therefore has no parts, the other or remainder:
and therefore is not a whole, which is a sum of 2.aa. If one is not one, other things are all.
parts, and therefore has neither beginning, 2.bb. If one has not being, other things are not.
middle, nor end, and is therefore unlimited, and 25
Parmenides
therefore formless, being neither round nor possible still is the coming into being either as a straight, for neither round nor straight can be whole or parts of that which is neither a whole defined without assuming that they have parts; nor parts. The one, then, is incapable of motion.
and therefore is not in place, whether in another But neither can the one be in anything, and there-which would encircle and touch the one at many fore not in the same, whether itself or some other, points; or in itself, because that which is self-con-and is therefore incapable of rest. Neither is one taining is also contained, and therefore not one the same with itself or any other, or other than but two. This being premised, let us consider itself or any other. For if other than itself, then whether one is capable either of motion or rest.
other than one, and therefore not one; and, if For motion is either change of substance, or the same with other, it would be other, and other motion on an axis, or from one place to another.
than one. Neither can one while remaining one But the one is incapable of change of substance, be other than other; for other, and not one, is the which implies that it ceases to be itself, or of other than other. But if not other by virtue of motion on an axis, because there would be parts being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by around the axis; and any other motion involves virtue of itself, not itself other, and if not itself change of place. But existence in place has been other, not other than anything. Neither will one already shown to be impossible; and yet more be the same with itself. For the nature of the impossible is coming into being in place, which same is not that of the one, but a thing which implies partial existence in two places at once, becomes the same with anything does not be-or entire existence neither within nor without come one; for example, that which becomes the the same; and how can this be? And more im-same with the many becomes many and not one.