I think so.
Impossible.
And would you say that the whole sail includes Or suppose one of us to have a portion of small-each man, or a part of it only, and different parts ness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore different men?
the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely small The latter.
be greater, that to which the part of the small is Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be added will be smaller and not greater than before.
divisible, and things which participate in them How absurd!
will have a part of them only and not the whole Then in what way, Socrates, will all things par-idea existing in each of them?
ticipate in the ideas, if they are unable to partici-That seems to follow.
pate in them either as parts or wholes?
Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the Indeed, he said, you have asked a question one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?
which is not easily answered.
Certainly not, he said.
Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, another question?
and that of the many great things, each one is What question?
great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than I imagine that the way in which you are led to absolute greatness—is that conceivable?
assume one idea of each kind is as follows:—You No.
see a number of great objects, and when you look Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small at them there seems to you to be one and the portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal same idea (or nature) in them all; hence you to some other thing by virtue of that portion only?
conceive of greatness as one.