Our conclusion occurred before the arguments that support it, and in this respect, our arguments are horribly biased at the onset. Although written by a single individual, they are our arguments because the arguments in this work are as old as philosophy. None of them are new, and many students of philosophy will recognize the originating sources, at times perhaps hearing the voices of those authors. Despite a lack of original argumentation, we have put these arguments to new use.
In these contradictory words, rather than presupposing the existence of objective deception or illusion or falsehood at the start, I sought an analysis of the reality of illusion on par with the analysis of the reality of reality. Particular attention is given to perceptual illusions because I assume that, through empirical illusions, the concept of illusion has been justified and given identity. After all, what is more certain than our history of perceptual error? The reader is asked to question this assumption, and although this is similar to questioning perceptual certainty itself, the two questions are not identical. The resulting analyses nonetheless inform each other.
I am led to the conclusion that the concepts of illusion, falsehood, and objective error in general—for I carelessly lump these together and make little distinction—are intrinsically contradictory in nature. This is not to say that they are valueless or that none of these exist, but if they do, each must exist in a contradictory state, at least according to our classical conceptions.
And I continue to believe that true deception exists, just as much as truth itself, but whatever this deception is, it is not what we thought it was, nor is it any sort of deception or illusion analogous to perceptual illusion, for perceptual illusions are not deceptive or illusory at all. Deception is far cleverer than it has led us to believe, which, although expected from Deception, does not mean that we have caught Deception in the act.