and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all
things prior to all; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the
monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this
greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth
to us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be
considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the
centre; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence.
-----------------
[6] By the first principle here, the one is to be understood for that
arcane nature which is beyond the one, since all language is subverted
about it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and
venerated in the most profound silence.
-----------------
That this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised
by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from
what he says in the Philebus: for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts
that in Jupiter a royal intellect, and a royal soul subsist according to
cause. Pherecydes Syrus, too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher
(in Oedip. Egyptiac.), has the following lines:
[Greek:
O theos esti kuklos, tetragonos ede trigonos, Keinos de gramme, kentron, kai panta pro panton.]
i.e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square, centre and line, and all things
before all. From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine
is sufficiently apparent.
And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers: prior
to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius) asserted indeed, that
there is one superessential God, but that the other gods had an essential
subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from the one. They
likewise said that there is a multitude of superessential unities, who
are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity,
imparted to essences by the highest Gods. That this hypothesis, however,
is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his
Parmenides, in which he shows that the one does not subsist in itself.
(See vol. iii, p. 133). For as we have observed from Proclus, in the
notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is
self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power
always comprehends, according to cause that which it produces, it is
necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far
as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is
caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused,
that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended.
If therefore a
subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced
by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133,
vol. iii), a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself. If the one therefore is not self-subsistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be
necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows
that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately
proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self-subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not
be a true sufficiency in any thing.
Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by
nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the
case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of
intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life: if
of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being.
For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in
itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If
therefore, these are in the latter, they will also be in the former. I mean
the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such
are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does
not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the
genus of substance, and is contra-distinguished from accident, which cannot
exist independent of a subject.
Self-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate
progeny of the one, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which
ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the
ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and the one must be
conceived as something even more excellent than this.
From this divine
self-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect
natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according
to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the
human soul; proximately suspended from the daemoniacal order: for this
order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet, "stands in the middle rank
between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links
together all intelligent nature." And here to the reader, who has not
penetrated the depths of Plato's philosophy, it will doubtless appear
paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce
itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The
solution of this difficulty is as follows:--Essential production, or that
energy through which any nature produces something else by its very
being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are
seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat, by its very essence,
and snow coldness. And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in
which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As
this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all
others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first
belong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the
ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of
beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will
necessarily be different in different producing causes.
Hence, from that
which subsists, at the summit of self subsistent natures, a series of
self subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be
secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it
produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its
cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in
consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect;
but it is produced by intellect immutably, and by itself transitively;
for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So
far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is
produced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by
itself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit
of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that
summit is its own spontaneous energy; and, through this it becomes
self-subsistent, and self-perfect.
That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces
itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:--That which is able to
impart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can
easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same
genus; but well being confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than
mere being. The rational soul imparts well being to itself, when it
cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the
contagion of the body. It will therefore also impart being to itself. And
this with great propriety; for all divine natures, and such things as
possess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others,
necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the
sun himself is an illustrious example; for he illuminates all things with
his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all
splendour. Hence, since the souls imparts life and motion to other
things, on which account Aristotle calls an animal antokincton, self-moved, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and
motion to itself.
From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato,
respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it
follows that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the
universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timaeus,
not through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power.
All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him at once, into light; but
divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the
universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably
to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree.
But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate
subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls
Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader
will readily admit that this dogmas is so far from being derogatory to the
dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and,
preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable.
If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for as we have already observed,
it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturitions of the soul
which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the
principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or in the reverential
language of the Egyptians, as a darkness thrice unknown.[7] Highly laudable
indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which
the great ancients paid to this immense principle. This I have already
noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides, and I shall only observe at
present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious
reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to
the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated
intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his Mss. Scholia on the Cratylus,
"Not every genus of the gods has an appellation; for with respect to the
first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is
ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to
the one, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For
that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly
ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should
terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that
which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms,
and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light.
But, the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known
by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing
theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says that this
is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from
it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods."
-----------------
[7] Psalm xviii:11; xcvii:2.
-----------------
With no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak
concerning the ineffable principle of things. "Let us now if ever remove
from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life,
and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this
purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions
alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first be at peace; but let
the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us
with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable.
Let us also
standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any
thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the
rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to
behold him,--let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible
gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean;
and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and
from intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to
ourselves what the natures are from which in this progression we shall
consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him,
not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence
to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these
indeed, but among the last of things. But prior to these, let us
celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and
intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and
mundane divinities as, the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities,
and beyond the first adyta--as more ineffable than all silence, and more
unknown than all essence,--as holy among the holies, and concealed in
the intelligible gods." Such is the piety, such the sublimity, and
magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of
that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to
speak about it, extending the ineffable parturitions of the soul to the
ineffable cosensation of the incomprehensible one.
From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is
noticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most ancient
theologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning
it, arose the great reverence which the ancients paid to the divinities
even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended,
considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as
so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the
Odyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls
of the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden
lamp fills all the place with a divine light,
[Greek:
. . . . . paroithe de pallas Athene Chryseon lychnon echrusa phars perikalles epoiei.]
Before thee Pallas Athene bore a golden cresset and cast a most lovely
light. Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial
gods was present,
[Greek:
Emala tis deos endon, of ouranon euryn echousi.]
Verily some God is within, of those that hold the wide heaven. Ulysses
says in reply, "Be silent, restrain your intellect (i.e.
even cease to
energize intellectually), and speak not."
[Greek:
Siga, kai kata son noon ischana, med' ereeine.]
Hold thy peace and keep all this in thine heart and ask not hereof.
--Book 19, Odyssey.
Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately
obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there
can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect
analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to
Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from
being a part of a consubsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated
with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is
even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and
habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge
refunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of
Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the
intelligent from the notes on the Parmenides, and the extracts, from
Damascius. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle
of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will,
I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion.
In the next place, following Proclus and Olympiodorus as our guides, let us
consider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of
divine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same
mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely
inspired energy, and at other times dialectically, he evolves the truth
concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable
idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in
them the primary causes of wholes. For in the Phaedrus being evidently
inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession,
divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual,
liberated, and mundane gods. But in the Sophista dialectically contending
about being, and the subsistence of the one above beings, and doubting
against philosophers more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are
suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself
participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a
passive,[8] one, but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the
one, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in
the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from the
one, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there
asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again
in the Gorgias, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and
their demiurgic allotment. But in the Banquet he speaks concerning the
union of love; and in the Protagoras, about the distribution of mortal
animals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth
concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his
mind to the most genuine of his readers.
-----------------
[8] It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever
participates of any thing is said to be passive to that which it
participates, and the participations themselves are called by him passions.
-----------------
Again, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the
mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from
ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the
Timaeus, many in the dialogue called Politicus, and many may be seen
scattered in other dialogues; here likewise, to those who are desirous of
knowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus,
for instance, the Politicus shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens.
But the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions
in the Timaeus, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over
the parts of the universe. And the divisions of the essence of the soul in
that dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods.
To this we may
also add that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures,
and adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains.
All these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns,
exhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the
latter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato.
"But those," says Proclus, "who treat of divine concerns in an indicative
manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of
those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses
according to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods.
And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic,
and, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods.
But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical
disciplines were invented by the Pythagorean in order to a reminiscence of
divine concerns, to which through these as images, they endeavour to
ascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to
the testimony of their historians. But the enthusiastic character, or he
who is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods
essentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do
not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their
familiars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers in
consequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of
divine concerns according to science is the illustrious, prerogative of the
Platonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who
are known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order
the regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual difference, the
common idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each."
Again, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider
whence the ancients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place,
what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of
poets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know that
the ancients employed fables looking to two things, viz.
nature, and our
soul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of
things, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent,
and incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of
bodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them;
as with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding
motive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer
so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which
moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and
unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted,
that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as,
for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the
gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with
the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the
unapparent, and investigate the true signification.
After this manner,
therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed.
But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are
children we live according to the phantasy, but the phantastic part is
conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the
phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables in
consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said that
a fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth:
for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the
natures prior to herself; and hence the soul very properly rejoices in
fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood
nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And
thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables.
In the next place let us consider what the difference is between the
fables of philosophers and poets. Each therefore has something in which
it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from the
other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must
not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult
truth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter w