

CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES:

THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING



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Editors



HISTORICAL
COLLECTIONS

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Scope Note

This study focuses on the contribution of clandestine source reporting to the production of finished intelligence on the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine, strategy, capabilities, and intentions during the period 1955–85. It examines products of CIA and national intelligence estimates (NIEs) of the Intelligence Community (IC) writ large. It includes more than 1,000 declassified CIA clandestine reports and CIA finished intelligence publications. Some of the finished intelligence publications were produced after 1985, but none of the clandestine reports. Although the focus of the study is on the contributions of clandestine human sources, the clandestine and covert technical operations such as the U-2 and satellite reconnaissance programs yielded a treasure trove of information that was incorporated in CIA's analysis. Chapter V illustrates the special significance of those reconnaissance programs for the solution of some important problems in the 1960s but those programs yielded essential information throughout the thirty year period studied.

The analytical reports featured in the study are generally the results of long-term research using all sources of information. With some exceptions, the study excludes CIA current intelligence reporting. Nor does it address intelligence on Warsaw Pact naval forces or Soviet strategic forces, the great contributions of signals intelligence (SIGINT), or intelligence from the US Army, Navy, or Air Force. The services' intelligence components played important roles, for example, as the principal contributors to the military-focused NIEs for the period 1955–61, with the exception

of the military-related economic and scientific estimating and in accord with the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID)¹ of the time. This study also does not specifically address the contributions of economic, political, weapons, or scientific intelligence efforts, but it does, as appropriate attend to the operational and strategic consequences of those efforts. It only generally discusses intelligence support for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations.

The study refers to many documents provided by clandestine sources; these references are generally meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Finally, the study includes historical material to provide a general context for discussing the intelligence. It is not intended, however, to be a definitive history of the times.

The authors owe a debt of gratitude to the many intelligence officers who painstakingly sifted through the not always well-organized archives for documents sometimes 50 or more years old. They especially note the assistance of officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for searching their archives for CIA reports the authors were unable to locate in CIA archives.

This essay was produced by Joan and John Bird.

¹ See NSCID No.3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 13 January 1948, and NSCID No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 21 April 1958 for details of the responsibilities of the CIA and other intelligence departments and agencies of the US government. NSCID No. 3 limited the role of CIA to economic and scientific analysis, making the military services responsible for all military intelligence. The 1958 revised version broadened the areas for which the CIA could produce intelligence.

Session of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, December 1981



Introduction

The Soviet Union established itself as a threat to the West by its military occupation of Poland and other eastern European countries at the end of World War II and through the unsuccessful attempts by its armed proxies to capture Greece and South Korea. Its unceasing attempts to subvert governments throughout Western Europe and America, and later through the “wars of national liberation” cast a shadow over everyday life in the West. The massive Soviet armed forces stationed in central Europe stood behind its political offensives such as the Berlin Crises. The West countered with the formation of NATO and the acceptance into NATO, and rebuilding of, West Germany. During the same period that the West welcomed West Germany into NATO, the Soviets established – through the Warsaw Treaty of May 1955 – a formal military bloc of Communist nations.

This study continues CIA’s effort to provide the public with a more detailed record of the intelligence derived from clandestine human and technical sources that was provided to US policymakers and used to assess the political and military balances and confrontations in Central Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. Finished intelligence², based on human and technical sources, was the basis for personal briefings of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and other cabinet members, and for broader distribution through NIEs. It is the opinion of the authors that the information considerably aided US efforts to preserve the peace at a bearable cost.

This study showcases the importance of clandestine source reporting to CIA’s analysis of the Warsaw Pact forces. This effort complements the CIA’s release of the “Caesar” series of studies³ and other significant CIA documents in 2007; and releases by other IC agencies. It also complements ongoing projects, including those of the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution and NATO that reexamine the Cold War in light of newly available documentation released by several former members of the Warsaw Pact.

The clandestine reports by the predecessor organizations of CIA’s current National Clandestine Service (NCS) are representative of those that at the time made especially valuable contributions to understanding the history, plans, and intentions of the Warsaw Pact. Many of these documents are being released for the first time. The clandestine source documents do not represent a complete record of contemporary intelligence collection. There was much information made available from émigrés and defectors as well as from imagery and SIGINT that was essential in the estimative process but is not the focus of this study.

The study includes NIEs that CIA has previously released. It also includes finished intelligence documents produced by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), some previously released, and the clandestinely obtained information upon which those reports were largely based. The DI reports were selected in part because they were the detailed basis of CIA contributions to NIEs that focused on the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact. The DI finished intelligence reports also provided the background for future current intelligence. Appended to this study is a collection of declassified intelligence documents relating to the Warsaw Pact’s military forces, operational planning, and capabilities. Although many of the documents were released in past years, new reviews have provided for the restoration of text previously redacted. All of the documents selected for this study are available on the attached DVD, on CIA’s website at http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections.asp or from the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) located at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD or contact us at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.

The finished intelligence during this period seldom linked the specific clandestine or other sources of evidence to the analysis based on their information. For example, the early intelligence documents often described clandestine sources only in the most general fashion. Rules to protect sources, especially the human agents, rarely allowed analysts to acknowledge a clandestine source, openly evaluate a source’s reliability, or describe a source’s access to the information. Only in publications of extremely limited distribution, for as few as a handful of recipients, were these rules relaxed. They changed little until the 1980s, when analysts could provide evaluations that included some sense of the source’s reliability and access.

The study lists in the Catalogue of Documents on the DVD important clandestine and covert source reports and finished intelligence publications by chapter. These documents are generally arrayed chronologically according to the dates of dissemination within the IC, not the dates of publication by the Soviets that sometimes were years earlier.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/> or contact us at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.

² Finished Intelligence is the CIA term for the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available all source information. ³ The Caesar Studies are analytic monographs and reference aids produced by the DI through the 1950s to the mid-1970s. They provided in-depth research on Soviet internal politics primarily intended to give insight on select political and economic issues and CIA analytic thinking of the period.

Frequently Used Acronyms

CPSU/CC	Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee
CSI	Center for the Study of Intelligence
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DI	Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DO	Directorate of Operations, 1973–2005 (CIA)
DP	Directorate of Plans, 1950s–1973 (CIA)
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States (A US Department of State History Series)
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
IC	Intelligence Community
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NCS	National Clandestine Service, 2005–present (CIA)
NIC	National Intelligence Council, established December 1979 (DCI)
NIC/WC	National Indications Center/Watch Committee, pre-1979 (DCI)
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPIC	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSC	National Security Council
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact [countries]
NTM	National Technical Means
OCI	Office of Current Intelligence (CIA)
OER	Office of Economic Research (CIA)
ONE	Office of National Estimates (CIA)
OPA	Office of Political Analysis (CIA)
ORR	Office of Research and Reports (CIA)
OSR	Office of Strategic Research (CIA)
PCC	Political Consultative Committee (Warsaw Treaty Organization)
SOVA	Office of Soviet Analysis (CIA)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRS	Senior Research Staff
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Warsaw Treaty



The founding document of the Warsaw Pact organization was signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955, and came into force on 6 June 1955. At the time, CIA analysts judged that Moscow had drafted the treaty without consulting its allies and had modeled it after the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (sometimes referred to as the Washington Treaty) that established NATO. CIA analysis showed that some clauses of the Warsaw Treaty appeared to be almost direct translations from the Washington Treaty and that both had similar provisions, for example, for joint action in case one of the signatories was attacked, recognition of the ultimate authority of the UN, and settlement of all disputes without use or threat of force. The combined military command seemed to be a facsimile of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).⁴ The treaty apparently was not crafted to override existing bilateral treaties of mutual assistance, friendship, and cooperation between Moscow and its allies, which were the basis for addressing Soviet security concerns in Europe at that time. CIA analysts believed that the Warsaw Treaty was set up primarily as a bargaining chip to obtain the dissolution of NATO. The following text of the treaty does not include the signature blocks.

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Republic.⁵

The Contracting Parties

Reaffirming their desire to create a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of all European States, irrespective their social and political structure, whereby the said States may be enabled to combine their efforts in the interests of ensuring peace in Europe;

Taking into consideration, at the same time, the situation that has come about in Europe as a result of the ratification of the Paris Agreements, which provide for the constitution of a new military group in the form of a "West European Union", with the participation of a remilitarized West Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, thereby increasing the danger of a new war and creating a threat to the national security of peace-loving States;

Being convinced that in these circumstances the peace-loving States of Europe must take the necessary steps to safeguard their security and to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe;

Being guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization;

In the interests of further strengthening and development of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of States and of non-intervention in their domestic affairs;

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: [not listed here]

who, having exhibited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare that they are prepared to participate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation in all international action for ensuring international peace and security, and will devote their full efforts to the realization of these aims.

In this connexion, the Contracting Parties shall endeavor to secure, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, the adoption of effective measures for the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult together on all important international questions involving their common interests, with a view to strengthening international peace and security.

Whenever any one of the Contracting Parties considers that a threat of armed attack on one or more of the States Parties to the Treaty has arisen, they shall consult together immediately with a view to providing for their joint defense and maintaining peace and security.

⁴ A comparison of the Warsaw Treaty with the 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO can be found in a study prepared by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence 22 years later, *The Warsaw Pact: Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs from Its Origin to the Present Day*, A Study for the Jackson Subcommittee, 5 May 1966 (See the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter VI, Document VI-13, Annex B, p B-1. ⁵ The text of the treaty was available through the FBIS Daily Report on 14 May 1955, but we do not have a copy of that report. The text of the treaty here is a UN English translation of the text of the treaty as registered at the UN by Poland on 10 October 1955.

Article 4

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the States Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of States, each State Party to the Treaty, shall, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, afford the State or States so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with the other States Parties to the Treaty, by all means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force. The States Parties to the Treaty shall consult together immediately concerning the joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken under this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. These measures shall be discontinued as soon as the Security Council takes the necessary action to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Unified Command, to which certain elements of their armed forces shall be allocated by agreement between the parties, and which shall act in accordance with jointly established principles. The Parties shall likewise take such other concerted action as may be necessary to reinforce their defensive strength, in order to defend the peaceful labour of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and afford protection against possible aggression.

Article 6

For the purpose of carrying out the consultations provided for in the present Treaty between the States Parties thereto, and for the consideration of matters arising in connexion with the application of the present Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be established, in which each State Party to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially appointed representative.

The Committee may establish such auxiliary organs as may prove to be necessary.

Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements the purposes of which are incompatible with the purposes of the present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their obligations under international treaties at present in force are not incompatible with the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and co-operation to promote the further development and strengthening of the economic and cultural ties among them, in accordance with the principles of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and of non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs.

Article 9

The present Treaty shall be open for accession by other States, irrespective of their social and political structure, which express their readiness, by participating in the present Treaty, to help in combining the efforts of the peace-loving states to ensure the peace and security of the peoples. Such accessions shall come into effect with the consent of the States Parties to the Treaty after the instruments of accession have been deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

Article 10

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People's Republic.

The Treaty shall come into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification. The Government of the Polish People's Republic shall inform the other States Parties to the Treaty of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

Article 11

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For contracting Parties which do not, one year before the expiration of that term, give notice of termination of the treaty to the government of the Polish People's Republic, the Treaty shall remain in force for a further ten years.

In the event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty concerning collective security, a goal which the Contracting Parties shall steadfastly strive to achieve, the Treaty shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the General European Treaty comes into force.

Done at Warsaw, this fourteenth day of May 1955, in one copy, in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be transmitted by the Government of the Polish People's Republic to all other Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

The Statute on Unified Command

A Statute on Unified Command was completed on 7 September 1955, but not approved, signed or ratified until March 18, 1980. It was kept secret by the USSR and was not available to CIA analysts in 1955.

*The Establishment of a Combined Command of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.*⁶

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory states have decided to establish a Combined Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states shall be subject to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states.

The Ministers of Defense or other military leaders of the signatory states are to serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of the participation of the German Democratic Republic in measures concerning the armed forces of the Joint Command will be examined at a later date.

A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and will include permanent representatives of the General Staffs of the signatory states.

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirement of their mutual defense.⁷



⁶ Ibid, Catalogue, Document VI-13, see Annex A, p A-5. ⁷ For additional information about the fate of this statute, see the Catalogue of Documents, Document VII-177.

CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

Warsaw Pact Countries, 1955-1991





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49. If the...
 tion of hostilities, they could...
 combat ready and 125 nonready divisions.
 the following would be in areas from which they could be...
 against NATO:

LOCATION	COMBAT READY DIVISIONS	NONREADY DIVISIONS
GSFG	20	
NGF	2	52
SGF	4	8
Western USSR	28	12
Northwest USSR	4	12
Southeast USSR	10	
	18	84
	86	



CHAPTER I

Early Khrushchev Period (1955-1960)

Changes in Soviet relations with the West after the death of Stalin and the consolidation of power by Nikita Khrushchev⁸ initially characterized this period. By deed and word Moscow offered prospects for détente. At the same time Khrushchev attempted to bully the West by exploiting the purported strength of Soviet military and economic superiority. Soviet actions included the signing of the Vienna Agreement (known formally as the Austrian State Treaty) freeing Austria of Soviet controls, which contrasted with his threats to “bury” the West, and explicit military confrontation over Berlin and Cuba between 1958 and 1962. Advances in military-related technologies as well as the changing relationships between the Soviet and Western Blocs also led to internal debates and changes in national military strategies beginning first in the West and later in and among the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev’s policies affected Soviet internal, political, economic, and military developments. Perhaps most important were his responses to the looming disastrous economic effects of Stalin’s legacy, the Sixth Five-Year Plan. To Khrushchev, Stalin’s military programs alone required massive misallocation of economic resources. Taken together with the overconcentration of resources for development of heavy industry and inattention to agricultural production, the economy must have looked to Khrushchev like a train heading for a wreck. He instituted a major reorganization of the bureaucracy to control the economy including huge new agricultural programs, and substituted a new Seven-Year Plan for the doomed Sixth Five-Year Plan.⁹

On 15 May 1955, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union signed the Vienna Agreement, which provided for the withdrawal of the Soviet and Western forces

from Austria. This show of confidence on the part of the Soviets was followed by Khrushchev’s August 1955 announcement of a reduction of 640,000 men from the Soviet armed forces. In May 1956 he called for another cutback of 1.2 million Soviet troops. In 1957, in a climax to maneuvering by military and political leadership for power, Khrushchev ousted Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov and reestablished party control of the military. He also began retiring senior Soviet military officers who disagreed with his policies. Khrushchev reorganized the Soviet military¹⁰ and promoted those officers who supported his pronouncements on the nature of a war with NATO. He advocated military capabilities with which he believed wars would be fought. These actions and his fixation on missiles and planning for nuclear war took center stage by 1961 when a debate took place among Soviet military officers that was reflected in special Top Secret Editions of *Military Thought*.¹¹

Khrushchev later announced additional unilateral troop reductions including one of 300,000 troops in January 1958 and another of 1.2 million in January 1960 in a speech to the Supreme Soviet. All of the proposed decreases were meant to serve several purposes: to shift funds into the production of missiles and long-range bombers; to lessen the burden of ground force requirements on heavy industry; to free labor for productive purposes in the civilian economy; and to bring international pressure on the United States to cut its forces. The aim of the reductions proposed in 1960 and in the years immediately following also may have been to compensate for the smaller numbers of militarily acceptable men available to the armed services, because of the low birth rate attendant to the tremendous losses suffered during World War II (WWII).

⁸ Khrushchev became First Secretary of the CPSU/CC in March 1953 and Premier in March 1958. ⁹ The editors have drawn from the documents listed in the Catalogue of Documents for each chapter for much of the material in the chapter essays. References in the essays to material drawn from documents listed in other chapters are noted in footnotes. ¹⁰ For more information on the reorganization of the Soviet Army, see the Catalogue of Documents, Document VII-91, Organizational Development of the Soviet Ground Forces, 1957-1975, 7-14. ¹¹ See FBIS Radio Propaganda Reports addressing the debates among the military leadership that appeared in the open press following the death of Stalin in 1953. The debates also were addressed in secret and top secret versions of the Soviet military journal, *Military Thought* that are addressed in Chapter III.



Organizing and Managing the Warsaw Pact

The Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956, famous for Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech, ushered in what would become an era of many changes in Soviet–East European relations. The congress set forth new guidance for communist governance, implicit and explicit, and dissolved the COMINFORM¹² to “facilitate cooperation with the socialist parties” of the noncommunist world. The resulting policy vacuum in Eastern Europe persisted though the fall of 1956 and probably was an important precipitant of the Hungarian uprising and the riots in Poland. Intentionally or not, Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalinism unsettled the communist governments of Eastern Europe, most of which were run by unreconstructed Stalinists. Their ousting from office was accompanied by unintended disorder and some violent outbreaks of worker discontent in Eastern Europe that the presence of Soviet garrisons could not avert. Subsequent actions would illustrate that Moscow's guidance for communist governance notwithstanding, the Warsaw Treaty was providing a new vehicle for establishing Soviet authority over intra-Bloc relations. Moscow defined this authority even to include “legitimizing” physical intervention, a vehicle that the Soviets would soon use.

By midsummer 1956, riots in Poland threatened the future integrity and success of the year-old Warsaw Pact. The Soviets mobilized and prepared forces in response, but the crisis was resolved short of Soviet military intervention. Instead, the Soviets employed those forces to suppress the far more serious situation developing in Hungary, after the Hungarians forcibly removed the remnants of the oppressive Stalinist regime and installed the mildly communist one of Imre Nagy. Nagy opted to lead Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact, treason in the eyes of the Soviets. After the garrison of Soviet forces in Hungary initially took a beating at the hands of the revolutionaries, the Soviets unleashed the forces mobilized to intervene in Poland. The bloody suppression that ensued reimposed Soviet control. In a declaration on 30 October 1956, Moscow hypocritically stated its readiness to respect the sovereignty of its Warsaw Pact allies even as the Soviets already were in the process of violating Hungary's.

Outweighing the promise of a common defense of the Bloc, the Soviet military threat to Poland and the aggression against Hungary represented the downside of the Warsaw Treaty—that it was a formal mechanism for Soviet control. The rocky start for the Warsaw Pact was followed by the growing estrangement of Albania and Romania, and problems with China. Yugoslavia had already bolted from the Soviet orbit in 1948. Nonetheless, the Soviets persevered, building the Warsaw

Treaty Organization into an ever-tightening device for controlling its satellite allies, and a source of additional military power.

In broad general terms, the Soviet General Staff created the Warsaw Pact military plans even though the Warsaw Treaty provided formal arrangements for the Soviets and their East European allies to share management of their combined military forces. Contrary to the Articles of the Warsaw Treaty, particularly Article 5, Soviet planning for the Warsaw Pact initially called for the forces of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries to remain under nominal national control, with the intention that the Soviets would closely direct all forces during a crisis or war. Nonetheless, throughout the life of the Warsaw Pact, the NSWP members, with varying degrees of success, resisted yielding control of their own forces to Soviet unilateral command. Only in the case of East German forces did the Soviets fully succeed.

During the 1950s CIA analysts assessed that the Warsaw Pact's forces were not integrated and jointly controlled and that only the Soviets really managed them. The IC in NIE 11-4-58, *Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963*, judged it unlikely that Soviet planners would count on East European forces to make an important contribution to Soviet military operations except perhaps for air defense. Soviet preparations for military contingencies associated with Moscow's projected aggressive moves against West Berlin in the summer of 1961 called for putting all NSWP forces into Soviet field armies, clearly a plan to subordinate the former to Soviet control.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, archival documents from former members further illustrated their unequal treatment during this period. In a 1956 classified critique of the statute of the Unified Command, Polish Gen. Jan Drzewiecki complained, “The document in its present form grants the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces certain rights and obligations, which contradict the idea of the independence and sovereignty of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty.”¹³ In a January 1957 *Memorandum on Reform of the Warsaw Pact*, General Drzewiecki further stated, “The authority of the Supreme Commander [a Soviet officer] on questions of leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with the national character of the armies of the corresponding states.”¹⁴ In the latter half of the 1970s Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a CIA clandestine source, provided information revealing the NSWP members finally signed and ratified the Statutes on 18 March 1978, except for the one on Unified Command for Wartime. That one was not signed and ratified until 1980.¹⁵ Clearly the Soviets had not achieved their aims at legal control for decades.

¹² COMINFORM was the acronym for the “Information Bureau of the Communist and Worker's Parties” that was founded in 1947. Its purpose was to coordinate the foreign policy activities of the East European communist parties under Soviet direction. ¹³ *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955-1991*, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, Central European University Press, Budapest, New York, p.84–86. ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 87–90. ¹⁵ See Chapter VII, page 35 for more details on the statutes. For the documents, see the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter 7, Section, “Formal Mechanisms to Manage the Warsaw Pact,” page 185.

Intelligence Sources and Analysis in the Early Years

The Western Allies shared military and policy information to a limited extent with the Soviet Union during WWII, but even that all but ceased when the war ended. By 1949, the Soviet Union and its allies were concealing much of their military activities and policy decisions from the outside world. The police state that Stalin established made recruiting human sources inside the USSR extremely difficult¹⁶ and prevented Western diplomats and military attachés from traveling widely there. Thus, the central problem for CIA analysts during this period of the Cold War in Europe was the lack of direct and convincing evidence other than that derived from SIGINT, defectors, and the media. Efforts to fill the gaps in collection with photography and other supporting information were of limited success.

In the early 1950s military analysts based their understanding of Soviet military organization, doctrine, capabilities, and tactics largely on evidence from World War II, SIGINT, information available from the Soviet press, military attaché reporting, defector and émigré debriefings, and the observations of US military missions in Austria and East Germany. Some German prisoners of the Soviet Union from the WWII period and some Spanish émigrés from the Spanish Civil War days who were returning to the West provided valuable military-industrial information. For example, the German prisoners, who had worked on Hitler's missile program and were forced to help the Soviet program, relayed useful data about Soviet missile programs. Most Soviet military émigrés or defectors, however, were generally low level and the military defectors could report only on their experiences in the military units where they served—typically located in Austria or East Germany.

During the period 1955–59, CIA had only two productive clandestine sources of Soviet military information. One was a special project, the Berlin Tunnel Operation, which yielded invaluable information, for example, about deployed military forces, Soviet political-military relationships, and the tactical-level organization and manning of Soviet forces in East Germany through most of 1955 until spring 1956.¹⁷ The other was Major (later promoted to Lt. Colonel) Pyotr Popov, the CIA's first high-quality clandestine Soviet military source.

Popov served in place and reported on Soviet military policy, doctrine, strategy, tactics and organization from 1953 until the late 1950s. Richard Helms testified that "Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov, until he fell under suspicion, single-handedly supplied the most valuable intelligence on Soviet military matters of any human

source available to the United States" during the period.¹⁸ He also said Popov's reporting had a "direct and significant influence on the military organization of the United States, its doctrine and tactics, and permitted the Pentagon to save at least 500 million dollars in its scientific research program."¹⁹ The information and documents he provided continued to inform the CIA analysis years after he was arrested.

Popov provided the IC with unique classified documentary and semi-documentary information otherwise unavailable after the late 1940s, including extant Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR and other manuals that provided new doctrine and strategies for the armed forces.²⁰ The subjects of his reports ranged from routine unit locations to nuclear warfare tactics, strategic air operations, and guided missiles. He supplied the IC with information on the organization and functions of the Soviet General Staff and technical specifications of Soviet Army conventional weapons, including the first information about new weapons such as the T-10 heavy tank and PT-76 amphibious light tank. Popov also provided documents on Khrushchev's reorganization of the Soviet military and a number of unique and highly valuable classified documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU/CC), including those concerning Soviet policy toward Berlin. The information Popov supplied was important for understanding the Soviet political and military establishments following the Stalinist years and at the startup of the Warsaw Pact. And it provided a basis for understanding how the political and military establishments of the satellite countries would operate with the Soviet Union. Because of the tight control over disseminated information from the Popov operation, analysts made no references in finished intelligence that might lead to his apprehension. However, much later, a former officer in the CIA's Directorate of Plans (DP), William Hood, in his 1982 book, *Mole*,²¹ extensively discussed Popov's contribution.

According to CIA records, Popov also supplied copies of the Soviet military publication, *Military Thought*.²² We know from the author of a CIA study, *Soviet Naval Strategy and the Effect on the Development of the Naval Forces 1953-1963*, that *Military Thought* articles from the 1953–59 period were available for his analysis. Analysts who participated in the 1963 CIA/DIA joint study, discussed in Chapter V,²³ also had Popov-supplied documents available to support their analysis. The above testimony shows that his efforts provided the IC with some of the best human-source information on developing Soviet military tactics and doctrine during the period.

¹⁶ For more information on the difficulties in recruiting Soviet human sources during the early years, see William Hood, *Mole, The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1982). ¹⁷ For more information on the Berlin Tunnel project see Catalogue of Documents, Document I-34 the official *Clandestine Services History, The Berlin Tunnel Operation 1952-1956, 24 June 1968*, for information on the intelligence derived from the Berlin Project, see Annex B, "Recapitulation of the Intelligence Derived". Also see Donald P. Steury, ed., *On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). ¹⁸ See Richard Helms, with William Hood, *A Look over My Shoulder A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003), 105. ¹⁹ Ibid. Helms p.132. ²⁰ See Catalogue of Documents, Document III-11, *Military Thought*, Issue No.1, 1964, "The New Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, for a discussion by Marshal Chuykov on the importance of the Field Service Regulation Manuals for putting into effect new doctrine and strategies for the armed forces. ²¹ Hood, *Mole*. ²² NARA has available fourteen Russian-language issues of *Military Thought* from the period 1953–58, when Popov was active. ²³ For references to documents provided by Popov that aided the Joint CIA/DIA study, See the Catalogue of Documents, Document V-13, p. 54, *A Study of the Soviet Ground Forces, An Interim Report of the CIA-DIA Panel for a Special Study of the Soviet Ground Forces for Secretary McNamara*, 21 August 1963.



REGULATION POST
 REGULATION SECTOR
 REGULATION AREA
 AND POSTS OF THE DISTRICT
 MOVEMENT CONTROL
 AND THE TROOP MOVEMENT
 ZONES OF THE POLISH
 FORCES
 MOVEMENT CONTROL AREAS
 THE POLISH ARMED FORCES
 LOCATION LINES BETWEEN
 DISTRICTS AND TROOP
 CONTROL ZONES



CHAPTER II

The Berlin Crisis—Col. Oleg Penkovskiy and Warsaw Pact Preparations for Associated Military Operations (1958–1961)

The second Berlin crisis was a continuation of the disagreement over the future of Germany and Berlin that caused the first crisis in 1948. The seeds of both were sown in discussions during WWII over who would eventually control Germany and Berlin. The Allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—agreed in 1944 on joint occupation and administration of the country and its capital. This arrangement was formalized in June 1945, after Germany had surrendered, and a fourth sector of occupation was established for France. The agreement provided the three Western powers with the right of access to Berlin, located deep within the Soviet-controlled part of Germany that later became the German Democratic Republic (GDR).²⁴ In an attempt to abrogate the agreement over the city, the Soviets walked out of the first Allied Control Council in 1948, declaring that the Western powers no longer had any rights to administer Berlin. By 23 June, the Soviets had completely blocked deliveries of food and other supplies over land to the three Western-controlled sectors of the city. Thus began the first Berlin crisis. The Western powers responded with a huge operation, known as the Berlin Airlift, flying in 4,000 tons of supplies a day to the city until the Soviets lifted the blockade in May 1949.

After the crisis subsided the Soviets continued to harass Allied military truck convoys to West Berlin from West Germany. In the meantime, the United States, France and the United Kingdom began establishing a nucleus for a future German government that eventually became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Khrushchev instigated a second crisis on 10 November 1958. At the Friendship Meeting of the Peoples of the Soviet Union and Poland, he delivered what was in effect an ultimatum calling

for a separate peace treaty with the GDR that would terminate the Western powers' right of access to West Berlin. After the speech, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated sharply, and a series of political and military confrontations over the status of Berlin followed. The crisis culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and with US and Soviet armored forces facing off directly against each other at Checkpoint Charlie on the border between East and West Berlin. As in the crisis of 1948, the Soviets sought to force the West to abandon control of the Western sectors of Berlin and to stop the flow of East German refugees. CIA analysis judged Khrushchev evidently also hoped that forcing the Western powers to recognize East Germany and leave Berlin would discredit the United States as the defender of the West and eventually cause NATO to dissolve.

The crisis proved to be an important milestone in the development of both NATO and Warsaw Pact military thinking and planning. The strategic importance of what seemed to be overwhelmingly strong Soviet conventional forces facing NATO in Europe became starkly evident to the new US administration of John F. Kennedy. The attempted US responses to the crisis revealed the lack of readiness of the Western forces and underscored the dangers to the West of US reliance on the massive retaliation doctrine for inter-Bloc confrontations short of general (total) war. The crisis was perhaps the greatest test of the solidarity and meaning of NATO since the Berlin Airlift.²⁵ It threatened to lead to direct conventional military hostilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact ground forces that could easily escalate to nuclear warfare.

²⁴ Op cit. *On the Front Lines*, Preface and Introduction, pp iii, v, 131-135. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II, Chapter IV, "The Berlin Crisis", pages 867–1284, for more detailed information on this period of post-WWII Four Power occupation and administration of Germany and the ensuing crisis. The early FRUS volumes are available through the Library website of the University of Wisconsin. ²⁵ For a brief summary of the discussions in August 1961 of how Western countries saw future developments of the Berlin situation and how they proposed to handle it, see *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* Vol. XIV, 372–73. The term, "Live Oak", which appears in the FRUS discussion, was the code name for Western Quadripartite Powers' planning for a military confrontation within the larger context of NATO war planning.



Intelligence Sources and Analysis

Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, a Soviet officer who became a clandestine source of CIA and the British MI-6, began reporting in April 1961 about Khrushchev's views of the Kennedy administration, and subsequently supplied invaluable insights into Khrushchev's plans and military capabilities for confronting the West over Berlin.

Khrushchev implicitly threatened to use the massive array of Soviet armored ground forces to prevent the West from protecting its interests in Berlin. He reinforced this threat through large-scale Warsaw Pact exercises conducted in October and November 1961. At the same time, Penkovskiy's reporting indicated the growing concern among the Soviet elite that Khrushchev's threats risked uncontrolled war. Indeed, Penkovskiy reported that the Soviet military hierarchy strongly believed that the Red Army was not ready for a war with NATO over Berlin.²⁶

During the summer and fall of 1961 CIA continued to disseminate reports based on information surreptitiously passed by Penkovskiy and elicited at clandestine meetings during his trips to England and France. The reports almost certainly bolstered the President's resolve to take strong military actions to counter any Soviet

attempts to force change in the status of Berlin. The reports also showed growing Soviet concern about US and NATO intentions toward Berlin. According to the clandestine information, Moscow ordered Soviet embassies in all capitalist countries to determine the degree of participation of each NATO country in decisions about Berlin.

Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source, little was written down about the precise communication of Penkovskiy's information to the President. Circumstantial evidence suggests Penkovskiy's reporting was an important unrecorded motivation in US policy councils. It was certainly prescient regarding Soviet reaction to the US decisions. CIA does have evidence that DCI Allen Dulles briefed the President on 14 July 1961 and that Penkovskiy's reporting was read by the President as he prepared his 25 July speech to the American people. CIA also has evidence that Penkovskiy's reporting was sent to the White House for a morning briefing on 22 August and that his reporting was pouched to the President in Newport, RI, in September 1961.

Penkovskiy's suggestions for appropriate reactions to Soviet moves basically paralleled what actually happened. They were the basis for a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) on 20 September 1961 that was passed to US decision makers as part of the planning process for US and Allied responses to Khrushchev's demands. Penkovskiy's reporting in September was the subject of another SNIE, 11-10/1-61, dated 5 October 1961. Whatever the actual effects of US and other western actions, in the end, Khrushchev did not order the access to West Berlin closed and the more serious military scenarios did not play out.

The whole episode gradually receded until Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964. In the meantime, his actions served to focus Western attention on the conventional military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. In the USSR, the military began to raise questions about a doctrine dependent on massive nuclear-missile strikes. In a sense, the Soviets were a few years behind changes underway in the United States that were foreshadowed by General Maxwell Taylor's influential 1959 book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*.²⁷

The seriousness of the confrontations notwithstanding, the Soviet military preparations and movements associated with the crisis provided Western intelligence valuable information about the organization and strength of the Warsaw Pact ground forces—Penkovskiy's reporting provided further understanding of the potential foe.

US Announced Responses to Khrushchev's Moves in Berlin

To demonstrate US intentions not to abandon Berlin, President Kennedy announced by radio and television on 25 July 1961 that his administration was beginning a program to enlarge the US Army and mobilize Reserve and National Guard forces to strengthen US forces in Europe and to send additional forces to West Berlin.

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, followed up the President's 25 September 1961 speech to the UN General Assembly by telling the US Business Council on 21 October 1961 that the United States not only would significantly improve its forces protecting Europe but would further augment them should the USSR pursue an aggressive course in Berlin.

²⁶ See the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter II, Document II-13 for the Penkovskiy report exposing Khrushchev's threats to use ICBMs as unfounded. ²⁷ General Maxwell D. Taylor U.S.A. (Ret.), *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper Brothers, Publishers, 1959).

CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

Top : 1944: First Ukrainian Front; from right to left, Penkovskiy; Lieutenant General Varentsov; Pozovnyy, Adjutant to Varentsov; and an orderly.
Bottom: Graduating class of the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Engineering Academy; Penkovskiy is the third from right in the front row.



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