

You Cannot Surge Trust

**Combined Naval Operations of the Royal Australian Navy,
Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and United States Navy, 1991–2003**



Gary E. Weir, Principal Investigator
Sandra J. Doyle, Editor

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FRONT COVER: USS *Ronald Reagan* (CVN 76) leads a formation of ships from several allied navies in the Pacific Ocean during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the world's largest multinational maritime exercise, 24 July 2010. *MCI Scott Taylor*



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CONTENTS

Foreword	vii
<i>Henry J. Hendrix II</i>	
Preface	
An International City at Sea.....	ix
<i>Gary E. Weir</i>	
Contributors	xiii
Introduction	
The Combined Framework: How Naval Powers Deal with Military Operations Other Than War.....	1
<i>Sarandis Papadopoulos</i>	
Chapter 1	
The U.S. Navy's Role in Coalition Maritime Interception Operations in the Arabian Gulf Region, 1991–2001.....	23
<i>Jeffrey G. Barlow</i>	
Chapter 2	
Royal Navy Operations off the Former Yugoslavia: Operation Sharp Guard, 1991–1996	45
<i>Stephen Prince and Kate Brett</i>	
Chapter 3	
The U.S. Navy's Contribution to Operation Sharp Guard	83
<i>Sarandis Papadopoulos</i>	
Chapter 4	
The Combined Naval Role in East Timor.....	101
<i>David Stevens</i>	
Chapter 5	
A Limited Commitment to Ending Civil Strife: The U.S. Navy in Operation Stabilise.....	149
<i>Sarandis Papadopoulos</i>	
Chapter 6	
The U.S. Navy's Role in Coalition Maritime Interception in Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001–2002.....	167
<i>Jeffrey G. Barlow</i>	

Chapter 7

The Canadian Navy, Interoperability, and U.S. Navy-Led
Operations in the Gulf Region from the First Gulf War to 2003..... 189

Robert H. Caldwell

Summary 279

Edward J. Marolda

Conclusion 295

Sarandis Papadopoulos

Acronyms 309

Index 315

FOREWORD

As our nation and our Navy shift their focus away from the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have so dominated our internal conversations for more than a decade and pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, it is most appropriate that this study, *You Cannot Surge Trust*, should make its appearance. The assembled authors, under the assured editorial hand of Sandra Doyle, bring forward a series of episodes that demonstrate the evolving and increasingly important nature of maritime coalition operations around the world. Beginning with a look at maritime interception operations in the Arabian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this work moves forward through the post-Cold War era to include recent operations in the Middle East and central Asia. Written from a multinational point of view, the analysis suggests that nations, even superpowers, are increasingly dependent upon each other for support during major combat operations and that only by frequent consultation, exercises, cooperation in technology development, and understanding of force structure capabilities will future maritime coalitions be successful.

This study also advances a larger argument regarding the relevance of naval and maritime history in defense policy development. The challenges faced by coalition forces during the 1991 to 2005 period are not so different from what confronted those who sailed before. The crews of Continental Navy ships during the American Revolution had difficulty keeping up with French ships owing to differences in the size of the respective fleets and individual ship design. During World Wars I and II the U.S. and Royal navies consistently had to overcome problems inherent in differences in classification and communications. Lastly, in the increasingly geopolitical complexities of modern warfare, illustrated by our experiences operating alongside allies in Korea and Vietnam, history reveals that the different rules of engagement under which nations exercise their forces can cause conflicts within a partnership—even as the partners prosecute a conflict. Each of these issues has been raised before, each is examined within *You Cannot Surge Trust*, and each will raise its head again in some future hostility. To the extent that decision makers review history and anticipate

the future they can anticipate success. Ignorance of the past necessarily results in a painful fate of rediscovering lessons hard learned.

It is through the efforts of such distinguished historians as Randy Papadopoulos, Jeffrey Barlow, Stephen Prince, Kate Brett, David Stevens, Robert Caldwell, and Edward Marolda under the research direction of Gary Weir that the lessons of the era encompassing my own operational career have been captured for those who follow to study. Given the steadily shrinking periods of peace between conflicts in the modern world, “those who follow” should begin reading now.

This work, as well as many others, would not have been possible without the concerted effort and the deep well of experience that Ms. Doyle brought to the task. This past January Ms. Doyle closed out a 31-year career in government service. During that time she had a hand in the publication of more than 70 printed works which were a key component of the Naval History and Heritage Command’s (and its predecessor, the Naval Historical Center) mission of creating and delivering relevant historical knowledge to key decision makers. That Ms. Doyle did all this while operating quietly behind the scenes to help scholars and analysts present their work in a professional and polished manner is to her infinite credit, and to our collective benefit.

Henry J. Hendrix II
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ph.D.)
Director of Naval History

An International City at Sea

With the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 and the subsequent debate in the United States about the *coalition of the willing*, a group of historians at the Naval Historical Center (now the Naval History and Heritage Command) joined the discussion by reflecting on the nature of effective coalitions. As head of the Contemporary History Branch during the opening phases of OIF, I asked the historians to consider recent coalitions engaging in *combined* naval operations. Under what circumstances did various national command authorities adopt a *combined* solution to an external threat rather than acting alone? What did these international coalitions look like? What assets and talents did the combined force need? Did efforts of this sort in the recent past work effectively given the mission? What critical factors contributed to the success or failure of the combined effort?

We soon realized that historical analysis, approaching problems as it does from the humanities perspective, could address these questions in an informative, unique, and stimulating way. Thus the growing public debate presented us with an unexpected opportunity to apply history directly to immediate naval needs in an age defined, in part, by 11 September 2001. In the end, the subject matter, the ongoing public debate, and the opportunity to apply historical methodology proved too compelling to remain as an informal discussion of combined operations.

Although initially conceived as an American project, it seemed counterproductive not to seek out other naval history programs officially pressed and intellectually stimulated by the same issues and possibilities. I asked a good friend, Michael Whitby of the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) in Ottawa, to reflect on the possible profit in informing the present by evaluating naval coalition experiences of the recent past. Together, we and other colleagues might examine a few select combined operations as case studies. Did he think my scheme worthwhile given the current interests of his navy and, perhaps more important, would the proposal interest his director, Dr. Serge Bernier?

I laid before him a plan to initiate a project involving four national navies, frequent allies, to examine historically the nature of naval combined

operations. The project would endeavor to derive conclusions and lessons that serving naval officers might find immediately useful in their efforts to address their missions in the Near East. My plans called for participation by Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.

Dr. Bernier emerged from his discussion with Michael and DHH Senior Historian Dr. Steven Harris convinced that the proposal had merit. He assigned one of his more capable people, Robert Caldwell, as the Canadian member of the team. With the credibility provided by Dr. Bernier's generosity and willingness to take a measured risk, I recruited the balance of the team in 2003: Stephen Prince, who came to us courtesy of Captain Christopher Page, RN (Ret.), then the director of the Royal Navy's Naval Historical Branch in Portsmouth, United Kingdom; Dr. David Stevens of the Royal Australian Navy's Sea Power Centre in Canberra; and Drs. Jeffrey Barlow and Randy Papadopoulos from the Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Bernier's faith also helped me achieve two important goals. I convinced then Director of Naval History Dr. William Dudley of the viability and value of the applied history project we proposed. With his help we made a successful application to the Naval Historical Foundation for a grant that sustained this effort and made the collaboration possible. Retired Vice Admiral Robert Dunn, president of the foundation, and his executive director, Captain Charles Todd Creekman, USN (Ret.), smoothed our way and contributed substantively to the positive outcome of the project.

An inaugural team meeting in 2004 hosted by DHH on a cold winter day in Ottawa determined the best and most evocative cases for study. Within the 1991–2003 timeframe, our historians would look at maritime interception operations in the 1990–1991 Gulf War and in Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001–2003; Operation Stabilise, the United Nations-mandated action to bring peace to East Timor in 1999; and Operation Sharp Guard in ethnically torn Yugoslavia through 1996.

We designed this study to remind policymakers, strategists, and operators living in a 21st-century coalition world of the very *human* nature of combined operations. While technology enables naval action, combined operations emerge from these pages as a human endeavor, based upon personal and professional relationships formed and reformed by sailors of all ranks across national and cultural boundaries.

In these pages communication and trust become paramount. Without the trust engendered by effective, well-trained liaison officers and frequent collaborative exercises at sea, combined operations become an exercise in futility. Deliberate and frequent contact allows people to broker the mutual understanding that served Admiral Lord Nelson so well within his own fleet two centuries ago and has become even more necessary given the potential contemporary barriers of language, culture, technology, and operational experience. The history of recent combined operations repeatedly speaks to these critical, but often overlooked, personal characteristics. *You Cannot Surge Trust* brings history to engaged naval forces as an essential professional tool that can help address current operational problems by more completely revealing the nature of coalition war.

National navies of the 21st century rarely look to history to provide this service. Thus historians recall with some envy the role played by historian and strategist Sir Julian Corbett in educating and advising the leadership of the Royal Navy at the turn of the 20th century. His applied history became critical to understanding the adversary and planning accordingly. Considering a formula in 1914 that might lure Kaiser Wilhelm's High Seas Fleet out of its secure bases and into a decisive defeat, Admiral Sir John Fisher repeatedly looked to Corbett for insights into German military behavior that extended as far back as England's participation in the Seven Years War (1756–1763), a conflict once described by Winston Churchill as the first true world war. Fisher concluded that only by actually or apparently threatening the German Baltic coast would Great Britain pose a threat sufficient to precipitate a decisive encounter at sea between the two major fleets. Drawing much of his preliminary planning from historical analysis, Fisher then asked his historical partner to prepare a paper on employing the fleet to gain control of the Baltic. With a nearly unrivaled knowledge of history across the entire Royal Navy experience and access to both Fisher and the sources emerging from the current war, Corbett complied. He provided the admiral with a conceptual foundation, resonating with past experience, which supported fleet expansion as well as the distribution and commitment of valuable assets.*

The relationship between Corbett and Fisher proved not only constructive but essential to the Royal Navy. The team composing this

volume suggests that this relationship remains every bit as essential in this new century, in spite of a reluctance within modern navies to follow Fisher's lead in permitting past human behavior to inform the present. In our own time, advanced technology and its solutions represent the present and future in an immediate and dynamic way. For many, history pales by comparison. Indeed, to use history a la Corbett and Fisher implies that the participant has become an artifact rather than a modern player. In response the historian asks, can technology provide an understanding of our own professional behavior and that of our adversary, as well as insight into the very nature of a war currently claiming precious lives? Is our capable technology truly effective without such understanding? Naval ships and weapons systems can only serve as outward tools and choices. Only sailors and their support cast form the *substance* of any naval endeavor. Our team created this volume to demonstrate that through humanities analysis the historian can make common human experience speak in ways the contemporary sailor can immediately apply at sea. If those who waged the Seven Years War can inform and influence naval strategy nearly two centuries later in the Great War, who are we to ignore an invitation to have a historical conversation with those involved in combined operations over past last two decades?

The proposed 1,000-ship navy coalition, this *international city at sea* so essential to the vision of the maritime future first embraced by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen, will not take shape without the aforementioned historical conversation. The level of international professional intimacy required to achieve or even approach Admiral Mullen's goal makes implementing the conclusions of the present volume necessary. If navies intend to keep the ocean open in an age of pervasive terrorism, combined operations regularly informed by official and professional historical perspective must become a permanent and essential part of naval practice.

Dr. Gary E. Weir
Chief Historian
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

**The discussion of Julian Corbett owes a great deal to email exchanges with Professor Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History at King's College London.*

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), Washington, D.C., graduated in history from Westminster College (Pennsylvania) and in international studies from the University of South Carolina. His 1981 Ph.D. dissertation analyzed the role of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy administration. Prior to coming to NHHC, he served as a defense analyst with the Heritage Foundation on Capitol Hill and as a military analyst for the National Institute for Public Policy/National Security Research. For the past 25 years he has been a historian at NHHC. The author of the award-winning book *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950* (1994), he has written more than a dozen chapters for books dealing with World War II and the Cold War. His book *From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955*, was published by Stanford University Press in January 2009.

Kate Brett is Historian and Curator at the Naval Historical Branch, Naval Staff, U.K. Ministry of Defence, based in Portsmouth. She graduated in English and German from the University of Exeter and completed a master's degree in museology from the University of East Anglia before joining the Naval Historical Branch as Curator in 1998. Working both with headquarters and the front line, she manages the Royal Navy's operational recordkeeping system, providing comment and analysis on the most recent phases of naval history and contributing evidence to support significant decisions on policy and procurement. She conducts research on the Royal Navy's contemporary role in offshore patrol, counterpiracy, and counternarcotics operations. She also has a leading role in unifying Royal Navy scientific and historical research.

Robert H. Caldwell of the Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario, served in the Canadian Army for 35 years. He completed technical and general staff courses at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham, the British Army Staff College at Camberley, and the Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum. He passed the Master of Arts program in War Studies at the Royal Military College at Kingston in 1987, and thereafter was employed as a researcher and historian at the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment,

followed by the Directorate of History and Heritage, in National Defence Headquarters. Mr. Caldwell has been a member of the Naval History Team for 17 years, and he is a contributing author for two books comprising the official history of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War. He has completed several studies for the forthcoming postwar naval history. Since 2006, Mr. Caldwell has worked with the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan on the preparations for the official history.

Sandra J. Doyle, senior editor of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), graduated in history from Marymount College, Tarrytown, New York, and trained in professional editing at the George Washington University and EEI Communications. During her 30-year career, first as a naval historian compiling a history of U.S. naval operations in Vietnam and then as a writer-editor, she has guided through the publication process more than 70 works on 20th- and 21st-century U.S. naval operations, strategy, science, and policy. Authors of 12 of these works have received book awards from academic societies. She is coeditor of the NHHC series on the U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War. Ms. Doyle retired in January 2013.

Dr. Edward J. Marolda retired in September 2008 after 40 years of federal service with the Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C. Dr. Marolda served at one time or another as Acting Director of Naval History, Senior Historian, and Chief of Histories and Archives Division. He graduated from Pennsylvania Military College in 1967 with a bachelor of arts degree in history and served as a U.S. Army officer in the Republic of Vietnam from 1969 to 1970. He completed a master's degree at Georgetown University in 1971 and a doctorate at the George Washington University in 1990. He has authored, coauthored, or edited 12 books, including *By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the United States Navy and the War in Southeast Asia* (1994); *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War* (coauthor Robert J. Schneller Jr., 1998); *The U.S. Navy in the Korean War* (editor, 2007); and *The Approaching Storm: Conflict in Asia, 1945–1965* (2009), the first issue in a series on the U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War, which he coedits with Sandra Doyle. Marolda serves as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and as a consultant for the Cold War Gallery of the National

Museum of the U.S. Navy. His latest book *Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet* was published in 2012.

Dr. Sarandis (Randy) Papadopoulos is the Secretariat Historian, Office of the Undersecretary of the Navy. Before assuming that position in April 2010, he spent ten years as a historian in the Contemporary History Branch of the former Naval Historical Center, now the Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C. He studied at the University of Toronto, the University of Alabama, and the George Washington University. His Ph.D. dissertation, “Feeding the Sharks: The Logistics of Undersea Warfare, 1935–1945,” compares the German and U.S. submarine services. Between 1999 and 2010 he taught history at the George Washington University, Norwich University, and the University of Maryland University College. He is a principal coauthor of the book *Pentagon 9/11* published by the Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2007, and the author of several journal articles, book reviews, and contributions to reference works. He is the Region III Coordinator for the Society for Military History and chairs the Military Classics Seminar at Fort Myer, Virginia.

Stephen Prince heads the Naval Historical Branch, Naval Staff, U.K. Ministry of Defence, based in Portsmouth. He is a graduate of Warwick University and King’s College London, where he received the Russell Prize for the best M.A. performance. He has been Sir Robert Menzies Scholar at the Australian War Memorial, lecturer at Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, senior lecturer at the U.K.’s Joint Services Command and Staff College, and a historian in the Naval Historical Branch. His publications include articles in the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Defense Analysis* and the *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, as well as his book *Raiding Zeebrugge* (2010). He has been Directing Staff for more than 50 British and International Defence training exercises from the Falkland Islands to Turkey. In 2006 he was deployed as the War Diarist for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Dr. David Stevens is Director of Strategic and Historical Studies within the Sea Power Centre–Australia, Canberra. He has contributed articles and essays to many publications, and his work has been translated

into several languages. His most recent publications include *A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia's Maritime Defence, 1915–54* (2005); *The Royal Australian Navy: A History* (coauthor, 2006); *Australia's Navy in the Gulf* (coauthor, 2006); *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II* (editor, 2d ed., 2005); *The Face of Naval Battle: The Human Experience of Modern War at Sea* (coeditor, 2003); *The Navy and the Nation* (coeditor, 2005); and *Sea Power Ashore and In the Air* (coeditor, 2007).

Dr. Gary E. Weir of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) served a year on the U.S. Naval Academy history faculty, in 1986–1987, before joining the Naval History and Heritage Command. He served 19 years as a historian and then head of the former Contemporary History Branch. He is the NGA chief historian, a professor of history with the University of Maryland University College, and a guest investigator with the Marine Policy Center of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. His published works include *An Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environment* (2001), winner of the Organization of American Historians' Richard Leopold Prize; and *Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines that Fought the Cold War* (coauthor, 2003). Dr. Weir created and led the Combined Operations Project from its inception in 2004.

A word about usage and editorial decisions

In general American English is used in the text except when it comes to formal names of Commonwealth institutions, titles of source materials, and Operation Stabilise named by the Royal Australian Navy. National definitions for the term MIO alternate between Maritime Interdiction Operations and Maritime Interception Operations. For purposes of clarity, note that these terms are used interchangeably throughout the work. U.S. sources often use the term Persian Gulf War to refer to the First Gulf War (or simply Gulf War) of 1990–1991, but in general the latter terms are used herein. For operational purposes, the U.S. Navy and its allies refer to the body of water geographically known as the Persian Gulf as the Arabian Gulf, the Northern Arabian Gulf, and the Southern Arabian Gulf to describe operations in those waters.

The Combined Framework: How Naval Powers Deal with Military Operations Other Than War

Sarandis Papadopoulos

In the aftermath of the Cold War political leaders and other analysts in the developed world suggested the rise of a period marked by a relative quiescence. The end of the East-West rivalry offered a diminution of military activity, resulting from the lowering of tensions, and a “peace dividend,” with money saved from lower armed services’ budgets. Despite such hopes, the decade of the 1990s and the first two years of the 21st century saw an intensification of activity for military forces, specifically the navies of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Operating “combined,” that is as parts of multinational forces, three or four of these services enforced United Nations sanctions against Iraq for more than a decade, did the same against the former Yugoslav republics during their breakup between 1993 and 1996, landed and supported ground forces in East Timor in 1999, and in late 2001 launched a new worldwide campaign to combat terrorism. These navies worked continually alongside one another, sometimes operating within coalitions of more than a dozen allied nations. Their capability to do so reflected a longstanding commitment to developing the methods, technical needs, and exercises required to make complex naval operations work.

In studying the spectrum of armed conflict below major combat operations, analysts of naval operations contend with a significant constraint: their most common subject of study, the elements of sea power, loses autonomy. The focus on the primacy of the warship, or of sea battle,

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