Cratylus by Plato. - HTML preview

Cratylus – Plato

thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein (break), and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts in leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) of movements he generally finds an expression in the itself, liparon (sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and letter R, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the like: the heavier sound of gamma detained the slip-the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the ping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in of a glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, order to express motion, just as by the letter iota he gloiodes. The nu he observed to be sounded from within, expresses the subtle elements which pass through all and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence he things. This is why he uses the letter iota as imitative introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he as-of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of signed to the expression of size, and nu of length, be-letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the pronuncia-cause they are great letters: omicron was the sign of tion is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; roundness, and therefore there is plenty of omicron these are used in the imitation of such notions as mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the psuchron (shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, shaken), seismos (shock), and are always introduced by and impressing on them names and signs, and out of the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is them by imitation compounding other signs. That is phusodes (windy). He seems to have thought that the my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

delta and tau was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement of HERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you be-lambda, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, fore, Cratylus mystifies me; he says that there is a fit-67

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ness of names, but he never explains what is this fit-SOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the ness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is in-view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out; tended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the pres-and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, ence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly been saying about names, or have you something bet-accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that ter of your own? and if you have, tell me what your you have found some better notion. For you have evi-view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or dently reflected on these matters and have had teach-Socrates and I will learn of you.

ers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your CRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not disciples.

suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such a CRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very great-made a study of these matters, and I might possibly est of all.

convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to HERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I say to you what Achilles in the ‘Prayers’ says to Ajax,—

agree with him, ‘to add little to little’ is worth while.

And, therefore, if you think that you can add anything

‘Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.’

trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to 68

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give answers much to my mind, whether you are in-CRATYLUS: Certainly.

spired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously SOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?

to yourself.

CRATYLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wonder-ing at my own wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I SOCRATES: And who are they?

think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—

CRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

when the deceiver is always at home and always with you—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to SOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like retrace my steps and endeavour to ‘look fore and aft,’ in other arts? Let me explain what I mean: of painters, the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; some are better and some worse?

where are we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:—has this propo-CRATYLUS: Yes.

sition been sufficiently proven?

SOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am dis-mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them posed to think, is quite true.

worse; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.

SOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?

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CRATYLUS: True.

friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in SOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his do their work better and some worse?

name at all?

CRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.

CRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really the SOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are name of somebody else, who has the nature which cor-better and others worse?

responds to it.

CRATYLUS: No, indeed.

SOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may SOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?

be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not.

CRATYLUS: Certainly not.

CRATYLUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?

SOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is im-CRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all.

possible? For if this is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.

SOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our 70

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CRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which SOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if is not?—say something and yet say nothing? For is not you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or falsehood saying the thing which is not?

false, or partly true and partly false:—which is all that I want to know.

SOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you CRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting him-are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood self in motion to no purpose; and that his words would may be spoken but not said?

be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.

CRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said.

SOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot SOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a find a meeting-point, for you would admit that the name person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take is not the same with the thing named?

your hand and say: ‘Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion’—these words, whether CRATYLUS: I should.

spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or SOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the perhaps to nobody at all?

name is an imitation of the thing?

CRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would CRATYLUS: Certainly.

only be talking nonsense.

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SOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also CRATYLUS: Very true.

imitations of things, but in another way?

SOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, CRATYLUS: Yes.

or only the first?

SOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not CRATYLUS: Only the first.

rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) SOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which are not equally attributable and applicable to the things attributes to each that which belongs to them and is of which they are the imitation.

like them?

CRATYLUS: They are.

CRATYLUS: That is my view.

SOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may at-SOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being tribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the friends should have a good understanding about the woman to the woman; and so on?

argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, CRATYLUS: Certainly.

I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and assign-SOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness ing the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?

case of names, false as well as wrong.

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CRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of CRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and pictures; they may be wrongly assigned; but not in the therefore I say, Granted.

case of names—they must be always right.

SOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which SOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign a man and say to him, ‘This is your picture,’ showing names as well as pictures to objects, the right assign-him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a ment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assign-woman; and when I say ‘show,’ I mean bring before the ment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong sense of sight.

assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and CRATYLUS: Certainly.

verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them.

What do you say, Cratylus?

SOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say,

‘This is your name’?—for the name, like the picture, is CRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very an imitation. May I not say to him—‘This is your name’?

true.

and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, ‘This is a man’; or of a SOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be com-female of the human species, when I say, ‘This is a pared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give woman,’ as the case may be? Is not all that quite pos-all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not sible?

give them all—some may be wanting; or there may be too many or too much of them—may there not?

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CRATYLUS: Very true.

SOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?

SOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture CRATYLUS: Yes.

or figure; and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

SOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former CRATYLUS: Yes.

admissions hold good?

SOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and let-CRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, ters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is you see, is different; for when by the help of grammar appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words we assign the letters alpha or beta, or any other letters a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or mis-will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer place a letter, the name which is written is not only that some names are well and others ill made.

written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

CRATYLUS: That is true.

SOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether SOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes correct, Cratylus.

good, or he may be bad?

CRATYLUS: How so?

CRATYLUS: Yes.

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SOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about CRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes SOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so some other principle of truth in images, and also in of any other number: but this does not apply to that names; and not insist that an image is no longer an which is qualitative or to anything which is represented image when something is added or subtracted. Do you under an image. I should say rather that the image, if not perceive that images are very far from having quali-expressing in every point the entire reality, would no ties which are the exact counterpart of the realities longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two which they represent?

objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that CRATYLUS: Yes, I see.

some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, SOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect but also creates an inward organization like yours, hav-of names on things, if they were exactly the same with ing the same warmth and softness; and into this in-them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no fuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, one would be able to determine which were the names and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them and which were the realities.

by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were CRATYLUS: Quite true.

two Cratyluses?

SOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to ad-75

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mit that one name may be correctly and another incor-street late at night: and be likewise told by truth her-rectly given; and do not insist that the name shall be self that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occa-find out some new notion of correctness of names, and sional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to will be inconsistent with yourself.

the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character CRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say of the thing which you are describing is retained; and to be very reasonable.

this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of SOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask the letters.

ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember.

CRATYLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is pre-served, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, SOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are still the thing is signified;—well, if all the letters are like the things?

given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be pun-CRATYLUS: Yes.

ished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the 76

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SOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly SOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the are representations of things, is there any better way of greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper framing representations than by assimilating them to and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that the beauty and formation of the word: you would admit names are conventional, and have a meaning to those that?

who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that CRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quar-convention is the only principle; and whether you abide relling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name by our present convention, or make a new and opposite which is incorrectly given is a name at all.

one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, they would say, makes no difference, if SOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representa-you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you tion of a thing?

prefer?

CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.

CRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is in-finitely better than representation by any chance sign.

SOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?

SOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are com-CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.

posed must also be like things. Returning to the image 77

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of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever CRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.

compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled SOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smooth-the things imitated, and out of which the picture is ness, and softness, and the like?

composed?

CRATYLUS: There again you were right.

CRATYLUS: Impossible.

SOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is SOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any ac-called by us sklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter.

tually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of re-CRATYLUS: Very true.

semblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the original elements are letters?

SOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the CRATYLUS: Yes.

termination rho, which there is to us in sigma, or is there no significance to one of us?

SOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you CRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.

agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of rapid-ity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in SOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they saying so?

are unlike?

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CRATYLUS: In as far as they are like.

SOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I un-SOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?

derstand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying?

CRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.

CRATYLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is expressive not of hardness but of SOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, softness.

there is an indication given by me to you?

CRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly CRATYLUS: Yes.

inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion SOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting let-from unlike as well as from like, for example in the ters upon occasion.

lamda of sklerotes. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness SOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which of us; when I say skleros (hard), you know what I mean.

are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention.

CRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of And even supposing that you distinguish custom from that is custom.

convention ever so much, still you must say that the 79

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signification of words is given by custom and not by CRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imag-likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well ine, is to inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus names knows also the things which are expressed by them.

(for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to con-SOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as tribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose the name is, so also is the thing; and that he who knows we take the instance of number, how can you ever imag-the one will also know the other, because they are ine, my good friend, that you will find names resem-similars, and all similars fall under the same art or sci-bling every individual number, unless you allow that ence; and therefore you would say that he who knows which you term convention and agreement to have au-names will also know things.

thority in determining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible re-CRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean.

semble things; but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, which SOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of con-this information about things which, according to you, vention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information?

we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which or is there any other? What do you say?

are perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the most im-CRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the perfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, best sort of information about them; there can be no and what is the use of them?

other.

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SOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of gave names according to his conception, in what posi-them, he who discovers the names discovers also the tion shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall things; or is this only the method of instruction, and is we not be deceived by him?

there some other method of enquiry and discovery.

CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking CRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry that he must surely have known; or else, as I was say-and discovery are of the same nature as instruction.

ing, his names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, SOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he and the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did who follows names in the search after things, and analy-you ever observe in speaking that all the words which ses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?

you utter have a common character and purpose?

CRATYLUS: How so?

SOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder SOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave into agreement with the original error and with him-them according to his conception of the things which self; there would be nothing strange in this, any more they signified—did he not?

than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and CRATYLUS: True.

are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should SOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he expend his chief thought and attention on the consid-81

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eration of his first principles:—are they or are they not face of it the stopping ( istanai) of the stream; and the rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, word piston (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may find that names are really consistent. And here let us see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. More-revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that over, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not be the same as sunesis and episteme and other words conceive that to be the meaning of them?

which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai, sumpheresthai); and much the same may be CRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and said of amathia and akolasia, for amathia may be ex-the true meaning.

plained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these SOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to to be framed on the same principle as those which have signify stopping the soul at things than going round the best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning might find many other examples in which the giver of as at present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, insertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but that they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion.

but epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of CRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater num-motion. Again, the word