conveyed to him by me to day.
VII. Neverthelesse, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will; if yet to words
relating to the future, there shall some other signes be added, they may become as valid, as if they had
been spoken of the present: If therefore, as by reason of those other signes, it appear, that he that
speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his
Right, they ought to be valid; for the conveyance of right depends not on words, but (as hath been
instanc'd in the 4. Article) on the declaration of the Will.
VIII. If any man conveigh some part of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit
received, or for some compact, a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift, or free Donation. But in free
donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the present, or the time past; for if they respect the
future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the foregoing Article: It must needs therefore be, that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will: But, because whatsoever is voluntarily
done, is done for some good to him that wils it; there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give
it, except some benefit either already receiv'd, or to be acquir'd; but is suppos'd, that no such benefit is
acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift: It remains therefore, that a
mutuall good turne without agreement be expected; but no signe can be given, that he, who us'd future
words toward him who was in no sort engag'd to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so
understood, as to oblige himselfe thereby. Nor is it suitable to Reason, that those who are easily
enclined to doe well to others, should be oblig'd by every promise, testifying their present good
affection: And for this cause, a promiser in this kind, must be understood to have time to deliberate,
and power to change that affection as well as he to whom he made that promise, may alter his desert.
But he that deliberates, is so farre forth free, nor can be said to have already given: But if he promise
often, and yet give seldome, he ought to be condemn'd of levity, and be called not a Donour, but
Doson.
IX. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveighing their Rights, is call'd a Contract. But in every
Contract, either both parties instantly performe what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had
from either to other; or the one performes, the other is trusted, or neither performe. Where both parties
performe presently, there the Contract is ended, as soon as 'tis performed; but where there is credit
given either to one, or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of
promise is called a COVENANT.
X. But the Covenant made by the party trusted with him, who hath already performed, although the
promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no lesse transfer the right of future time, than if it
had been made by words signifying the present, or time past: for the others performance is a most
manifest signe that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly
make performance also at the appointed time; and by this signe the party trusted knew himselfe to be
thus understood, which, because he hindred not, 'twas an evident token of his Will to performe. The
promises therefore which are made for some benefit received (which are also Covenants) are Tokens
of the Will; that is, (as in the foregoing Section hath been declared) of the last act of deliberating,
whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolisht, and by consequence are obligatory; for where
Liberty ceaseth, there beginneth Obligation.
XI. But the Covenants, which are made in contract of mutuall trust, neither party performing out of
hand, if there arise 2 a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid: for he that first performes by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their owne
advantage, either by right, or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath
Contracted; for it suites not with reason, that any man should performe first, if it be not likely that the
other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable, or not, he that doubts it, must be
judge of, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 9. Article. Thus, I say, things stand in the
state of nature, but in a Civill State, when there is a power which can compell both parties, he that hath
contracted to perform first, must first performe; because, that since the other may be compell'd, the
cause which made him fear the others non-performance, ceaseth.
XII. But from this reason, that in all Free-gifts, and Compacts, there is an acceptance of the
conveighance of Right required: it followes, that no man can Compact with him who doth not declare
his acceptance; and therefore we cannot compact with Beasts, neither can we give, or take from them
any manner of Right, by reason of their want of speech, and understanding, Neither can any man
Covenant with God, or be oblig'd to him by Vow, except so far forth as it appeares to him by Holy
Scriptures, that he hath substituted certaine men who have authority to accept of such like Vowes and
Covenants, as being in Gods stead.
XIII. Those therefore doe vow in vain, who are in the state of nature, where they are not tyed by any
Civill Law, (except by most certain Revelation the Will of God to accept their Vow, or Pact, be made
known to them) for if what they Vow, be contrary to the Law of Nature, they are not tyed by their Vow,
for no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull act; but if what is vowed, be commanded by some Law of
nature, it is not their Vow, but the Law it self which ties them; but if he were free before his vow, either
to doe it, or not doe it, his liberty remaines, because that the openly declar'd Will of the obliger is
requisite to make an obligation by Vow, which in the case propounded is suppos'd not to be: Now I call
him the Obliger to whom any one is tyed, and the Obliged him who is tyed.
XIV. Covenants are made of such things onely as fall under our deliberation, for it can be no Covenant
without the Will of the Contractor, but the Will is the last act of him who deliberates; therefore they
onely concerne things possible, and to come; no man therefore, by his Compact, obligeth himself to an impossibility. But yet, though we often Covenant to doe such things as then seem' d possible when we
promis'd them, which yet afterward appear to be impossible, are we therefore freed from all obligation?
The reason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future incertainty receives a present benefit; on
condition, that he return another for it: for his Will, who performes the present benefit hath simply
before it, for its object, a certain good [equally] valuable with the thing promised; but the thing it selfe
not simply, but with condition if it could be done; but if it should so happen, that even this should prove
impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants therefore oblige us not to
perform just the thing it selfe covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this onely is, the things
themselves are not in our power.
XV. We are freed from Covenants two wayes, either by performing, or by being forgiven: By
performing, for beyond that we oblig'd not our selves. By being forgiven, because he whom we oblig'd
our selves to by forgiving, is conceiv'd to return us that Right which we past over to him; for, forgiving,
implies giving: that is, by the fourth Article of this Chapter, a conveyance of Right to him to whom the
gift is made.
XVI. Its an usuall question, Whether Compacts extorted from us, through fear, do oblige, or not: For
example, If to redeeme my life, from the power of a Robber, I promise to pay him 100 l. next day; and
that I will doe no act whereby to apprehend, and bring him to Justice, whether I am tyed to keep
promise, or not? But though such a Promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not
to be accounted so, because it proceeded from fear, for then it would follow that those promises which
reduc'd men to a civill life, and by which Lawes were made, might likewise be of none effect, (for it
proceeds from fear of mutuall slaughter, that one man submits himselfe to the Dominion of another:)
And he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his
redemption. It holds universally true, that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received;
and that to promisee and the thing promised, be lawfull: But it is lawfull, for the redemption of my life,
both to promise, and to give what I will of mine owne to any man, even to a Thief. We are oblig'd
therefore, by promises proceeding from fear, except the Civill Law forbid them, by vertue whereof, that
which is promised becomes unlawfull.
XVII. Whosoever shall contract with one to doe, or omit somewhat, and shall after Covenant the
contrary with another; he maketh not the former, but the latter Contract unlawfull: for, he hath no longer
Right to doe, or to omit ought, who by former Contracts hath conveyed it to another; wherefore he can
conveigh no Right by latter Contracts, and what is promised, is promis'd without Right: He is therefore
tyed onely to his first Contract; to break which is unlawfull.
XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any Contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or
any other way hurt his Body; for there is in every man a certain high degree of feare through which he
apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest, and therefore by naturall necessity he
shuns it all he can, and 'tis suppos'd he can doe no otherwise: When a man is arrived to this degree of
fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight, or fight. Since therefore no man is
tyed to impossibilities, they who are threatned either with deathe (which is the greatest evill to nature)
or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to
endure them. Farthermore, he that is tyed by Contract is trusted, (for Faith only is the Bond of
Contracts) but they who are brought to punishment, either Capitall, or more gentle, are fettered, or
strongly guarded, which is a most certain signe that they seem'd not sufficiently bound from non
resistance by their Contracts. Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointed, kill me.
Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be, contract the first way; but there is need sometimes. This second way, none, neither is it ever
needfull; for in the meer state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state it selfe affords you a Right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterward kill him. But in a Civill
State, where the Right of life, and death, and of all corporall punishment is with the Supreme; that
same Right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the Supreme himselfe
contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punishment, but onely this, that no man offer to defend
others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two Cities, there should a Contract be made, on
condition of killing, if it were not perform'd, we must presuppose another Contract of not killing before
the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of Warre returnes; that
is, an hostile state, in which all things are lawfull, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract
of not resisting, we are oblig'd of two Evills to make choice of that which seemes the greater; for
certaine Death is a greater evill than Fighting; but of two Evills it is impossible not to chuse the least: By
such a Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities, which is contrary to the very nature of
compacts.
XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any Compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose
dammage he is like to procure himselfe a bitter life; wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear
witnesse against his Sonne, nor a Husband against his Wife, nor a Sonne against his Father; nor any
man against any one, by whose meanes he hath his subsistance; for in vain is that testimony which is
presum'd to be corrupted from nature; but although no man be tyed to accuse himself by any compact,
yet in a publique tryal he may, by torture, be forc'd to make answer; but such answers are no testimony
of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tortur'd his answer
be true, or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by Right.
XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a promise, whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of Gods
mercy, unlesse he perform his word; which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have
in them the very essence of an Oath, to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as with the Romans,
Doe thou Jupiter so destroy the deceiver, as I slay this same Beast: neither is this any let, but that an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory, as promissory; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an
Oath, promiseth that he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for Subjects to
Swear by their Kings; that custome took its Originall hence, That those Kings took upon them Divine
Honour; for Oathes were therefore introduc'd that by Religion, and consideration of the Divine Power
men might have a greater dread of breaking their Faiths, than that wherewith they fear men, from
whose eyes their actions may lie hid.
XXI. Whence it followes, that an Oath must be conceived in that forme which he useth, who takes it; for
in vain is any man brought to Swear by a God whom he beleeves not, and therefore neither feares him.
For though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to Swear
by him in any other fashion, or by any other name than what is contain'd in the precepts of his own
proper, that is, (as he who Swears imagines) the true Religion.
XXII. By the definition of an Oath we may understand, that a bare Contract obligeth no lesse, than that
to which we are Sworn; for it is the contract which binds us, the Oath relates to the Divine punishment,
which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in its selfe unlawfull; but it could not be
unlawfull if the Contract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the mercy of God
obligeth himselfe not to any punishment, because it is ever lawfull to deprecate the punishment
howsoever provok'd, and to enjoy Gods Pardon if it be granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath is
this, To cause men who are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment, to
make the more Conscience of their words and actions.
XXIII. To exact an Oath, where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where
the party compacted, withall wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto
self-defence, and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfe, as to prejudice another. For
an Oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of Gods anger, that is to
say, of him that is Omnipotent against those who therefore violate their Faith, because they think that
by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscient against
those, who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.
1. Right Reason. By Right Reason in the naturall state of men, I understand not, as many doe, an
infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man
concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the dammage, or benefit of his
neighbours. I call it Peculiar, because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme (i.e.
the Civill Law) is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this Civill
Government, (in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with His
owne) every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are
done at His owne perill, but also for the measure of another mans reason, in such things as doe
concerne him. I call it True; that is, concluding from true principles rightly fram'd, because that the
whole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men who
see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation;
but the Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, and 7. articles of the first Chapter.
2. Arise. For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other
token of the will not to performe from the other part, it cannot be judg'd to be a just fear; for the cause
which was not sufficient to keep him from making Compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of
it, being made.
Chapter III.
Of the other Lawes of Nature
I. Another of the Lawes of Nature is, to performe Contracts, or to keep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law of Nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain
Peace; to conveigh certain rights from each to other, and that this (as often as it shall happen to be
done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible to peace, as we shall performe
Our selves, what we contract with others, shall be done, or omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be
made, unlesse we stood to them. Because therefore, to stand to our Covenants, Or to keep faith, is a
thing necessary for the obtaining of peace, it will prove by the second Article of the second Chapter to
be a precept of the naturall Law.
II. Neither is there in this matter, any exception of the persons, with whom we Contract, as if they keep
no faith with others; Or hold, that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he
that Contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vaine, and it is against reason for a
knowing man to doe a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so, he
affirms the Contract to be made in vain: He therefore, who Contracts with one with whom he thinks he
is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a Contract to be a thing done in vaine, and not in
vaine, which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them;
that is, either there must be a declared Warre, Or a sure and faithfull Peace.
III. The breaking of a Bargain, as also the taking back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action, Or
omission) is called an INJURY: But that action, or omission, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury, and
an unjust action, or omission, signifie the same thing, and both are the same with breach of Contract
and trust: And it seemes the word Injury came to be given to any action, or omission, because they
were without Right. He that acted, or omitted, having before conveyed his Right to some other. And
there is some likenesse between that, which in the common course of life we call Injury; and that,
which in the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as he, who by Arguments is driven to deny the
Assertion which he first maintain'd, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who
through weaknesse of mind does, or omits that which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doe, or
omit, commits an Injury, and falls into no lesse contradiction, than he, who in the Schools is reduc'd to
an Absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not
done, which is to will a thing done, and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An Injury
therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.
IV. From these grounds it followes, that an injury can be done to no man 1 but him with whom we enter
Covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way
of bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master command his
Servant, who hath promis'd to obey him, to pay a summe of money, or carry some present to a third
man; the Servant, if he doe it not, hath indeed damag'd this third party, but he injur'd his Master onely.
So also in a civill government, if any man offend another, with whom he hath made no Contract, he
damages him to whom the evill is done, but he injures none but him to whom the power of government
belongs: for if he, who receives the hurt, should expostulate the mischief; and he that did it, should
answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I rather doe according to yours, than mine owne will,
since I do not hinder, but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath
no manner of pre-contract past, I see not, I confesse, what is reprehensible.
V. These words just, and unjust, as also justice, and injustice, are equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Persons, another when to actions: When they are attributed to Actions, Just
signifies as much as what's done with Right, and unjust, as what's done with injury: he who hath done
some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Person, but guiltlesse, and he that hath done some unjust thing, we doe not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applyed to Persons; to be just, signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to doe
righteousnesse, or to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and to be unjust, is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present
benefit; so as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing; that of an
action, or omission, another; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust
man, just: But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the Law commands it,
unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness
for fear of the punishment annext unto the Law, and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his
mind.
VI. The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds; Commutative, and Distributive, the
former whereof they say consists in Arithmeticall, the latter in Geometricall proportion: and that is
conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location, and conduction, and other
acts whatsoever belonging to Contracters, where, if there be an equall return made, hence they say
springs a commutative justice: But this is busied about the dignity, and merits of men; so as if there be
rendred to every man kata pen axian more to him who is more worthy, and lesse to him that deserves
lesse, and that proportionably, hence they say ariseth distributive justice: I acknowledge here some
certaine distinction of equality; to wit, that one is an equality simply so called, as when two things of
equall value are compar'd together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the
other is an equality, secundum quod; as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to an hundred men, 600
pounds are given to 60 men, and 400 to 40 where there is no equality between 600 and 400. But when
it happens, that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one
of them shall take an equall part, whence it is called an equall distribution: But such like equality is the
same thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is all this to Justice? for neither, if I sell my goods for
as much as I can get for them, doe I injure the buyer, who sought, and desir'd them of me? neither if I
divide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesse, so long as I give the other what I have agreed
for, do I wrong to either? which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospell. This
therefore is no distinction of Justice, but of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'd, but that Justice is
a certain equality, as consisting in this onely; that since we are all equall by nature, one should not
arrogate more Right to himselfe, than he grants to another, unlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact.
And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of Justice, although now almost generally
receiv'd by all, lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else, than the breach of Faith,
or Contract, as hath been defin'd above.
VII. It is an old saying, Volenti non fit iniuria (the willing man receives no injury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles. For grant, that a man be willing that that should be done, which he
conceives to be an injury. to him; why then that is done by his will, which by Contract was not lawfull to
be done; but he being willing that should be done, which was not lawfull by Contract, the Contract it self
(by the 15. Article of the foregoing Chapter) becomes void: The Right therefore of doing it returnes,
therefore it is done by Right; wherefore it is no injury.
VIII. The third precept of the Naturall Law, is, That you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who out
of the confid