51Ibid., 1:53.
52Ibid., 1:74. Cf. Philo, Her. 205, in which the Logos is identified as this very angel.
53Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, 152. This vitiates somewhat Hurtado's point that
the different functions, "creation, redemption, revelation," are assigned to different quasi-
divine figures in "Judaism," while all are assigned to one in "Christianity," thus marking a significant difference (Hurtado, One God, 21). Of course, one could argue that the Memra
is a post-Christian development, not an impossible suggestion, and one that would make the
point of continued Jewish/Christian closeness all the more eloquently. While in general I
find Hurtado's argument bracing and important, his exclusive reliance on only one criterion,
worship, as determining the divine nature of a given intermediary seems to me overly nar-
row and rigid. There may be no gainsaying his demonstration, I think, that worship of the
incarnate Logos, is a novum, a "mutation" as he styles it, introduced by Jesus-people, but the belief in an intermediary, a deuteros theos, was common to them and other Jews. To Hurtado's one-dimensional notion of what constitutes a divine being, contrast Daniel Abrams:
"When is an attribute a literary means of describing divine activity, and when is it personi-
fied as a hypostatic element, receiving an identity of its own, while nevertheless partaking
in the divine ontology? The latter appears to be the case when the physical manifestation of
God is not excluded from the divine being" ("The Boundaries of Divine Ontology: The
Inclusion and Exclusion of Metatron in the Godhead," HTR 87 [1994] 292). On this crite-
rion, as I have indicated, many non-Christian Jews did indeed believe in second divinities