De Cive by Thomas Hobbs - HTML preview

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conveyed to him by me to day.

VII. Neverthelesse, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will; if yet to words

relating to the future, there shall some other signes be added, they may become as valid, as if they had

been spoken of the present: If therefore, as by reason of those other signes, it appear, that he that

speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his

Right, they ought to be valid; for the conveyance of right depends not on words, but (as hath been

instanc'd in the 4. Article) on the declaration of the Will.

VIII. If any man conveigh some part of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit

received, or for some compact, a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift, or free Donation. But in free

donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the present, or the time past; for if they respect the

future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the foregoing Article: It must needs therefore be, that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will: But, because whatsoever is voluntarily

done, is done for some good to him that wils it; there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give

it, except some benefit either already receiv'd, or to be acquir'd; but is suppos'd, that no such benefit is

acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift: It remains therefore, that a

mutuall good turne without agreement be expected; but no signe can be given, that he, who us'd future

words toward him who was in no sort engag'd to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so

understood, as to oblige himselfe thereby. Nor is it suitable to Reason, that those who are easily

enclined to doe well to others, should be oblig'd by every promise, testifying their present good

affection: And for this cause, a promiser in this kind, must be understood to have time to deliberate,

and power to change that affection as well as he to whom he made that promise, may alter his desert.

But he that deliberates, is so farre forth free, nor can be said to have already given: But if he promise

often, and yet give seldome, he ought to be condemn'd of levity, and be called not a Donour, but

Doson.

IX. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveighing their Rights, is call'd a Contract. But in every

Contract, either both parties instantly performe what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had

from either to other; or the one performes, the other is trusted, or neither performe. Where both parties

performe presently, there the Contract is ended, as soon as 'tis performed; but where there is credit

given either to one, or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of

promise is called a COVENANT.

X. But the Covenant made by the party trusted with him, who hath already performed, although the

promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no lesse transfer the right of future time, than if it

had been made by words signifying the present, or time past: for the others performance is a most

manifest signe that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly

make performance also at the appointed time; and by this signe the party trusted knew himselfe to be

thus understood, which, because he hindred not, 'twas an evident token of his Will to performe. The

promises therefore which are made for some benefit received (which are also Covenants) are Tokens

of the Will; that is, (as in the foregoing Section hath been declared) of the last act of deliberating,

whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolisht, and by consequence are obligatory; for where

Liberty ceaseth, there beginneth Obligation.

XI. But the Covenants, which are made in contract of mutuall trust, neither party performing out of

hand, if there arise 2 a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid: for he that first performes by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their owne

advantage, either by right, or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath

Contracted; for it suites not with reason, that any man should performe first, if it be not likely that the

other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable, or not, he that doubts it, must be

judge of, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 9. Article. Thus, I say, things stand in the

state of nature, but in a Civill State, when there is a power which can compell both parties, he that hath

contracted to perform first, must first performe; because, that since the other may be compell'd, the

cause which made him fear the others non-performance, ceaseth.

XII. But from this reason, that in all Free-gifts, and Compacts, there is an acceptance of the

conveighance of Right required: it followes, that no man can Compact with him who doth not declare

his acceptance; and therefore we cannot compact with Beasts, neither can we give, or take from them

any manner of Right, by reason of their want of speech, and understanding, Neither can any man

Covenant with God, or be oblig'd to him by Vow, except so far forth as it appeares to him by Holy

Scriptures, that he hath substituted certaine men who have authority to accept of such like Vowes and

Covenants, as being in Gods stead.

XIII. Those therefore doe vow in vain, who are in the state of nature, where they are not tyed by any

Civill Law, (except by most certain Revelation the Will of God to accept their Vow, or Pact, be made

known to them) for if what they Vow, be contrary to the Law of Nature, they are not tyed by their Vow,

for no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull act; but if what is vowed, be commanded by some Law of

nature, it is not their Vow, but the Law it self which ties them; but if he were free before his vow, either

to doe it, or not doe it, his liberty remaines, because that the openly declar'd Will of the obliger is

requisite to make an obligation by Vow, which in the case propounded is suppos'd not to be: Now I call

him the Obliger to whom any one is tyed, and the Obliged him who is tyed.

XIV. Covenants are made of such things onely as fall under our deliberation, for it can be no Covenant

without the Will of the Contractor, but the Will is the last act of him who deliberates; therefore they

onely concerne things possible, and to come; no man therefore, by his Compact, obligeth himself to an impossibility. But yet, though we often Covenant to doe such things as then seem' d possible when we

promis'd them, which yet afterward appear to be impossible, are we therefore freed from all obligation?

The reason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future incertainty receives a present benefit; on

condition, that he return another for it: for his Will, who performes the present benefit hath simply

before it, for its object, a certain good [equally] valuable with the thing promised; but the thing it selfe

not simply, but with condition if it could be done; but if it should so happen, that even this should prove

impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants therefore oblige us not to

perform just the thing it selfe covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this onely is, the things

themselves are not in our power.

XV. We are freed from Covenants two wayes, either by performing, or by being forgiven: By

performing, for beyond that we oblig'd not our selves. By being forgiven, because he whom we oblig'd

our selves to by forgiving, is conceiv'd to return us that Right which we past over to him; for, forgiving,

implies giving: that is, by the fourth Article of this Chapter, a conveyance of Right to him to whom the

gift is made.

XVI. Its an usuall question, Whether Compacts extorted from us, through fear, do oblige, or not: For

example, If to redeeme my life, from the power of a Robber, I promise to pay him 100 l. next day; and

that I will doe no act whereby to apprehend, and bring him to Justice, whether I am tyed to keep

promise, or not? But though such a Promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not

to be accounted so, because it proceeded from fear, for then it would follow that those promises which

reduc'd men to a civill life, and by which Lawes were made, might likewise be of none effect, (for it

proceeds from fear of mutuall slaughter, that one man submits himselfe to the Dominion of another:)

And he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his

redemption. It holds universally true, that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received;

and that to promisee and the thing promised, be lawfull: But it is lawfull, for the redemption of my life,

both to promise, and to give what I will of mine owne to any man, even to a Thief. We are oblig'd

therefore, by promises proceeding from fear, except the Civill Law forbid them, by vertue whereof, that

which is promised becomes unlawfull.

XVII. Whosoever shall contract with one to doe, or omit somewhat, and shall after Covenant the

contrary with another; he maketh not the former, but the latter Contract unlawfull: for, he hath no longer

Right to doe, or to omit ought, who by former Contracts hath conveyed it to another; wherefore he can

conveigh no Right by latter Contracts, and what is promised, is promis'd without Right: He is therefore

tyed onely to his first Contract; to break which is unlawfull.

XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any Contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or

any other way hurt his Body; for there is in every man a certain high degree of feare through which he

apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest, and therefore by naturall necessity he

shuns it all he can, and 'tis suppos'd he can doe no otherwise: When a man is arrived to this degree of

fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight, or fight. Since therefore no man is

tyed to impossibilities, they who are threatned either with deathe (which is the greatest evill to nature)

or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to

endure them. Farthermore, he that is tyed by Contract is trusted, (for Faith only is the Bond of

Contracts) but they who are brought to punishment, either Capitall, or more gentle, are fettered, or

strongly guarded, which is a most certain signe that they seem'd not sufficiently bound from non

resistance by their Contracts. Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointed, kill me.

Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be, contract the first way; but there is need sometimes. This second way, none, neither is it ever

needfull; for in the meer state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state it selfe affords you a Right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterward kill him. But in a Civill

State, where the Right of life, and death, and of all corporall punishment is with the Supreme; that

same Right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the Supreme himselfe

contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punishment, but onely this, that no man offer to defend

others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two Cities, there should a Contract be made, on

condition of killing, if it were not perform'd, we must presuppose another Contract of not killing before

the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of Warre returnes; that

is, an hostile state, in which all things are lawfull, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract

of not resisting, we are oblig'd of two Evills to make choice of that which seemes the greater; for

certaine Death is a greater evill than Fighting; but of two Evills it is impossible not to chuse the least: By

such a Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities, which is contrary to the very nature of

compacts.

XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any Compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose

dammage he is like to procure himselfe a bitter life; wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear

witnesse against his Sonne, nor a Husband against his Wife, nor a Sonne against his Father; nor any

man against any one, by whose meanes he hath his subsistance; for in vain is that testimony which is

presum'd to be corrupted from nature; but although no man be tyed to accuse himself by any compact,

yet in a publique tryal he may, by torture, be forc'd to make answer; but such answers are no testimony

of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tortur'd his answer

be true, or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by Right.

XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a promise, whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of Gods

mercy, unlesse he perform his word; which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have

in them the very essence of an Oath, to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as with the Romans,

Doe thou Jupiter so destroy the deceiver, as I slay this same Beast: neither is this any let, but that an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory, as promissory; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an

Oath, promiseth that he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for Subjects to

Swear by their Kings; that custome took its Originall hence, That those Kings took upon them Divine

Honour; for Oathes were therefore introduc'd that by Religion, and consideration of the Divine Power

men might have a greater dread of breaking their Faiths, than that wherewith they fear men, from

whose eyes their actions may lie hid.

XXI. Whence it followes, that an Oath must be conceived in that forme which he useth, who takes it; for

in vain is any man brought to Swear by a God whom he beleeves not, and therefore neither feares him.

For though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to Swear

by him in any other fashion, or by any other name than what is contain'd in the precepts of his own

proper, that is, (as he who Swears imagines) the true Religion.

XXII. By the definition of an Oath we may understand, that a bare Contract obligeth no lesse, than that

to which we are Sworn; for it is the contract which binds us, the Oath relates to the Divine punishment,

which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in its selfe unlawfull; but it could not be

unlawfull if the Contract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the mercy of God

obligeth himselfe not to any punishment, because it is ever lawfull to deprecate the punishment

howsoever provok'd, and to enjoy Gods Pardon if it be granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath is

this, To cause men who are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment, to

make the more Conscience of their words and actions.

XXIII. To exact an Oath, where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where

the party compacted, withall wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto

self-defence, and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfe, as to prejudice another. For

an Oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of Gods anger, that is to

say, of him that is Omnipotent against those who therefore violate their Faith, because they think that

by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscient against

those, who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.

1. Right Reason. By Right Reason in the naturall state of men, I understand not, as many doe, an

infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man

concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the dammage, or benefit of his

neighbours. I call it Peculiar, because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme (i.e.

the Civill Law) is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this Civill

Government, (in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with His

owne) every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are

done at His owne perill, but also for the measure of another mans reason, in such things as doe

concerne him. I call it True; that is, concluding from true principles rightly fram'd, because that the

whole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men who

see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation;

but the Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2, 3, 4,

5, 6, and 7. articles of the first Chapter.

2. Arise. For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other

token of the will not to performe from the other part, it cannot be judg'd to be a just fear; for the cause

which was not sufficient to keep him from making Compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of

it, being made.

Chapter III.

Of the other Lawes of Nature

I. Another of the Lawes of Nature is, to performe Contracts, or to keep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law of Nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain

Peace; to conveigh certain rights from each to other, and that this (as often as it shall happen to be

done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible to peace, as we shall performe

Our selves, what we contract with others, shall be done, or omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be

made, unlesse we stood to them. Because therefore, to stand to our Covenants, Or to keep faith, is a

thing necessary for the obtaining of peace, it will prove by the second Article of the second Chapter to

be a precept of the naturall Law.

II. Neither is there in this matter, any exception of the persons, with whom we Contract, as if they keep

no faith with others; Or hold, that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he

that Contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vaine, and it is against reason for a

knowing man to doe a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so, he

affirms the Contract to be made in vain: He therefore, who Contracts with one with whom he thinks he

is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a Contract to be a thing done in vaine, and not in

vaine, which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them;

that is, either there must be a declared Warre, Or a sure and faithfull Peace.

III. The breaking of a Bargain, as also the taking back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action, Or

omission) is called an INJURY: But that action, or omission, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury, and

an unjust action, or omission, signifie the same thing, and both are the same with breach of Contract

and trust: And it seemes the word Injury came to be given to any action, or omission, because they

were without Right. He that acted, or omitted, having before conveyed his Right to some other. And

there is some likenesse between that, which in the common course of life we call Injury; and that,

which in the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as he, who by Arguments is driven to deny the

Assertion which he first maintain'd, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who

through weaknesse of mind does, or omits that which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doe, or

omit, commits an Injury, and falls into no lesse contradiction, than he, who in the Schools is reduc'd to

an Absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not

done, which is to will a thing done, and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An Injury

therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.

IV. From these grounds it followes, that an injury can be done to no man 1 but him with whom we enter

Covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way

of bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master command his

Servant, who hath promis'd to obey him, to pay a summe of money, or carry some present to a third

man; the Servant, if he doe it not, hath indeed damag'd this third party, but he injur'd his Master onely.

So also in a civill government, if any man offend another, with whom he hath made no Contract, he

damages him to whom the evill is done, but he injures none but him to whom the power of government

belongs: for if he, who receives the hurt, should expostulate the mischief; and he that did it, should

answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I rather doe according to yours, than mine owne will,

since I do not hinder, but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath

no manner of pre-contract past, I see not, I confesse, what is reprehensible.

V. These words just, and unjust, as also justice, and injustice, are equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Persons, another when to actions: When they are attributed to Actions, Just

signifies as much as what's done with Right, and unjust, as what's done with injury: he who hath done

some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Person, but guiltlesse, and he that hath done some unjust thing, we doe not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applyed to Persons; to be just, signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to doe

righteousnesse, or to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and to be unjust, is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present

benefit; so as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing; that of an

action, or omission, another; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust

man, just: But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the Law commands it,

unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness

for fear of the punishment annext unto the Law, and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his

mind.

VI. The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds; Commutative, and Distributive, the

former whereof they say consists in Arithmeticall, the latter in Geometricall proportion: and that is

conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location, and conduction, and other

acts whatsoever belonging to Contracters, where, if there be an equall return made, hence they say

springs a commutative justice: But this is busied about the dignity, and merits of men; so as if there be

rendred to every man kata pen axian more to him who is more worthy, and lesse to him that deserves

lesse, and that proportionably, hence they say ariseth distributive justice: I acknowledge here some

certaine distinction of equality; to wit, that one is an equality simply so called, as when two things of

equall value are compar'd together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the

other is an equality, secundum quod; as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to an hundred men, 600

pounds are given to 60 men, and 400 to 40 where there is no equality between 600 and 400. But when

it happens, that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one

of them shall take an equall part, whence it is called an equall distribution: But such like equality is the

same thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is all this to Justice? for neither, if I sell my goods for

as much as I can get for them, doe I injure the buyer, who sought, and desir'd them of me? neither if I

divide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesse, so long as I give the other what I have agreed

for, do I wrong to either? which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospell. This

therefore is no distinction of Justice, but of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'd, but that Justice is

a certain equality, as consisting in this onely; that since we are all equall by nature, one should not

arrogate more Right to himselfe, than he grants to another, unlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact.

And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of Justice, although now almost generally

receiv'd by all, lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else, than the breach of Faith,

or Contract, as hath been defin'd above.

VII. It is an old saying, Volenti non fit iniuria (the willing man receives no injury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles. For grant, that a man be willing that that should be done, which he

conceives to be an injury. to him; why then that is done by his will, which by Contract was not lawfull to

be done; but he being willing that should be done, which was not lawfull by Contract, the Contract it self

(by the 15. Article of the foregoing Chapter) becomes void: The Right therefore of doing it returnes,

therefore it is done by Right; wherefore it is no injury.

VIII. The third precept of the Naturall Law, is, That you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who out

of the confidence he had in you, first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind

to endeavour, that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. For without this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this

meanes all beneficence, and trust, together with all kind of benevolence would be taken from among

men, neither would there be ought of mutuall assistance among them, nor any commencement of

gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarily remain, contrary to

the fundamentall Law of Nature: But because the breach of this Law is not a breach of trust, or

contract, (for we suppose no Contracts to have pass'd among them) therefore is it not usually termed

an injury, but because good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each other, it is called

INGRATITUDE.

IX. The fourth precept of Nature, is, That every man render himself usefull unto others: which, that we may rightly understand, we must remember that there is in men, a diversity of dispositions to enter into

society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that which is found in stones, brought

together in the Building, by reason of the diversity of their matter, and figure. For as a stone, which in

regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones than it fils up it selfe,

neither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest together, or easily cut, and would

hinder the building from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, who for the

harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from

others, and being incorrigible, by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections, is commonly said to be

uselesse, and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by Right onely, but even by

naturall necessity is suppos'd, with all his main might, to intend the procurement of those things which

are necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities, by his

default there will arise a Warre, because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending, he

therefore acts against the fundamentall Law of Nature: Whence it followes (which wee were to shew)

that it is a precept of nature; That every man accommodate himselfe to others. But he who breaks this

Law may be called uselesse, and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulnesse, as having regard to this very Law.

X. The fifth precept of the Law of nature is: That we must forgive him who repents, and asketh pardon

for what is past; having first taken caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the

remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of Peace to him that asketh it, after he hath

warr'd against us, & now is become penitent. But Peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him

that retains an hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the future; that is, seeks not Peace, but

oportunity, is not properly Peace but feare, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that

will not pardon the penitent, and that gives future caution, peace it selfe it seems is not pleasing; which

is contrary to the naturall Law.

XI. The sixth precept of the naturall Law is, That in revenge and punishments we must have our eye

not at the evill past, but the future good. That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better.

But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one

another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Article.

Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be onely considered, is nothing else but a certain

triumph, and glory of minde, which points at no end, (for it contemplates onely what is past; but the end

is a thing to come) but that which is directed to no end is vain; That revenge therefore which regards

not the future, proceeds from vaine glory, and therefore without reason. But to hurt another without

reason introduces a warre, and is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature; It is therefore a precept

of the Law of nature, that in revenge wee look not backwards but forward. Now the breach of this Law,

is commonly called CRUELTY.

XII. But because all signes of hatred, and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting,

insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives, (that I say not their Peace) than suffer reproach; it

fol owes in the seventh place, That it is prescribed by the Law of nature, that no man either by deeds,

or words, countenance, or laughter, doe declare himselfe to hate, or scorne another. The breach of

which Law is called Reproach. But although nothing be more frequent than the scoffes and jeers of the

powerfull against the weak, and namely of Judges against guilty persons, which neither relate to the

offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the Judges, yet these kind of men do act against the Law of nature,

and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

XIII. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the naturall, but civill state;

for it hath been shewed before, Chap. I. Art. 3. that all men by nature are equall, and therefore the

inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civill Law. I

know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science,

that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others onely to serve; as if Lord and Master

were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptnesse, that is, a certain kind of naturall

knowledge, or ignorance; which foundation is not onely against reason (as but now hath been shewed)

but also against experience: for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it

better to be ruled by himselfe, than to yeeld himselfe to the government of another; neither if the wiser

and stronger doe contest, have these ever, or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men

be equall by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequall, because they are like to

contest for dominion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace, that they be esteemed as equall; and

therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of nature, That every man be accounted by nature

equall to another, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE.

XIV. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man, that he should part with some of his Rights,

so it is no lesse necessary to the same conservation, that he retain some others, to wit the Right of

bodily protection, of free enjoyment of ayre, water, and all necessaries for life. Since therefore many

common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones

are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the naturall Law, to wit, That what Rights soever

any man challenges to himselfe, he also grant the same as due to all the rest: otherwise he frustrates

the equality acknowledged in the former Article. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of

persons in the making up of society, but to attribute equall Right and Power to those whom no reason

would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe equall things to equalls, is the same with giving things proportionall to proportionals. The observation of this Law is called MEEKNES, the violation pleonexia, the breakers by the Latines are styled Immodici et immodesti.

XV. In the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of nature, That every man in dividing Right to

others, shew himselfe equall to either party. By the foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more

Right by nature to our selves, than we grant to others. We may take lesse if we will, for that sometimes

is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by us unto others, we are

forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse than another. For he that by favouring one before

another, observes not this naturall equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is

declared above, that a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature. The observance of this Precept is

called EQUITY; the breach, Respect of Persons. The Greeks in one word term it prosopolepsia.

XVI. From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventh, Those things which cannot be divided, must be

used in common, (if they can) and (that the quantity of the matter permit) every man as much as he

lists, but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proportionally to the number of the users: for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to

be commanded by the Law of Nature.

XVII. Also what cannot be divided, nor had in common, it is provided by the Law of nature (which may

be the twelfth Precept) that the use of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one onely by lot, and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it; For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be found, but that of lot.

XVIII. But all lot is twofold; arbitrary, or naturall; Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the Contenders, and it consists in meer chance (as they say) or fortune. Naturall is primogeniture (in Greek klironomia, as it were given by lot) or first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be

divided, nor had in common, must be granted to the first possessour, as also those things which

belonged to the Father are due to the Sonne, unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly conveighed

away that Right to some other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature.

XIX. The 14. Precept of the Law of nature is; That safety must be assured to the mediators for Peace.

For the reason which commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But the

first dictate of Reason is Peace. All the rest are means to obtain it, and without which Peace cannot be

had. But neither can Peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety; it is therefore a

dictate of Reason, that is, a Law of nature, That we must give all security to the Mediators for Peace.

XX. Furthermore, because, although men should agree to make all these, and whatsoever other Lawes

of Nature, and should endeavour to keep them, yet doubts, and controversies would daily arise

concerning the application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done, were against the

Law, or not, (which we call, the question of Right) whence will follow a fight between Parties, either

sides supposing themselves wronged; it is therefore necessary to the preservation of Peace (because

in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on) that both the disagreeing Parties refer the

matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in

deciding the controversie. And he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an Arbiter. It is

therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall Law, That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right

submit themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third.

XXI. But from this ground, that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing Parties to determine the

controversie, we gather, that the Arbiter must not be one of the Parties: for every man is presumed to

seek what is good for himselfe naturally, and what is just, onely for Peaces sake, and accidentally; and

therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the Law of nature so exactly as a third

man would do: It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of nature, That no man must

be Judge or Arbiter in his own cause.

XXII. From the same ground followes in the seventeenth place, That no man must be Judge who

propounds unto himself any hope of profit, or glory, from the victory of either part: for the like reason swayes here, as in the foregoing Law.

XXIII. But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe, to wit, whether that bee done or not,

which is said to bee done, the naturall Law wills, that the Arbiter trust both Parties alike, that is,

(because they affirm contradictories) that hee believe neither: He must therefore give credit to a third,

or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be able to give judgement of the fact, as often as by other

signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbiters, and

Judges of fact, That where firm and certain signes of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence

by such witnesses, as seem to be indifferent to both Parts.

XXIV. From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may be furthermore understood, That no

contract or promise must Passe between him and the parties whose Judge he is appointed, by vertue

whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or be oblig'd to judge according to

equity, or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall. The Judge is indeed bound

to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature recounted in the 15. Article.

To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added by way of Compact. Such compact therefore

would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgement, he should contend for the equity of it, except

such Compact be of no force, the Controversie would remain after Judgement given, which is contrary

to the constitution of an Arbiter, who is so chosen, as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to

the judgement which he should pronounce. The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge to be

disengaged, which is its 19. precept.

XXV. Farthermore, forasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought else but the dictates of Reason, so

as, unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the Lawes

of Nature, it is manifest, that he, who knowingly, or willingly, doth ought, whereby the rationall faculty

may be destroyed, or weakned, he knowingly, and willingly, breaks the Law of nature: For there is no

difference between a man who performes not his Duty, and him who does such things willingly, as

make it impossible for him to doe it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who doe that

which disturbs the mind from its naturall state; that which most manifestly happens to Drunkards and

Gluttons; we therefore sin in the 20. place against the Law of Nature by Drunkennesse.

XXVI. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by a certain artifice from the

single dictate of Reason advising us to look to the preservation, and safegard of our selves, will say,

That the deduction of these Lawes is so hard, that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known,

and therefore neither will they prove obliging: for Lawes, if they be not known, oblige not, nay, indeed

are not Lawes. To this I answer, it's true, That hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetousnesse, vain glory,

and other perturbations of mind, doe hinder a man so, as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these

Lawes, whilst those passions prevail in him: But there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind;

At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and

unlearn'd, than this only Rule, That when he doubts, whether what he is now doing to another, may be

done by the Law of Nature, or not, he conceive himselfe to be in that others stead. Here instantly those

perturbations which perswaded him to the fact, being now cast into the other scale, disswade him as

much: And this Rule is not onely easie, but is Anciently celebrated in these words, Quod tibi fieri non

vis, alteri ne feceris: Do not that to others, you would not have done to your self.

XXVII. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of present profit, are very unapt to

observe these Lawes, although acknowledg'd by them, if perhaps some others more humble than the

rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates, those not practising the same,

surely they would not follow Reason in so doing; nor would they hereby procure themselves peace, but

a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey to the breakers of it.

It is not therefore to be imagin'd, that by Nature, (that is, by Reason) men are oblig'd to the exercise of

all these Lawes 2 in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others. We are oblig'd yet in the

interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce

to the end for which they were ordain'd. We must therefore conclude, that the Law of Nature doth

alwayes, and every where oblige in the internall Court, or that of Conscience, but not alwayes in the

externall Court, but then onely when it may be done with safety.

XXVIII. But the Lawes which oblige Conscience, may be broken by an act, not onely contrary to them,

but also agreeable with them, if so be that he who does it be of another opinion: for though the act it

self be answerable to the Lawes, yet his Conscience is against them.

XXIX. The Lawes of Nature are immutable, and eternall; What they forbid, can never be lawfull; what

they command, can never be unlawfull: For pride, ingratitude, breach of Contracts (or injury),

inhumanity, contumely, will never be lawfull; nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the Court of Conscience, where

onely they oblige, and are Lawes. Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances, and the Civill

Law, that what's done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at another; and what suits with reason

at one time, is contrary to it another. Yet Reason is still the same, and changeth not her end, which is

Peace, and Defence; nor of the minde which the meanes to attaine them, to wit, those vertues we have

declar'd above, and which cannot be abrogated by any Custome, or Law whatsoever.

XXX. It's evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the Lawes of Nature are to be observ'd,

because they require the endeavour onely, (but that must be true and constant) which who so shall

performe, we may rightly call him JUST. For he who tends to this with his whole might, namely, that his

actions be squar'd according to the precepts of Nature, he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill

all those Lawes, which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature. Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd

to, is a Just Man.

XXXI. All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same with the Morall. Let us see wherefore this

is true. We must know therefore, that Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the

inclination, or aversion of them by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverse,

according to their diverse Constitutions, Customes, Opinions; as we may see in those things we

apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the

common actions of life, where what this man commends, (that is to say, calls Good) the other

undervalues, as being Evil; Nay, very often the same man at diverse times, praises, and dispraises the

same thing. Whilst thus they doe, necessary it is there should be discord, and strife: They are therefore

so long in the state of War, as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites, they mete Good and

Evill by diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they are in it, to be evill,

and by consequence that Peace is good. They therefore who could not agree concerning a present,

doe agree concerning a future Good, which indeed is a work of Reason; for things present are obvious

to the sense, things to come to our Reason only. Reason declaring Peace to be good, it followes by the

same reason, that all the necessary means to Peace be good also, and therefore, that Modesty, Equity,

Trust, Humanity, Mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to Peace) are good Manners, or

habits, (that is) Vertues. The Law therefore, in the means to Peace, commands also Good Manners, or

the practise of Vertue: And therefore it is call'd Morall.

XXXII. But because men cannot put off this same irrationall appetite, whereby they greedily prefer the

present good (to which, by strict consequence, many unforeseen evills doe adhere) before the future, it

happens, that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertues, yet they disagree

still concerning their Nature, to wit, in what each of them doth consist; for as oft as anothers good

action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise the

bad actions, which please them, are ever entituled to some Vertue; whence it comes to passe that the

same Action is prais'd by these, and call'd Vertue, and dispraised by those, and termed vice. Neither is

there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers for this matter; for since they could not observe the

goodnesse of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to Peace, and the evill in this, that it related

to discord, they built a morall Philosophy wholly estranged from the morall Law, and unconstant to it

self; for they would have the nature of vertues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two

extremes, and the vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false: For to dare is

commended, and under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertue, although it be an extreme, if the

cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing given, whether it be great, or little, or between both,

makes not liberality, but the cause of giving it. Neither is it injustice, if I give any man more, of what is

mine own, than I owe him. The Lawes of Nature therefore are the summe of Morall Philosophy,

whereof I have onely delivered such precepts in this place, as appertain to the preservation of our

selves against those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts of rationall nature, from whence spring other vertues: for temperance also is a precept of Reason, because intemperance

tends to sicknesse, and death. And so fortitude too, (that is) that same faculty of resisting stoutly in

present dangers, (and which are more hardly declined than overcome) because it is a means tending

to the preservation of him that resists.

XXXIII. But those which we call the Lawes of nature (since they are nothing else but certain

conclusions understood by Reason, of things to be done, and omitted; but a Law to speak properly and

accurately, is the speech of him who by Right commands somewhat to others to be done, or omitted)

are not (in propriety of speech) Lawes, as they proceed from nature; yet as they are delivered by God

in holy Scriptures, (as we shall see in the Chapter following) they are most properly called by the name

of Lawes: for the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest Right.

1. Injury can be done to no man. The word injustice relates to some Law: Injury to some Person, as well as some Law. For what's unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done, and yet not

against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes against no private Person, but the Magistrate

only; sometimes also neither against the Magistrate, nor any private man, but onely against God; for

through Contract, and conveighance of Right, we say, that an injury is done against this, or that man.

Hence it is (which we see in all kind of Government) that what private men contract between

themselves by word, or writing, is releast againe at the will of the Obliger. But those mischiefes which

are done against the Lawes of the Land, as theft, homicide, and the like, are punisht not as he wills, to

whom the hurt is done, but according to the will of the Magistrate; that is, the constituted Lawes.

2. The exercise of all these Lawes. Nay among these Lawes some things there are, the omission

whereof (provided it be done for Peace, or Self-preservation) seemes rather to be the fulfilling, than

breach of the Naturall Law; for he that doth all things against those that doe all things, and plunders

plunderers, doth equity; but on the other side, to doe that which in Peace is an handsome action, and

becomming an honest man, is dejectednesse, and Poornesse of spirit, and a betraying of ones self in

the time of War, But there are certain naturall Lawes, whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of

War it self; for I cannot understand what drunkennesse, or cruelty (that is, Revenge which respects not

the future good) can advance toward Peace, or the preservation of any man. Briefly, in the state of

nature, what's just, and unjust, is not to be esteem'd by the Actions, but by the Counsell, and

Conscience of the Actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of endeavour for Peace, for the

preservation of our selves, is done with Right; otherwise every damage done to a man would be a

breach of the naturall Law, and an injury against God.

Chapter IV.

That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law

I. The same Law which is Naturall, and Morall, is also wont to be called Divine, nor undeservedly, as well because Reason, which is the law of Nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his

actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same with those which

have been delivered from the divine Majesty, for the LAWES of his heavenly Kingdome, by our Lord

Jesus Christ, and his holy Prophets and Apostles. What therefore by reasoning we have understood

above concerning the law of nature, we will endeavour to confirme the same in this Chapter by holy

writ.

II. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared, that the Divine Law is seated in right

reason. Psalm xxxvii. 30, 31. The mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdome, and his tongue

will be talking of Judgement: The law of God is in his heart. Jerem. xxxi. 33. I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. Psal. xix. 7. The law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the soule. ver. 8. The Commandement of the Lord is Pure, and giveth light unto the eyes. Deuteron.

xxx. 11. This Commandement which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far

off, &c. vers. 14. But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thine heart; that thou maist doe it. Psal. cxix. 34. Give me understanding, and I shall keep thy law. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my paths. Proverbs ix. 10. The knowledge of the holy is understanding.

Christ the Law-giver himselfe is called (John i. 1.) the word. The same Christ is called (vers. 9.) the true light that lighteth every man that cometh in the world. All which are descriptions of right reason, whose dictates, we have shewed before, are the lawes of nature.

III. But that which wee set downe for the fundamentall law of nature, namely, that Peace was to be

sought for, is also the summe of the divine law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. iii. 17.

Righteousnesse, (which is the summe of the law) is called the way of Peace Psal. lxxxv. 10.

Righteousnesse and Peace have kissed each other. Matth. v. 9. Blessed are the Peace-makers, for

they shall be called the children of God. And after Saint Paul in his 6. Chapter to the Hebrewes, and the last verse had called Christ (the Legislator of that law we treat of) an High-Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedeck; he addes in the following Chapter, the first verse, This Melchizedeck was King of

Salem, Priest of the most high God, &c. vers. 2. First being by interpretation King of Righteousnesse, and after that also King of Salem, which is, King of peace. Whence it is cleare, that Christ the King in his Kingdome placeth Righteousnesse and Peace together. Psal. xxxiv. Eschue evill and doe good,

seek Peace and pursue it. Isaiah ix. 6, 7. Unto us a child is born, unto us a Sonne is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the

mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace. Isaiah lii. 7. How beautifull upon the

mountaines are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth Peace, that bringeth good

tidings of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith unto Sion, thy God reigneth! Luke ii. 14. In the Nativity of Christ, the voice of them that praised God saying, Glory be to God on high, and in earth

Peace, good will towards men. And Isaiah liii. 5. The Gospell is called the chastisement of our Peace.

Isaiah lix. 8. Righteousnesse is called the way of Peace. The way of Peace they know not, and there is no judgement in their goings. Micah v. 4, 5. speaking of the Messias, he saith thus, He shall stand and feed in the strength of the Lord, in the Majesty of the name of the Lord his God, and they shall abide,

for now shall he be great unto the end of the earth; And this man shall be your Peace, &c. Prov. iii. 1, 2.

My sonne forget not my law, but let thine heart keep my Commandements, for length of dayes, and

long life, and Peace, shall they adde to thee.

IV. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all things, or concerning the

introduction of meum & tuum, We perceive in the first place how great an adversary this same Community is to Peace, by those words of Abraham to Lot, Gen. xiii. 8, 9. Let there be no strife I Pray

thee, between thee and me, and between thy heard-men, and my heard-men, for we be brethren. Is not

the whole land before thee? Separate thy selfe I Pray thee from me. And all those places of Scripture

by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon our neighbours, as, Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not

commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, &c. doe confirm the law of distinction between Mine, and Thine.

for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away.

V. The same precepts establish the second law of nature of keeping trust: for what doth, Thou shalt not

invade anothers right, import, but this? Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by thy contract ceaseth to be thine; but expressely set down, Psal. xv. vers. 1. To him that asked, Lord who shall dwell in thy Tabernacle? It is answered, vers. 4: He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and disappointeth him not; and Prov. vi. 1, 2. My sonne if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger, Thou art snared with the words of thy mouth.

VI. The third Law concerning gratitude is proved by these places, Deut. xxv. 4. Thou shalt not muzzle

the Oxe when he treadeth out the corn; which Saint Paul I. Cor. ix. 9. interprets to be spoken of men,

not Oxen onely. Prov. xvii. 13. Who so rewardeth evill for good, evill shall not depart from his house.

And Deut. xx. 10, 11. When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim Peace unto it.

And it shall be if it make thee answer of Peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people

that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Proverbs iii. 29. Devise not evill against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

VII. To the fourth Law of accommodating our selves, these precepts are conformable, Exod. xxiii. 4, 5.

If thou meet thine enemies Oxe, or his Asse going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again; if

thou see the Asse of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him,

thou shalt surely help with him. Also, vers. 9. Thou shalt not oppresse a stranger. Prov. iii. 30. Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no harme. Prov. xv. 18. A wrathfull man stirreth up strife, but he that is slow to anger, appeaseth strife. Prov. xviii. 24. There is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother. The same is confirmed, Luke x, by the Parable of the Samaritan, who had

compassion on the Jew that was wounded by theeves, and by Christs precept, Matth. v. 39. But I say

unto you, that ye resist not evill, but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the

other also, &c.

VIII. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are some. Matth. vi. 14, 15. If you

forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men their

trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Matth. xviii. 21, 22. Lord how oft shall my Brother sinne against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say not till seven

times, but till seventy times seven times: that is, toties quoties.

IX. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those places are pertinent which command us to shew

mercy; such as Mat. v. 7. Blessed are the mercifull, for they shall obtain mercy. Levit. xix. 18. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people. But there are, who not onely think this law is not proved by Scripture, but plainly disproved from hence, that there is an eternall

punishment reserved for the wicked after death, where there is no place either for amendment, or

example. Some resolve this objection by answering, That God, whom no law restrains, refers all to his

glory, but that man must not doe so; as if God sought his glory, (that is to say) pleased himselfe in the

death of a sinner. It is more rightly answered, that the institution of eternall punishment was before sin,

and had regard to this onely, that men might dread to commit sinne for the time to come.

X. The words of Christ prove this seventh, Matth. v. 22. But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry

with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgement, and whosoever shall say unto his

Brother Racha, shall be in danger of the Counsell, but whosoever shall say, thou foole, shall be in

danger of hell fire. Prov. x. 18. Hee that uttereth a slander is a foole. Prov. xiv. 21. Hee that despiseth his neighbour, sinneth. Prov. xv. 1. Grievous words stir up anger. Prov. xxii. 10. Cast out the scorner, and contention shall goe out, and reproach shall cease.

XI. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature, that is, of humility, is established by these

places. Mat. v. 3. Blessed are the Poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of heaven. Prov. vi. 16-19.

These six things doth the Lord hate, yea seven are an abomination unto him: A proud look, &c. Prov.

xvi. 5. Every one that is proud is an abomination unto the Lord, though hand joyne in hand, he shall not

be unpunished. Prov. xi. 2. When pride cometh, then cometh shame, but with the lowly, is wisdome.

Thus Isaiah xl. 3. (where the comming of the Messias is shewed forth, for preparation towards his

Kingdome) The voyce of him that cryed in the wildernesse, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord,

make strait in the desart a high way for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain,

and hill, shall be made low; which doubtlesse is spoken to men, and not to mountains.

XII. But that same Equity which we proved in the ninth place to be a Law of Nature, which commands

every man to allow the same Rights to others they would be allowed themselves, and which containes

in it all the other Lawes besides, is the same which Moses sets down, Levit. xix. 18. Thou shalt love thy

neighbour as thy self; and our Saviour calls it the summe of the morall Law, Mat. xxii. 36-40. Master, which is the great Commandement in the Law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God

with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great

Commandement, and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. On these two

Commandements hang all the Law and the Prophets. But to love our neighbor as our selves, is nothing

else, but to grant him all we desire to have granted to our selves.

XIII. By the tenth Law respect of Persons is forbid; as also by these places following, Mat. v. 45. That

ye may be children of your Father which is in Heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the Evill, and on

the Good, &c. Collos. i i. 11. There is neither Greek, nor Jew, circumcision, nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, or Scythian, bond, or free, but Christ is all, & in all. Acts x. 34. Of a truth, I perceive, that God is no respecter of Persons. 2 Chron. xix. 7. There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of Persons, nor taking of gifts. Eccles. xxxv. 12. The Lord is Judge, and with him is no respect of Persons. Rom. ii. 11. For there is no respect of Persons with God.

XIV. The eleventh Law, which commands those things to be held in common which cannot be divided, I

know not whether there be any expresse place in Scripture for it, or not; but the practise appears every

where in the common use of Wels, Wayes, Rivers, sacred things, &c. for else men could not live.

XV. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a Law of Nature, That where things could neither be

divided, nor possess'd in common, they should be dispos'd by lot, which is confirmed as by the

example of Moses, who by Gods command, Numb. xxvi. 55. divided the severall parts of the land of

promise unto the Tribes by Lot: So Acts i. 24. by the example of the Apostles, who receiv'd Matthias,

before Justus, into their number, by casting Lots, and saying, Thou Lord, who knowest the hearts of all

men, shew whether of these two thou hast chosen, &c. Prov. xvi. 33. The lot is cast into the lappe, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. And which is the thirteenth Law, the Succession was due