anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed,
it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of
goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were
to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very
inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did
indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that
to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. This
constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty
beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl.
Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore
over-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)
CHAPTER. VIII.
OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the
political power of another, without his own consent. The only way
whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite
into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a
greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men
may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as
they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men
have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby
presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority
have a right to act and conclude the rest.
Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one
body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being
only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to
that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should
move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent
of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one
body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united
into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that
consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in
assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by
that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes
for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the
law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body
politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every
one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and
to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with
others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no
compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in
before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any
compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees
of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent
to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his
compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit
himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be
received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing
but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of
the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if
we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which
in a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will
necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add
the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably
happen in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such
terms would be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out
again. Such a constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a
shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast
the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think,
that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to
be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there
they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately
dissolved again.
Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a
community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the
ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the
community, unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the
majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one
political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be,
between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And
thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society,
is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a
majority to unite and incorporate into such a society.
And this is that,
and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful
government in the world.
Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no
instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and
equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and
set up a government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all
men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not
at liberty to begin a new one.
Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all
to be wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men,
that lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that
condition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any
number of them together, but they presently united and incorporated, if
they designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose men ever
to have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in
such a state, we may as well suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes
were never children, because we hear little of them, till they were men,
and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records,
and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of
civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their
safety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history
of their founders, and search into their original, when they have
outlived the memory of it: for it is with commonwealths as with
particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and
infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are
beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it.
And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed,
and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain
instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have
manifest footsteps of it.
Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of
fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that
shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it
agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning
of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and
independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural
superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken,
he tells us, that in many parts of America there was no government at
all.
There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men,
speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor
commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the
Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no
certain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose
their captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25.
If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or
the head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father
took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he
thought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, these men,
it is evident, were actually free; and whatever superiority some
politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves claimed it
not, but by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set
rulers over themselves. So that their politic societies all began from a
voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the
choice of their governors, and forms of government.
Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus,
mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen
independent one of another, and to have set up a government over
themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples,
out of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being
met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of
such instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor
could not be so begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were
better let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty: for if they
can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon
paternal right, I think (though at best an argument from what has been,
to what should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any
great danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the
case, they would do well not to search too much into the original of
governments, as they have begun de facto, lest they should find, at the
foundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the
design they promote, and such a power as they contend for.
Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are
naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the
governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning
laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people;
there can be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what
has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first erecting
of governments.
Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will
direct us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally
find them under the government and administration of one man. And I am
also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist
by itself, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as
it often happens, where there is much land, and few people, the
government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the
law of nature, the same power with every man else to punish, as he
thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punish his
transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their
pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all
join with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby
power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in
effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that remained in
conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted; paternal
affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the
custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to
him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule
them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live
together; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common
father; unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body
made him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his
next heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities,
less fit for rule; or where several families met, and consented to
continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their
natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest, and most
likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the people
of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and
spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico)
enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they
commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him
any way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest
and bravest man for their ruler.
Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any
account of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly
find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I
affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the
consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who,
when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government
they thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and
think, that by nature government was monarchical, and belonged to the
father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in the
beginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the
father's pre-eminency might, in the first institution of some
commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in
one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of
government in a single person, was not any regard, or respect to
paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all
monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon
occasion, elective.
Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father's
government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed
them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised
with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was
sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness
they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch
upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their
infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they
had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy being
simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed
in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had
taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the
inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt
to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that
they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of
restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the
authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by
placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt
the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age,
nor their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter
for covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or
provide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves
into such a frame of government, as was not only, as I said, most
obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present state and
condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions
and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple
poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of
each man's small property, made few controversies, and so no need of
many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the
process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but
few trespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one
another so well as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have
some acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in
another; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, than
of one another: and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be
supposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. It was
natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which
might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to
conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and
in this chiefly be their ruler.
Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which
is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the
inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money
gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest
for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their
armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home and in
time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very
moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily
either in the people, or in a council. Tho' the war itself, which admits
not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the
king's sole authority.
Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their
judges, and first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and
leaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out
and in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home
again in the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of
lephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear
send to lephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and
article with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites, to make
him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made him
head and captain over them, Judg. xi, ii. which was, as it seems, all
one as to be judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7.
that is, was
their captain-general six years. So when lotham upbraids the Shechemites
with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and
ruler, he tells them, He fought for you, and adventured his life far,
and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix.
17. Nothing
mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is
found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech
particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general.
And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's sons, the children
of Israel desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go
out before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God
granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou
shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he may save
my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16.
As if the only
business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their
defence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon
him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over
his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul's being
solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling
to have him their king, made no other objection but this, How shall this
man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be
our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to
defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it
is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath
sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to
be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority
were nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who
had stuck to Saul's family, and opposed David's reign, when they came to
Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other
arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in
effect their king in Saul's time, and therefore they had no reason but
to receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when
Saul was king over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in
Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel,
and thou shalt be a captain over Israel.
Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a
commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the
elder son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted
to it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every
one acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a
right of succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the
descendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business
brought together, uniting into society, the need of a general, whose
conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the great
confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age,
(such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to
last in the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners of
commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any
other express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing,
and the end of government required: which ever of those it was that at
first put the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no
body was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to
those ends, in the infancies of commonwealths, those who had it commonly
used it. And unless they had done so, young societies could not have
subsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public
weal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities
of their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished
together.
Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor
sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a
mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently
better governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then
no stretching prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor
consequently on the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or
restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers
and people about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury
in future ages* would retain and increase the power, without doing the
business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes
to have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it
necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights