Preparing for Martial Law: Through the Eyes of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski by Central Intelligence Agency - HTML preview

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Documents Provided By Col. Ryszard Kuklinski Regarding

Planning for and Implementation of Martial Law in Poland on

13 December 1981

Between July 980 and December 3, 98, Poland stumbled through the most serious political crisis faced by a Warsaw Pact member since the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 968. The resolution of this crisis through the declaration of martial law by the Polish authorities provided only a temporary respite. The rise and suppression of the trade union Solidarity, followed by the inability of Polish communist authorities to restore political credibility or economic activity, were key developments that created the conditions that led to the eventual collapse of the Warsaw Pact by the end of the decade.

On one side was a Polish society deeply disenchanted with its political system and the mismanagement of its economy that resulted in increased deprivation in the late 970’s. Initial strikes in July and August 980 protesting relatively mild increases in meat prices escalated as workers vowed not to accept near-term promises by the authorities. For the first time in post-war Poland, workers were joined by intellectuals bent on changing the broader political system. The meteoric and chaotic rise of Solidarity resulted in a mass movement with increasing determination to pursue fundamental change.

Facing this unprecedented development was a communist party apparatus with limited support, even from its members, and one that was lulled into lethargy by the vain hope of restoring calm with the time-tested tactic of buying off the opposition. Senior political and military authorities were averse to using force in the early months because of the memories of the deaths of shipyard workers during the uprisings in the Gdansk shipyards in December 970. As events spiraled out of control during the 8 months of the crisis, powers that be engaged in lengthy discussions of whether, when, and how Polish authorities could impose order through martial law. This discussion was strongly influenced by the hard line taken by Soviet political and military leaders who continually and arrogantly pushed Polish authorities to immediately resort to force. Soviet officials not so subtly tried to intimidate Polish authorities by implying that they would use both their own forces in addition to other Warsaw Pact forces to restore order (if necessary).

Partly out of consideration for self preservation and partly as a result of intense Soviet pressure, Polish authorities slowly and sometimes grudgingly proceeded with operational planning to introduce martial law. These plans, including all the required legal documentation, were essentially completed by the fall of 98.

In 97, Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff, volunteered his services to the United States at a time of increased friction between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World (see the book A Secret Life by Benjamin Weiser). Over the coming years, Kuklinski provided the CIA with thousands of pieces of key information regarding the Warsaw Pact. During the Polish crisis he continued to provide such information and also provided information and commentary regarding internal Polish developments and Soviet pressures. Located on the DVD are the declassified documents. A description of the documents follow:

  • 1 document from 977 outlining governmental tasks in the event of a threat to national security
  • 18 documents in which Kuklinski reports information and impressions gained from his close contacts on the Polish General Staff and from contact with Soviet officers
  • 42 reports which relay various official documents to which Kuklinski had access, including many of the planning documents
  • 16 reports based on Kuklinski’s information and thoughts disseminated after the declaration of martial law
  • 2 assessments provided by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence on the status of preparations for martial law
  • 1 report, prepared by Kuklinski in the United States in 983, in which he provides his thoughts regarding General Jaruzelski