

Crafting an Intelligence Community:
Papers of the First Four DCIs



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CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

HISTORICAL
COLLECTIONS

GEORGE
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Intelligence, Policy, and Politics: The DCI, the White House, and Congress

George Mason University | School of Public Policy | Arlington, VA

September 13, 2012

- 1:30 – 1:35 **Welcome**
Dr. Peter N. Stearns
Provost, George Mason University
- 1:35 – 1:40 **Public Release of the Papers of the Early DCIs**
Mr. Bruce S. Barkan
Chief, HCD, CIA
- 1:40 – 1:45 **Overview of DCI Panel and Introduction of Keynote Speaker**
Dr. David S. Robarge
Chief Historian, CIA
- 1:45 – 2:00 **Keynote Speaker**
General Michael V. Hayden, *USAF (retired)*
- 2:00 – 3:00 **Personal Perspectives of the DCIs**
Panel Members:
Hon. R. James Woolsey Hon. Leon E. Panetta, *Secretary of Defense*
Hon. Porter J. Goss General Michael V. Hayden, *USAF (retired)*
- 3:00 – 3:30 **Break**
- 3:30 – 4:15 **Directors of Central Intelligence 1946-2005 : A Long Look Back**
Dr. David S. Robarge
- 4:15 – 5:25 **The Office of the DCI: A View from the Hill**
Professor Thomas Newcomb Mr. Michael W. Sheehy
Dr. Louis Fisher Ms. Suzanne E. Spaulding
- 5:20 – 5:30 **Appreciations** Mr. Joseph W. Lambert
Director, IMS, CIA
- Closing Remarks** Dr. Edward Rhodes
Dean, School of Public Policy, George Mason University

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- Showcase CIA's contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.
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The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence fosters understanding of the Agency's history and its relationship to today's intelligence challenges by communicating instructive historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agencies, and the public. CIA historian research topics on all aspects of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through publications, courses, briefings and Web-based products. They also work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication and education projects that highlight inter-agency approaches to intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an ambitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the documentary record.



School of Public Policy

The School of Public Policy at George Mason University prepares highly qualified, astute policy professionals who move rapidly into leadership positions in the private sector; not-for-profits; state and federal governments; and international organizations. With its emphases on innovation, diversity, ethics, and international perspectives, the School of Public Policy is among George Mason University's fastest-growing units.

When the School of Public Policy was founded in 1990, it was housed in trailers on the main campus in Fairfax, Va. Twenty-two years later, it now lives in a brand-new, seven-story building in Arlington, Va., with more than 60 full-time faculty and more than 950 full- and part-time Master's and PhD students.

In a short time, the School of Public Policy has been recognized as one of the largest and most respected public policy schools in the country. It offers students and working professionals a comprehensive education that integrates real-world experience, problem-solving and applied knowledge. Master's students pursue degrees in Public Policy; Health and Medical Policy; International Commerce and Policy; Organization Development and Knowledge Management; Peace Operations; or Transportation Policy, Operations, and Logistics.

Students graduate with the methodological and communication skills needed to design and promote effective policies. And because solving complex policy challenges requires an interdisciplinary approach, the School employs faculty members with backgrounds ranging from economics to political science, anthropology, and law, representing expertise in diverse topic areas, including transportation, economic development, national security, ethics, health care, global trade, education, governance, and technology.

Speaker Biographies

LOUIS FISHER, PHD

Dr. Louis Fisher is the Scholar in Residence at The Constitution Project, headquartered in Washington, D.C. From 1970 to 2006, he worked at the Library of Congress as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers within the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and from 2006 to 2010 served as the Specialist in Constitutional Law within the Law Library. During his service with CRS, he was the research director for the House Iran-Contra Committee and wrote major sections of the Committee's final report.

Dr. Fisher has written over twenty books with the most recent being *Defending Congress and the Constitution* (2011). His writing has garnered numerous accolades including the Louis Brownlow Book Award and Neustadt Book Award. In 2011 he received the Walter Beach Pi Sigma Alpha Award from the National Capital Area Political Science Association for strengthening the relationship between political science and public service. In 2012 he received the Hubert H. Humphrey Award from the American Political Science Association in recognition of notable public service by a political scientist.

Louis Fisher received his doctorate in political science from the New School for Social Research (1967) and has taught at Queens College, Georgetown University, American University, Catholic University of America, Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University as well as the College of William and Mary and the Catholic University of America Law Schools.

PORTER J. GOSS

Porter J. Goss served as the 19th and last Director of Central Intelligence from September 24, 2004 until April 21, 2005. At that time, he became the first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under the newly signed Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. He continued as D/CIA until May 26, 2006.

Previously, Mr. Goss served as the Congressman from Southwest Florida for almost 16 years. He was Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 1997 until his nomination as DCI in August 2004. He served for almost a decade as a member of the committee which oversees the intelligence community and authorizes its annual budget. During the 107th

Congress, Mr. Goss co-chaired the joint congressional inquiry into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He was the second Director of Central Intelligence to have served in Congress.

In addition to Intelligence, Mr. Goss' Congressional career focused on the environment, House ethics, senior issues, health care reform and the Rules Committee. He was a leader on the Everglade's legislation and takes great pride in the passage of the Ricky Ray Bill which offered relief to victims who contracted HIV through a contaminated blood supply. Mr. Goss was awarded the Distinguished Service Award in 2006.

Mr. Goss was a U.S. Army Intelligence officer from 1960 to 1962. He served as a clandestine service officer with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1962 until 1972, when a serious illness forced his retirement. While at the CIA, he completed assignments in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe.

After leaving the CIA, Mr. Goss and his family settled in Sanibel, Florida, where he was a small business owner and co-founder of a local newspaper. He was an active leader in the incorporation of the City of Sanibel in 1974 and was elected its first Mayor. From 1983 until 1988, Mr. Goss was a member of the Lee County (Florida) Commission, serving as its chairman in 1985 and 1986.

Mr. Goss holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in classical Greek from Yale University, graduating with high honors. He was born in Waterbury, Connecticut on November 26, 1938. He and his wife, Mariel, have four children and 12 grandchildren.

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN



Michael V. Hayden is a Distinguished Visiting Professor with George Mason University's School of Public Policy. A retired U.S. Air Force four-star general, he is a former director of the National Security Agency (1999–2005) and the Central Intelligence Agency (2006–09).

General Hayden has more than 20 years' experience developing and implementing U.S. security and foreign policy, having worked in the White House, U.S. embassies, and the Department of Defense, as well as at the NSA and the CIA.

After earning a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in modern American history from Duquesne University, Michael Hayden entered active duty in the U.S. Air Force. He has taught American defense policy as part of the Air Force ROTC program at St. Michael's College in Winooski, Vermont.

General Hayden has appeared in the media on such shows as *Charlie Rose*, *Meet the Press*, *This Week*, *Nightline*, and *CNN's Nightly News*.

THOMAS M. NEWCOMB



Thomas M. Newcomb is a Professor of Political Science and Criminal Justice at Heidelberg University in Ohio and is a member of the CIA Director's Historical Review Panel. In 2005, Professor Newcomb retired from the White House as a Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He previously served as a legal advisor to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; an attorney in the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review at the Department of Justice; a subcommittee staff director and counsel on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI); an attorney with CIA's Office of General Counsel; a clandestine service officer and (once) chief of station at five CIA stations in Europe and Africa; and as a buck sergeant with the 101st Airborne infantry in Vietnam. With spouse Dee Jackson, who retired after service at CIA and HPSCI, he runs an agricultural folly called Dead Drop Vineyards on their farm in Ohio.

Professor Newcomb has a BA and JD from the University of Minnesota and practiced trial law with Minneapolis-area firms before turning to public service.

LEON E. PANETTA



Leon E. Panetta was sworn in as the 23rd Secretary of Defense on July 1, 2011. Before joining the Department of Defense, Secretary Panetta served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency [D/CIA] from 2009 to 2011 where he led the Agency and managed human intelligence and open-source collection programs on behalf of the Intelligence Community.

Before joining CIA, Secretary Panetta spent 10 years co-directing, with his wife, the Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy at California State University, Monterey Bay, a nonpartisan, nonprofit Institute promoting the value of public service. In 2006, he served as a member of the Iraq Study Group, which conducted an independent assessment of the war in Iraq.

From July 1994 to January 1997, Secretary Panetta served as Chief of Staff to President William Clinton. Earlier, he was Director of the Office of Management and Budget. From 1977 to 1993, he represented California's 16th (now 17th) Congressional District, rising to House Budget Committee chairman during his final term.

Secretary Panetta served as a legislative assistant to Senator Thomas H. Kuchel [R-CA]; special assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights; and executive assistant to Mayor John Lindsay of New York. He also spent five years in private law practice.

He served as an Army intelligence officer from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army Commendation Medal.

Secretary Panetta holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science, and a law degree, both from Santa Clara University, California. He was born June 28, 1938 in Monterey, and lives in Carmel Valley. The Panettas have three grown sons and six grandchildren.

DAVID ROBARGE, PHD



Dr. David Robarge received his Ph.D. in American History from Columbia University. After teaching at Columbia and working on the staff of banker David Rockefeller, and at the Gannett Center for Media Studies at Columbia, Dr. Robarge joined CIA in 1989 and worked as a political and leadership analyst on the Middle East. He came to the History Staff in 1996 and was appointed Chief Historian in June 2005. Dr. Robarge has published a classified biography of DCI John McCone and an unclassified monograph on CIA's supersonic reconnaissance aircraft, the A-12. His articles and book reviews on Agency leadership, analysis, counterintelligence, technical collection, and covert action have appeared in *Studies in Intelligence*, *Intelligence and National Security*, and the *Journal of Intelligence History*. He has taught intelligence history at George Mason University and Georgetown University and also has written a biography of Chief Justice John Marshall.

MICHAEL W. SHEEHY



Michael W. Sheehy joined McBee Strategic in March of 2009, after more than thirty years of service in the U.S. House of Representatives. For six years, Mr. Sheehy was the national security advisor for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. In that capacity, he served as the Speaker's principal advisor on all matters affecting the security of the United States including defense, foreign policy, energy security, homeland security, and intelligence.

Prior to joining the Speaker's staff, Mr. Sheehy served for thirteen years as Democratic staff director and chief counsel on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence where he was responsible for the committee's work in authorizing funding for, and overseeing the conduct of, the nation's intelligence activities. Before joining the Intelligence Committee, he was chief of staff for Congressmen Richard Neal (D-MA) and Edward Boland (D-MA).

Mr. Sheehy served in the Navy for five years before beginning his career on Capitol Hill. He holds a B.A. from Marquette University and a J.D. from Georgetown University.

SUZANNE E. SPAULDING



Ms. Suzanne E. Spaulding is a recognized expert on national security issues, including intelligence, homeland security, terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, cyber security, intelligence, law enforcement, foreign investment, biodefense, crisis management, and issues related to the threat from chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons.

Developing her expertise over a career spanning 20 years, Ms. Spaulding has worked on national security issues in the Executive Branch and for Congress. She served as the Executive Director of two Congressionally-mandated commissions: the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, and the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense and CIA Director John Deutch.

On Capitol Hill, Ms. Spaulding served as Legislative Director and Senior Counsel for Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), General Counsel for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Minority Staff Director for the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. She also spent time at the Central Intelligence Agency, where she was Assistant General Counsel and the Legal Adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center.

R. JAMES WOOLSEY



R. James Woolsey is Vice President at Booz Allen & Hamilton for Global Strategic Security and former director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, Mr. Woolsey was partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner.

He recently served as counsel for major corporations in both commercial arbitrations and the negotiation of joint ventures and other agreements.

Besides serving as Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey has served in the U.S. government as Ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Vienna, 1989-1991, Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977-1979, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1970-73.

He was also appointed by the President as Delegate at Large to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva between 1983 and 1986.

During his military service in the U.S. Army, he served as an adviser on the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), Helsinki and Vienna, from 1969 to 1970.

Symposium Overview

Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–2005

Dr. David Robarge

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For nearly six decades, the director of central intelligence (DCI) headed the world's most important intelligence agency and oversaw the largest, most sophisticated, and most productive set of intelligence services ever known. From 1946 to 2005, 19 DCIs served through 10 changes in president; scores of major and minor wars, civil wars, military incursions, and other armed conflicts; two energy crises; a global recession; the specter of nuclear holocaust and the pursuit of arms control; the raising of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Iron Curtain; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the arrival of international terrorism on the shores of America and the war against it overseas. During that time, the DCIs participated in or oversaw several vital contributions that intelligence made to US national security: strategic warning, clandestine collection, independent analysis, overhead reconnaissance, support to warfighters and peacekeepers, arms control verification, encouragement of democracy, and counterterrorism. The responsibilities of the DCI grew logarithmically after January 1946, when President Harry Truman whimsically presented the first DCI, Sidney Souers, with a black hat, black cloak, and wooden dagger

and declared him the “Director of Centralized Snooping.”¹ At that time, the DCI had no CIA to run, no independent budget or personnel to manage, no authority to collect foreign secrets, and no power to bring about a consensus among agencies. Maybe that is why Souers, when asked not long after his appointment, “What do you want to do?” replied, “I want to go home.”²

Then came the National Security Act of 1947, which set forth a description of the DCI's job: There is a Director of Central Intelligence who shall serve as head of the United States intelligence community...act as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security; and...serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Two years later, the Central Intelligence Agency Act laid down the DCI's and the Agency's administrative rubrics. Over the next several decades, the DCI would directly manage thousands of employees and billions of dollars, and would have an important part in guiding many thousands and many billions more.

“Nineteen DCIs served through 10 changes in president, scores of wars,... a global recession, the specter of nuclear holocaust, and the arrival of international terrorism on US shores.”

“IT’S A VERY HARD JOB”

After John McCone was sworn in as DCI in November 1961, President John Kennedy shook his hand and gently warned him that he was “now living on the bull’s eye, and I welcome you to that spot.”³ The bull’s eye seems an appropriate metaphor, considering how often DCIs were the targets of recrimination and attack. George H. W. Bush called the job “the best...in Washington,”⁴ but arguably it also was the toughest.

The DCI really did not “direct” something called “central intelligence.” He was responsible for coordinating national collection and analysis, but he lacked the authority to do so, faced formidable competitors in other agencies, and had no constituency to support him. He had to walk the knife’s edge between politics and politicization, and was the handy scapegoat for intelligence missteps often committed or set in train years before. And he had to deal with the reality that, as Allen Dulles wrote, “Intelligence is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of the professions.”⁵

The purpose for establishing the position of DCI and the CIA under law in 1947 was to help avoid another Pearl Harbor surprise by taking strategic intelligence functions from the confines of separate departments and elevating them to the national level. The DCI was to have been the only adviser to the president with even a chance of presenting him with unbiased, nondepartmental intelligence. The seemingly straightforward phrases in the National Security Act, however, only gave

the DCI the potential to be a leader of the Intelligence Community. Whether a given DCI came close to being one was a result of the interplay of personalities, politics, and world events. With line authority only over the CIA, the DCI depended on his powers of bureaucratic persuasion and, most vitally, his political clout at the White House to be heard and heeded. Richard Helms often noted that the secretary of defense was the second most powerful person in Washington—except, perhaps for a few first ladies—whereas the DCI was “the easiest man in Washington to fire. I have no political, military, or industrial base.”⁶ Moreover, the DCI’s showcase product—national-level analysis—often carried the implicit message, “Mr. President, your policy is not working.” Presidents often have unrealistic expectations about what the CIA’s espionage and covert action capabilities can achieve, and they usually did not appreciate hearing from their DCIs that the world was complicated and uncertain. No wonder R. James Woolsey said his version of the job’s description could be written very simply: “Not to be liked.”⁷

DCIs IN PROFILE

Allen Dulles once told Congress that the CIA “should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job.”⁸ While Dulles’s advice may be applicable to the heads of the Agency’s directorates and offices, hardly any part of his statement was borne out over the history of the DCI’s position. Elite, yes; but neither small in number nor anonymous—many were well known in their various pursuits when they were nominated. And even if they were willing to stay for the long haul, few did. In late 1945,

“With no political, military, or industrial base, the DCI was ‘the easiest man in Washington to fire.’”



an interdepartmental committee that was developing a plan for a national-level intelligence agency recommended that its director be appointed for a long term, preferably not less than six years.⁹ Testifying to Congress in early 1947 about the proposed National Security Act, Dulles asserted that appointment as DCI “should be somewhat comparable to appointment to high judicial office, and should be equally free from interference due to political changes.”¹⁰

The reality of a DCI’s tenure was otherwise. The average time they served was just over three years, and only five DCIs stayed at least four. It is a tribute to the DCIs and all the intelligence professionals they led under 11 administrations over nearly six decades that they were able to accomplish as much as they did despite all the bureaucratic disruptions.

The frequency of these “regime changes” at the CIA must further be considered in light of the fact that most new DCIs had next to no time to settle in and read in. Over half had to face foreign policy or intelligence-related crises within their first month. These included: the Chinese invasion of North Korea in 1950; the death of Stalin in 1953; the US military incursion into the Dominican Republic in 1965; France’s withdrawal from NATO and a marked upsurge in the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966; the Yom Kippur war and the fall of the Allende regime in Chile in 1973; the publication of the leaked Pike Committee report in 1976; the breakdown in the SALT II talks in 1977; a military coup attempt in recently democratized Spain in 1981; the assassination of the Lebanese prime minister in 1987; the official breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991; and a deadly terrorist attack in Egypt in 2004.

In other instances, major events immediately preceded the DCI’s arrival: the signing of the Vietnam War peace accords in 1973 and the terrorist shootings outside the CIA headquarters compound in 1993. Soon after his appointment in 1950, Walter Bedell Smith said, “I expect the worst and I am sure I won’t be disappointed.”¹¹ Most subsequent DCIs likewise were not. Perhaps the best advice they could have received from the presidents who picked them was, “Be ready to hit the ground running.”

Who were the DCIs? President Eisenhower called the CIA “one of the most peculiar types of operation[s] any government can have” and said “it probably takes a strange kind of genius to run it.”¹² Whatever the validity of that characterization, these are the salient demographic facts about the 19 DCIs:¹³

- ✦ They were born in 14 different states. Most hailed from the Midwest (nine) and the Northeast (seven). One was born in the Southwest, one in the West, and one overseas.
- ✦ They attended 21 different colleges, universities, and graduate or professional schools. Eight finished college, and ten others went on for post-graduate degrees. One, “Beetle” Smith, completed only high school. Considering that he ended his public service with four stars and an ambassadorship, he could be called the Horatio Alger of DCIs.
- ✦ Before their appointments, the DCIs came from a variety of walks of life, some from more than one. Six were from the military, eight had been government officials and/or lawyers, three had been businessmen, and four came from politics, academe, or journalism. All three branches of govern-

ment were represented, as were three of five military services.

- Two-thirds of the DCIs had direct experience with intelligence in military or civilian life before their appointments. One served in the OSS (William Casey), two in the CIA (Robert Gates and Porter Goss), and three in both (Dulles, Helms, and William Colby).
- The DCIs' average age at the time of their appointment was slightly under 55. The youngest was 43 (James Schlesinger); the oldest was 67 (Casey).

HISTORIANS AND DCIs

An inconsistency exists between the fairly extensive bibliography on DCIs and historians' evaluation of their personal contribution to US national security. Nearly as many biographies have been written about DCIs as about comparable members of the American foreign policy community—the secretaries of state and defense, the presidents' national security advisers, and the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the 19 heads of the largest agglomeration of secret services in what used to be called the Free World generally have not been perceived as being nearly as influential as most of their counterparts.

Historians have regarded a number of secretaries of state and defense—notably George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and Henry Kissinger—as major players in the diplomatic and military developments of their times, as is at least one national security adviser, Kissinger. The DCIs are another matter. Only two, Dulles and Casey, usually are considered to have had

an impact rivaling that of the other top foreign policy officials in the administrations in which they served. The rest rarely get mentioned in most foreign affairs surveys (although Helms and Colby may come up when the Agency's "time of troubles" in the 1970s is discussed). Even in overviews of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, only a handful—Hoyt Vandenberg, Smith, Dulles, McCone, Casey, and possibly Helms—are portrayed as making noteworthy contributions to the way the US government conducts intelligence activity.

That consensus may derive from conceptions of the proper place of intelligence practitioners in the foreign policy process. Intelligence, the premise goes, should be detached from policy so as to avoid cross-corruption of either. If intelligence services have a stake in policy, they may skew their analyses or become aggressive advocates of covert action. The Intelligence Community must remain a source of objective assessment and not become a politicized instrument of the incumbent administration. As heads of the Community, DCIs should be "intellocrats" who administer specialized secret functions, not to benefit any departmental interests but to advance policies set elsewhere in the executive branch—specifically, the White House.

The DCIs reported to the National Security Council and truly served at the pleasure of the president. Indeed, much of every DCI's influence was directly proportional to his personal relationship with the chief executive. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, after incoming presidents began choosing "their" DCIs in 1977, the nonpartisan stature of the DCI diminished and, along with it, his independence. The general rule of "new president, new DCI" did not always translate

into greater influence. The president's national security adviser and the secretaries of state and defense usually still had more access to the Oval Office.

The situation was not much different at Langley. Directors came and went, but bureaucracies stayed. When DCIs tried to “clean house” (Schlesinger and Stansfield Turner) or manage through loyalists from previous jobs (Turner and John Deutch), the result was administrative disarray and low morale. For these reasons and more, no DCI ever had a chance to become as autonomous as J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI, or to be assessed as having more than an episodic impact on US foreign policy achievements.

A LEADERSHIP TYPOLOGY

Can DCIs, then, be regarded as **leaders**, as opposed to heads of organizations or chief administrators? Was US intelligence noticeably different because a certain individual served as DCI? Did DCIs have—**could** they have had—a leadership role commensurate with that of their counterparts at the Departments of State and Defense? One way to begin answering those questions is through serial biography and group analysis. In contrast to clandestine services officers, however, DCIs have not been examined in such a fashion. They do not fit into categories like “prudent professionals” and “bold easterners,” and they lack the sociological homogeneity needed to be thought of, or to think of themselves as, a network of “old boys” or, in William Colby's words, “the cream of the academic and social aristocracy.” Biographers attached those labels largely to former operators in the Office of Strategic Services who joined the early CIA and then stayed on—a situation that ap-

plies to only three DCIs (Dulles, Helms, and Colby).¹⁴

This heterogeneity does not mean, however, that the DCIs cannot be analyzed collectively. At least some aspects of the many models applied to political and corporate leaders can be used with the DCIs, although empiricism or utility may suffer—complex personalities and complicated situations are sometimes made less square to fit more easily into the models' round holes, or so many different holes are created that comparisons among individuals become too hard to draw.

A straightforward approach to the DCIs would take into account the institutional and political limitations on their authority, the objectives they were appointed to accomplish, and the personality traits they exhibited and managerial methods they used during their tenures. What were the directors told to do (mission) and how did they go about doing it (style)? With those questions addressed, an evaluation of their effectiveness can be made. How well did the DCIs do what they were expected to do, given their authorities, resources, and access (record)? What “types” of DCIs, if any, have been most successful (patterns)?

Using this perspective, five varieties of DCIs are evident. The first is the administrator-custodian or administrator-technocrat, charged with implementing, fine-tuning, or reorienting intelligence activities under close direction from the White House. Examples of this type have been Souers, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, William Raborn, Woolsey, Deutch, and George Tenet. Usually appointed at a time of uncertainty about the Intelligence Community's roles and capabilities (the late 1940s and the mid-1990s), these DCIs tried

to maintain stability in the CIA's relationships with other Community agencies, Congress, and the public. Their main goal was to do better with what they already had, and to avoid distractions and scandals. Except for Raborn, all of these administrators had experience with intelligence affairs, but they were not intelligence careerists. Some had a very low-key style, almost to the point of acting like placeholders and time-servers (Hillenkoetter, Raborn). Others energetically pursued administrative changes designed to make the CIA and the Community more responsive to policymakers and better adapted to a new political environment (Deutch, Tenet).


The next type is the intelligence operator—DCIs who were current or former professional intelligence officers tasked with devising, undertaking, and overseeing an extensive array of covert action, espionage, and counterintelligence programs in aggressive pursuit of US national security policy. Three DCIs fit this category: Dulles, Helms, and Casey. The presidents they served had no qualms about using all of the US government's clandestine capabilities against America's adversaries,

and they relied on their DCIs' knowledge of and experience with operations to help them accomplish that end. The DCI as intelligence operator may have emphasized different secret activities depending on individual backgrounds and predilections, and the targets they worked against. For example, Dulles and Casey were devotees of covert action, while Helms preferred to work with espionage and counterintelligence. Because of the prominent place clandestine affairs had in American foreign policy when they served, this type of DCI generally served longer by far—seven years on average—than any other type.

The high level of secret activity during those long tenures recurrently produced operational mishaps, revelations of “flaps,” and other intelligence failures that hurt the CIA's public reputation and damaged its relations with the White House and Congress. The Bay of Pigs disaster under Dulles, the ineffective covert action in Chile under Helms, and the Iran-Contra scandal under Casey are prominent examples. As journalist James Reston noted during the Agency's dark days in the mid-1970s, DCIs who came up through the ranks might have known more about what CIA should be doing than outsiders, “but they are not likely to be the best men at knowing what it should not be doing.”¹⁵

Failures, indiscretions, and other such controversies in turn have led to the departures of those intelligence-operator DCIs and their replacement by manager-reformers charged with “cleaning up the mess” and preventing similar problems from happening again. There have been two kinds of manager-reformer DCIs. One is the insider—a career intelligence officer who used his experience at the CIA to reorganize its bureaucracy and redirect its

TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN OFFICE FOR DCI/A'S, SOUERS THROUGH GOSS



*21 April 2005, Goss became Director, Central Intelligence Agency after Negroponte took leadership of the US Intelligence Community.

activities during or after a time of political controversy and lack of certitude about its direction. Two DCIs functioned as manager-reformer insiders: Colby and Gates. Colby, an operations veteran with a career dating back to the OSS, sought to rescue the CIA from the political tempests of the mid-1970s and to regain some of the Agency's lost prestige through his policy of controlled cooperation with congressional investigators and targeted termination of questionable activities. Gates, a longtime Soviet analyst who had worked on the NSC in two administrations and also served as deputy director for intelligence, moved the Agency into the post-Cold War era after a period of undynamic leadership.

The other type of manager-reformer is the outsider, who was chosen because of his experience in the military, business, government, or politics to implement a major reorganization of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, or to regroup and redirect the Agency, especially after major operational setbacks or public conflicts over secret activities. Six DCIs were manager-reformer outsiders: Vandenberg, Smith, McCone, Schlesinger, Turner, and Porter Goss. Collectively, they were responsible for more major changes at the CIA (or its predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group [CIG]) than any other category of director. For example, under Vandenberg, the CIG acquired its own budgetary and personnel authority, received responsibility for collecting all foreign intelligence (including atomic secrets) and preparing national intelligence analyses, and coordinated all interdepartmental intelligence activities. Smith—in response to intelligence failures before the Korean War and to infighting among operations officers—centralized espionage and covert actions, analysis, and administration by

rearranging the CIA into three directorates and creating the Office of National Estimates. In effect, he organized the Agency into the shape it has today.

Schlesinger and Turner facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine services veterans in their quests to streamline the Agency's bureaucracy, lower the profile of covert action, and move the CIA more toward analysis and technical collection. Goss was the only one in the group who had previously worked at the Agency, but he was selected because he headed the intelligence oversight committee in the House of Representatives. Taking over during imbroglios over collection and analytic failures connected with the 9/11 terrorist attacks and assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, he set about revamping the Agency's work on international terrorism. Most DCIs in this category were far more concerned about achieving their objectives quickly than about angering bureaucratic rivals or fostering ill will among subordinates. Largely because they accomplished so much—or tried to—and did not worry about whom they antagonized along the way, some of them were among the most disliked or hardest to get along with DCIs.

Finally, there are the restorers: George Bush and William Webster. Like the manager-reformer outsiders, they became DCIs after the Agency went through difficult times—they succeeded Colby and Casey, respectively—but they were not charged with making significant changes in the way the CIA did business. Instead, they used their "people skills" and public reputations to raise morale, repair political damage, and burnish the Agency's reputation. Bush, a prominent figure in Republican Party politics, went to Langley to mend the CIA's

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