An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke - HTML preview

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Chapter I

No Innate Speculative Principles

1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is an

established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate

principles; some primary notions, {koinai ennoiai,} characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of

man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be

sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show

(as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural

faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and

may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will

easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom

God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less

unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate

characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge

of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of

truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that

made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave

to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

2. General assent the great argument. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that

there are certain principles, both speculative and practical, (for they speak of both), universally

agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions

which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as

necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this

misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein al mankind

agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to

that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

4. "What is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," not universally

assented to. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove

innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to

which al mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those

magnified principles of demonstration, "Whatsoever is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to

be and not to be"; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so

settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any

one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from

having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as


5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, etc. For, first, it is

evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want

of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant

of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on

the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else

but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's

perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds,

with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and

assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For

if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted,

how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to

say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing.

No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet

conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the

mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if

any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable

of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on

the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in

ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if

the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to

know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more,

but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says

nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the

mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge

acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on

the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths

the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious:

in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the

understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the

understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words "to be in the

understanding" have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding,

and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything

is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, "Whatsoever is, is,"

and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot

be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their

understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

6. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. To avoid this, it is usually

answered, that al men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason; and this is

enough to prove them innate. I answer:

7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who, being

prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For, to apply this

answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things:

either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to

be known and observed by them; or else, that the use and exercise of men's reason, assists them in

the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. If they mean, that by the use of

reason men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way

of arguing will stand thus, viz., that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us

firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is

made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this,--that by the use of reason we are capable to

come to a certain knowledge of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference

between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be

equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a

rational creature may certainty come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

9. It is false that reason discovers them. But how can these men think the use of reason necessary

to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing

else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already

known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover;

unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate.

We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that

there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is

originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to

make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a

man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impressed truths originally, and before the

use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect

to say, that men know and know them not at the same time.

10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims. It will here perhaps be said

that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon

as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have

occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only,

and that very readily, allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this

different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs, to make them out and to gain our

assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and

assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge,

which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be

confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give

this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for

the same thing to be and not to be," is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that

bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to

depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires

pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was

imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to

discover it?

11. And if there were, this would prove them not innate. Those who will take the pains to reflect with

a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that this ready assent of the mind to

some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the

mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing

to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that "men know and assent to them,

when they come to the use of reason," be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge

of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

12. The coming to the use of reason not the time we come to know these maxims. If by knowing and

assenting to them "when we come to the use of reason," be meant, that this is the time when they

come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason,

they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false;

because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore

the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many

instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any

knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?" And a great

part of illiterate people and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever

thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these

general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I

add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general

abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are

mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought

into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions,

which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the

sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason

before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men's coming to the use of

reason is the time of their discovery.

13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. In the mean time it is observable,

that this saying, that men know and assent to these maxims "when they come to the use of reason,"

amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,--that they are never known nor taken notice of before

the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man's life; but when is

uncertain. And so may all other knowable truths, as well as these; which therefore have no

advantage nor distinction from others by this note of being known when we come to the use of

reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery it would not prove them innate.

But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were, when

men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as

frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is

originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be

observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to

exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these

maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the

use of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because

men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate

principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it

comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time

when they are first taken notice of, and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them

innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men "assent to them when they

come to the use of reason," is no more but this,--that the making of general abstract ideas, and the

understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it,

children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having

for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their

ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If

assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I

desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.

15. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. The senses at first let in particular ideas, and

furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are

lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts

them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be

furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And

the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase.

But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow

together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I

confess, is very early in the mind but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will

observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first

which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most

frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and

others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and

perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the

use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call "the use of reason." For a child knows as

certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e., that sweet is

not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not

the same thing.

16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms

mean, and not on their innateness. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he

comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon

explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But

neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting til then

because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in

his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that

proposition upon the same grounds and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a

cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also that he may come to know

afterwards "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," as shall be more fully

shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about

which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them; or

to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent

to those maxims;--whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a

cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he

will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him

put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is

expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen

are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three:

yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the

ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which

are signified by one, two, and three.

17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate. This evasion therefore

of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference

between those suppose innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have

endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally

assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men,

even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they

think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail after they have once understood

the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these

propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the

very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then "that one and two are equal to three, that sweetness

is not bitterness," and a thousand the like, must be innate. In answer to this, I demand whether

ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain

mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if

it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are

generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with

innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz., of assent at first hearing and understanding the

terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several

propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that two and

two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that everybody

assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate

axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them;

but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet

with assent as soon as they are understood. That "two bodies cannot be in the same place" is a

truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that "it is impossible for the same thing to

be and not to be," that "white is not black," that "a square is not a circle," that "bitterness is not

sweetness." These and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct

ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must

necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and

understanding the terms to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate

propositions as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men can make propositions wherein

different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea is

denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this

general one, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," or that which is the foundation

of it, and is the easier understood of the two, "The same is not different"; by which account they will

have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But, since no

proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to suppose all our

ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, etc., innate, than which there cannot be anything more

opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding

the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate

impressions, but on something else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions

which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

19. Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims. Nor let it be said, that

those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as that "one

and two are equal to three," that "green is not red," etc., are received as the consequences of those

more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but

take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find that these, and the

like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those who are utterly

ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are

called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.

20. "One and one equal to Two, etc., not general nor useful," answered. If it be said, that these

propositions, viz., "two and two are equal to four," "red is not blue," etc., are not general maxims, nor

of any great use, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing

and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever proposition can be found that

receives general assent as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate

proposition, as well as this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," they

being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this

maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to

our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it is

longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding. And as to the

usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally

conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

21. These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate. But we have

not yet done with "assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms." It is fit

we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary;

since it supposes that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these

principles till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he

hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining

assent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any

such,) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the

mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he

has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these principles may be

made more evident to us by others' teaching than nature has made them by impression: which will ill

agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary,

makes them unfit to be the foundations of al our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This

cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their

being proposed: but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know

a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not

because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those

words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them.

And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate

principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be

innate. When yet it is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these

observations, and reduce them into general propositions: not innate, but collected from a preceding

acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made them,

unobserving men, when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their assent to.

22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them, or

else signifies nothing. If it be said, the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles,

but not an explicit, before this first hearing (as they must who will say "that they are in the

understanding before they are known,") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle

imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this,--that the mind is capable of

understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations,

as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind; which I fear they will

scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when

demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have

drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

23. The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent

teaching. There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us

that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing; because

they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument

or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which there seems to

me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything de novo; when, in

truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, it is evident

that they have learned the terms, and their signification; neither of which was born with them. But

this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about which the proposition

is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions

that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and

the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there

is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that

proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names,

and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in such

terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can

perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other

propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or

so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For, though a child quickly

assents to this proposition, "That an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance he has got the

ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names

apple and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will

assent to this proposition, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"; because

that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more

large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child

hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly

to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to

make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms; but as soon as ever he has

got those ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of

the forementioned propositions: and with both for the same reason; viz., because he finds the ideas

he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them are affirmed or

denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand

for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to such propositions, however evidently true or false in

themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty

sounds, any further than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them as they

correspond to those ideas we have, but no further than that. But the showing by what steps and

ways knowledge comes into our minds; and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the

business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason

that made me doubt of those innate principles.

24. Not innate, because not universally assented to. To conclude this argument of universal

consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles,--that if they are innate, they must needs

have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to, is to me as

unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these

men's own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to by those who

understand not the terms; nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never

heard nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the

number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show these

propositions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

25. These maxims not the first known. But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of

infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before

they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess

the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions: which, if they

were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is

certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do

so. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be

supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any such?

Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions from things

without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to

stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which

are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible

characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings?

This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its

characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well: and those are very ill

supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first

known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child

certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is

afraid of: that the wormseed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for: this it is

certainly and undoubtedly assured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, "That it is

impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," that it so firmly assents to these and other parts

of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age,

wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, children join in these

general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice,

be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of

that age.

26. And so not innate. Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with

constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of

more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in

those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent

of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate;--it being impossible that any

truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows

anything else. Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a

truth in the mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there by any innate truths,

they must necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.

27. Not innate, because they appear least where what is innate shows itself clearest. That the

general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind,

we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent, nor are

general impressions. But there is this further argument in it against their being innate: that these

characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those

persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that

they are not innate, since they are least known to those in whom, if they were innate, they must

needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate

people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or borrowed opinions; learning and

education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds; nor by super-inducing foreign and

studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably

imagine that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is

certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected that these principles should be

perfectly known to naturals; which being stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose,)

can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body, the only confessed difference

between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all these native

beams of light (were there any such) should, in those who have no reserves, no arts of

concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than

we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages,

and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What universal principles of

knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had

most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions.

A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age;

and a young savage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of

his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these

abstract maxims and reputed principles of science, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of

general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians: much less are they to be found in

the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the

language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that sort of

conversation or learning, where disputes are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial

argumentation and useful for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or

advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge I shall have

occasion to speak more at large, 1. 4, c. 7.

28. Recapitulation. I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration. And

probably it will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with

prejudice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out in the sequel of this Discourse,

being very willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not

be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we are all

apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two speculative Maxims innate: since

they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find is no other than what

several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: and since the assent

that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural inscription, as I doubt not

but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if these "first principles" of knowledge and

science are found not to be innate, no other speculative maxims can (I suppose), with better right

pretend to be so.