Two Treatises of Government by John Locke. - HTML preview

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Book II

CHAPTER. I.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF

CIVIL

GOVERNMENT

Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,

(<i>1</i>). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by

positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or

dominion over the world, as is pretended: (<i>2</i>). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:

(<i>3</i>). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive

law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may

arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could

not have been certainly determined: (<i>4</i>). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which

is the eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly

lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there

remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest

house, and to have the right of inheritance: All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is

impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or

derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be

the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal

jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that

all government in the world is the product only of force and violence,

and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where

the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder

and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers

of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out

another rise of government, another original of political power, and

another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what

Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what

I take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a

subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a

MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his

slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the

same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may

help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a

family, and a captain of a galley.

Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with

penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the

regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the

community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the

commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public

good.

CHAPTER. II.

OF THE STATE OF NATURE.

Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its

original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and

that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose

of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds

of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will

of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is

reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more

evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously

born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same

faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without

subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all

should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another,

and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted

right to dominion and sovereignty.

Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon

as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the

foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he

builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the

great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,

/#

The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no

less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those

things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I

cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands,

as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have

any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to

satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being

of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them

repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as

much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there

being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to

me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to

be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be,

imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the

like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves

and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons

natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is

ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.

#/

Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of

licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to

dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy

himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some

nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature

has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,

which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that

being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his

life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship

of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one

sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his

business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to

last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with

like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be

supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to

destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the

inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to

preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like

reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as

much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it

be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what

tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or

goods of another.

Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights,

and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed,

which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution

of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands,

whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to

such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would,

as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there

were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that

law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if

any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has

done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where

naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another,

what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a

right to do.

Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over

another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when

he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or

boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so

far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his

transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and

restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully

do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing

the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule

than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set

to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes

dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and

violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass

against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for

by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to

preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,

destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one,

who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it,

and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like

mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY

MAN HATH A RIGHT

TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF

NATURE.

Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some

men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what

right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any

crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue

of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the

legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they

did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which

they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power

over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England,

France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men

without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath

not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case

to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an

alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no

more power than what every man naturally may have over another.

Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and

varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes

degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature,

and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some

person or other, and some other man receives damage by his

transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has,

besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a

particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any

other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured,

and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make

satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.

Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime

for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing

is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to

the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being

magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can

often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit

the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot

remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has

received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in

his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this

power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender,

by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the

crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of

preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order

to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has

a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like

injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the

punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from

the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule

and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and

slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind,

and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild

savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon

this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood,

by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that

every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder

of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me;

so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the

lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I

answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so

much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the

offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the

like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may

in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it

may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present

purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its

measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that

too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of

that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer;

as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and

intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests

put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of

countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law

of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature

every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but

it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in

their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and

their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and

revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing

but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath

certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence

of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for

the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be

great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be

imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will

scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those

who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but

men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which

necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the

state of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what

kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state

of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be

judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he

pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul

those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led

by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to?

much better it is

in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the

unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own,

or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever

were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as

an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent

governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain

the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that

state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether

they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact

that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one

of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one

body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with

another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and

bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island,

mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a

Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them,

though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one

another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not

as members of society.

Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of

nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker,

Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,

/#

The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e.

the laws of

nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they

have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement

amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we

are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent

store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire,

a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those

defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and

solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and

fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting

themselves at first in politic societies.

#/

But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and

remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of

some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse,

to make it very clear.

CHAPTER. III.

OF THE STATE OF WAR.

Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and

therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a

sedate settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of

war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has

exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any

one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it

being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which

threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature,

man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be

preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may

destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his

being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because

such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no

other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as

beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure

to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.

Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into

his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with

him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his

life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his

power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me

there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can

desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by

force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a

slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my

preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my

preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it;

so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into

a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away

the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be

supposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that freedom

being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of

society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society

or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every

thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.

Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in

the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther

than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away

his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he

has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it

will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my

liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing

else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put

himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that

hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war,

and is aggressor in it.

Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of

nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are

as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and

preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual

destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to

reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge

between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared

design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common

superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it

is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against

an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief,

whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that

I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or

coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it

cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost,

is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of

war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not

time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for

remedy in a case where the m